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ABSTRACT
SKILL WAS NEVER ENOUGH: AMERICAN BOSCH, LOCAL 206
AND THE DECLINE OF METALWORKING IN
SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS
1900 - 1970
SEPTEMBER 1994
ROBERT F. FORRANT
B.A., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
M.A., NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Bruce Laurie
From the early nineteenth century through World War II Springfield,
Massachusetts was one of the world's preeminent metalworking centers.
On the eve of the Second World War hundreds of firms and thousands of
skilled machinists produced machine tools, fixtures, castings, forgings, and
precision components for the nation's automobile, electrical appliance,
steel, and aircraft industries. However, by the mid-1950s Springfield
industry commenced an inexorable decline, interrupted briefly by
Vietnam War defense spending. Firms were purchased by outside
investors and work moved, while foreign firms gained market share from
local companies.
Springfield's fall from manufacturing prominence mirrors events
elsewhere in the industrial Northeast and is important to understand. The
decline is examined mainly through a history of the American Bosch
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Company, its workers, and their union. Established in 1911, unionized in
1936, Bosch specialized in the design and manufacture of precision diesel
fuel injections components. During World War II it employed thousands
of skilled machinists. After the war it was purchased by Wall Street
investors and in the early 1950s became part of a small corporation
headquartered in New York City. By the early 1960s it had become the
most profitable firm in the diesel products division of a Fortune 500
corporation. By the time it closed in 1986 Bosch was an aging plant with a
few hundred workers owned by a Fortune 100 corporation.
From 1950 forward management attempted to implement numerous
strategies to reduce costs and maintain market share, including the
construction of a low-wage plant in Mississippi, the acquisition of overseas
factories, and in-plant schemes to streamline production. The union
resisted in-plant restructuring efforts, but offered token opposition to the
company's world-wide maneuvers. Throughout, unionists believed their
machining skills coupled with their knowledge of the products being
produced were assets the company needed to succeed. The company never
shared this perspective, and unresolved, this disjuncture contributed to
the closing of the plant. It is argued here that management's efforts failed
because workers were treated as appendages of their machines.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"You Don't Believe She is Going to Dip"
The shout "Make Them Stay or Make Them Pay" reverberated off
the walls of the Local 206 meeting hall on February 4, 1986. Just a few
hours earlier union members learned that United Technologies
Corporation, owner of the 76-year-old Springfield American Bosch plant
would shut it down by the end of July. The announcement was the
culmination of a series of permanent layoffs made by United Technologies
Corporation (UTC) since it acquired the facility in 1978. The production
workforce was already slashed to 800 from the 1,130 in 1979 as product
lines and machine tools were shifted to a new UTC facility in the South
and factories abroad.
Management had presented union negotiators with a closing
scenario in 1981: ratify the new incentive payment system we want and
$10 million to $20 million will be invested in the plant or no further
investment will be made in the facility. Outright closing was not
threatened, but the implications were obvious. The company's proposals
for the retiming of all jobs under a new measured time system was
accepted by the narrowest of margins in a membership vote. At the time
many workers believed that the system provided the company with a way
to study jobs before moving them elsewhere.
Union officials had warned repeatedly since the 1981 vote that the
plant was going to be added to the region's lengthy list of shuttered
manufacturers, but few paid attention. Elected officials, state and national
labor leaders and most workers in the shop had chosen to believe UTC
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assurances that the plant would never close. Now, everyone was upset
and angry as they crowded into the tiny hall several hundred yards from
the factory's main gate, eager to decide on a course of action. 1
Bosch had been the only place many of the unionists had worked.
The union sponsored several athletic teams and hosted family outings to
area amusements parks. Since the 1930s the union-company Athletic
Association ran clambakes, supported youth and adult sports teams,
mainly in baseball and basketball, and sponsored outings to professional
baseball, basketball and hockey games. It was not unusual for workers to
arrive at the plant an hour before their shift to drink coffee, discuss the
news of the day, and just be with friends. The closing would create a
gapping hole in the center of their lives.
Donald Staples worked in the sprawling facility for 36 years. He was
always active in the union, and able to send his two sons to college on the
steady wages he received as a chucking machine operator. He had
intended to work in the plant over the summer of 1948, then return to the
University of New Hampshire on the G.I. Bill. But the money was good
and the big city of Springfield beckoned to a country boy from New
Hampshire. Reflecting back he said: "It's sad. I didn't realize how much it
meant to me till I think about not having it. I can close my eyes and walk
through the building. It's like they tell you your mother's sick, but you
don't believe she's really going to die." Staples said he would have been
proud if his two sons had followed him into the trade. Now he was happy
they did not. 2
1 In June, 1985 a union press release stated in part: " The whole industrial base from
Greenfield to Springfield is being eroded. There may be jobs available, but they're not good
paying jobs." Holyoke Transcript-Telegram, June 26, 1985; Local 206 news release, July,
1985; Springfield Daily News (SDN) July 16, 1985.
2 Interview, July, 1993; Springfield Union, February 7, 1986.
Overview of Bosch Plant History
The Bosch had thrived in Springfield from the day its doors opened
in 1911 under German ownership and management. Even the national
economic contraction during the 1930s did not affect the Bosch, as sales
and employment increased through the 1930s and grew rapidly during
World War II. This 15 year period of growth could not withstand the
sharp decline in defense orders at the end of World War II. From this
point on wild swings in employment, largely a consequence of erratic
demand generated by the company's automotive, agricultural equipment,
aerospace, and defense customers, coupled with management's inability to
figure out how to maintain consistent production levels to avoid boom
and bust cycles, characterized the plant's history until it closed in the late
1980s. For example, blue collar jobs dropped to 1,200 in late 1948 from
2,600 in the Fall of 1946, jumped to over 2,600 at the height of the Korean
War, and down below 1,200 again in 1958. This made training difficult
and expensive and provided little continuity in the workforce when plant
managers attempted to introduce new manufacturing and quality control
procedures in the late 1950 and early 1960s. Workers and union leaders
realized that job security was tenuous at best.
Adding to job insecurity, a series of mergers and acquisitions
beginning in the late 1940s resulted in the Springfield facility becoming
part of the ARMA Corporation, headquartered in New York City. ARMA
would soon operate factories across the U.S. and in Europe. In 1953 an
assembly plant was built in Columbus, Mississippi and several high
volume automotive product lines were transferred there. Beginning in
the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s manufacturing facilities were
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purchased in the United States, England, Italy, and the Netherlands, and
production licensing agreements were negotiated with plants in South
America to build fuel injection components and assemblies originally
manufactured in Springfield. The corporation's name became AMBAC
Industries, Springfield was one of six company divisions.
For a time the corporation developed new products for markets in
the burgeoning defense electronics sector. Several million dollars was
spent on machine tools, a state-of-the-art computer systems to keep track
of in-plant inventory, and the construction of engineering and assembly
plants. This is not, then, simply the story of corporate disinvestment in an
aging factory, and for this reason the Bosch story is important.
Management articulated and employed a range of strategies to
increase profitability, including southern low-wage expansion, joint
production ventures in Europe and South America, plant acquisitions in
the U.S., and an in-plant modernization and cost control program in
Springfield. Almost immediately after World War II management
determined that ways had to be found to work more cheaply. As early as
1953 management warned workers of the impact of cheaper foreign labor
on the firm. Union leaders could not help but notice the corporation's
aggressive efforts to build a plant in Mississippi and establish several joint
production ventures in Europe and South America. At the same time a
$12 million investment was made in Springfield to improve production.
Despite the investment, employment levels dropped, falling under 750 by
late 1959, from over 4,000 at the end of World War II. For brief periods
the Korean and Vietnam wars stimulated both sales and job
growth, but peak employment levels never exceeded the post World War
U high point established in the l ;all of l c>53.
The story of the workers, the plant, and the city provides an
important chapter in understanding the post-Word War 11 economy. The
workers were highly skilled; the plant produced components tor the
agricultural, automotive and defense sectors; and the city had been part ol
a prosperous manufacturing region, stretching, up and down the
Connecticut River Valley between Hartford, C onnecticut and White River
function, Vermont that had designed and built machine tools and
components for every other manufacturing sector in the country and
around the globe. Yet this rich legacy was not enough to stem the tide ot
regional closings, nor could it arrest the decline of the American Bosch.
Could managers and workers have prevented the collapse ol the
valley's industrial base' Were interests so mutually exclusive that
rational dialogue was impossible? Were workers and their unions
sufficiently interested in production-related issues to offer solutions to the
problems i^ccd by industry? Were managers amenable to utilizing worker
input in constructive ways to improve the [Want? Were lines so rigidly
drawn, was management so adamant regarding their right to control the
shop floor, that workers and their union turned from trying to make the
factory run smoothly, in favor ot preserving a semblance ol job security as
long as possible? Managers manage and workers work was the paradigm.
And like Donald Staples, one could not find a Bosch worker desirous ot
having a son or daughter follow them into that paradigm well beiore the
factory gates were locked lor good.
5
Chapter Structure
Chapter 2 describes the evolution of the metalworking industry in
greater-Springfield. Early growth, sparked in large measure by the citing of
a federal armory in the city, propelled the city into a preeminent position
as home to large numbers of highly skilled machinists and many
innovative companies by the end of World War I. While many cities in
Massachusetts suffered through skyrocketing unemployment and business
failures during the Depression, Springfield metalworking firms
confronted a shortage of skilled machinists and responded by starting
innovative training programs. Employment levels soared during World
War II as industry received millions of dollars of war contracts and local
machine tool builders worked around the clock to supply U.S. companies
with new equipment. However, the end of the war marked the end of
industry growth. Employment levels fluctuated dramatically. Korean and
Viet Nam war production stimulated local industry while masking
fundamental problems companies faced, including aging factories and
equipment, outside ownership of once locally-controlled firms, and
increased competition from abroad.
Chapters 3 and 4 review the history of American Bosch. Starting in
1911 Bosch employed thousands of skilled machinists and assemblers
who produced precision products for the country's automobile, farm
equipment, aircraft, and electrical industries before it closed its doors in
1986. At the end of World War II the Springfield plant was purchased by a
Long Island, New York holding company and eventually became part of a
world-wide corporation headquartered in New York City. Springfield
production shifted in the mid-1950s to a new factory in Mississippi.
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By the early 1960s more work was relocated to plants in England, Holland,
and Italy. During these years the corporation spent several million dollars
improving the Springfield plant, but as chapters 3 and 4 show, the
investments did not result in stable employment or new work to replace
product lines shipped elsewhere.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 describe the history of workers in the plant from
start-up through 1960. Chapter 5 is concerned mainly with union
organization, with particular attention to the important role of skilled
workers. Chapter 6 discusses the acrimonious internal struggle for union
control waged after World War II between the United Electrical and the
up-start International Union of Electrical Workers. Here, as in chapter 5,
close attention is paid to the positions skilled workers took during this
decisive episode in the local's history. The chapter also reviews the
union's reaction to the company decision to build a new factory in
Mississippi and shift Springfield production to it. Chapter 7 reviews the
union's use of the grievance procedure and contract language on job
classifications to determine how workers responded to the company's in-
plant modernization program. The chapter continues the discussion
started in chapter 4 regarding union attempts to play an active and
constructive role in shop-floor improvement efforts. Through the 1950s
and early 1960s the local presented a thoughtful critique of management
efforts to improve productivity. However, management steadfastly
refused to discuss any union-initiated suggestions. The chapter concludes
with an analysis of the union's 1958 illegal eight day walk-out in support
of the plant's engineering union.
Chapter 8 unites the protagonists and continues their history
through the 1960s and early 1970s, paying particular attention to the issues
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surrounding lengthy strikes in 1968 and 1971. The concluding chapter
analyzes why the Bosch closed and discusses the decline of metalworking
in the region. How could Springfield, once a world-wide metal working
center with thousands of well-paying skilled jobs, lose that nucleus of
plants and jobs so rapidly.
Conclusion: Take as a Starting Point
Work and the Tob
It is the contention here that the rich tradition of worker skills and
pride in workmanship present in Springfield was instrumental in the
city's rise to metalworking preeminence. From the Springfield Armory,
through the early construction of automobiles, to the significant
developments in machine tool design and construction that occurred, skill
was at the root. In addition, the rapid diffusion of what was being learned
meant that the entire region made quantitative and qualitative leaps in its
production capabilities. As the reputation of the region grew it became a
magnet for skilled workers, and those entrepreneurs looking for the
proper blend of hands-on expertise and engineering ability required to
make their enterprises successful.
On the eve of the Second World War there was still room for
highly skilled tool and die makers, gage makers, and mold designers to
contribute their expertise to making a firm run well. Through the war
workers participated on production committees and were largely
responsible for the dramatically increased output from local factories. But
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at war's end, after seeing their shops unionized and being forced through
vigorous worker organization to bargain collectively with their
employees, managers sought to reassert control in the plants.
Eventually skilled workers and their unions began to withdrew
their intimate production knowledge from management, and simply did
the basic job required of them. No amount of technology could substitute
for the skill and product knowledge lost, to the long-term detriment of
U.S. industry. The Bosch record is clear: Through the 1950s and into the
1960s the union fought as vigorously to be included in plant
improvement efforts as they did to defend their members from illegal
terminations and the denial of seniority rights.
In the face of the tremendous changes under way in the global
economy, it is quite unlikely that a single plant, union-initiated
production strategy could have succeeded in keeping the firm open. But
the history is, nevertheless, a healthy antidote to two simplistic
characterizations that persist in the literature: the first, that American
industry lost its way because of unions; and the second that unions lost
their way after about 1948 and were interested in wage and benefit gains to
the exclusions of all else.
Finally, I concur with ideas expressed by historian David Brody in a
1978 speech to the Organization of American Historians, and hope this
study does his thoughts some justice. Brody reviewed American labor
historiography searching for a synthesis that could bring together the best
in economic, cultural, ethnic, and institutional scholarship. He argued
that the model E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working
Class provided for England was inappropriate for the United States. If not
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through a common culture, Brody questioned, where is the alternative
approach that provides some common ground applying to all American
workers, establishes historical continuity, and captures the dynamic forces
shaping the experience of workers. For Brody "These requirements can
probably best be met by an economic approach, taking as its starting point
not culture but work, and the job, and broadening out from there. "3
Skills played an important part in the history of the plant, union,
and region. Workers attitudes toward their jobs, especially fair treatment
at work, their continual attempts to make the shop floor more efficient
and quality conscious, and their deep-seated desire to be heard and
respected on the shop floor are themes that run through what follows.
In June, 1940 the Congress of industrial Organizations issued a labor
policy for national defense. Its cornerstone was the statement that "Our
industrial unions constitute a great reservoir of productive, technical and
administrative skill and resourcefulness. The brains of labor should be
utilized to serve the nation... ." Also in 1940, the United Auto Workers'
Walter Reuther, a skilled tool and die maker himself, assembled a team of
design engineers and tool- and die-makers who had spent years working
in automobile plants to craft a detailed plan for converting underutilized
auto plants to aircraft production. In 1941 Julius Emspak, Secretary-
Treasurer of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, put
forward a program for the establishment of production councils in every
UE-organized factory. Councils were to focus on improving methods of
work, improving shop- floor planning, better utilization of machinery,
3 David Brody, "Labor History in the 1970s: Toward a History of the American Worker,"
in Michael Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the
United States (Ithaca, 1980) p. 268. The essay was first delivered as a paper before the
Organization of American Historians meeting in 1978. E. P. Thompson, The Making of the
English Working Class (New York, 1968).
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and training and re-training. "The whole idea of such councils," Emspak
wrote, "is that workers do have a considerable knowledge of ways to
increase production in their own plant, and that if a machinery is
established whereby the workers can combine their knowledge with that
of management, increased production will result." Reuther's plans were
never implemented, while the councils Emspak described were set up in
hundreds of war-time factories, were instrumental in maintaining high
output through World War II, and most quickly dismantled by
management by the early 1950s.
In 1968 Local 206 challenged management to do a better job running
the plant and provided an analysis of the five major issues causing
problems on the factory floor. The five were: the consistent failure to
repair defective equipment resulting in excessive lost production time and
failures to meet shipping schedules to customers; a lack of proper tooling
available when needed to complete set-ups; incomplete information on
job process sheets and work orders leading to inventory and scheduling
difficulties; the generally dirty conditions in the plant; and poor work flow
and production bottlenecks, resulting in a lack of work for some
departments and excessive overtime for others. In making this statement
to management they were following a rich tradition exemplified by
Reuther and Emspak's statements. In management's failure to even
consider the union's thoughts lies at least part of an explanation for the
failure of U.S. industry over the last 25 years.4
4 American Council on Public Affairs, The CIO and National Defense (Washington, D.C.,
1940) p. 5; George Clark, "The Strange Story of the Reuther Plan," Harpers Magazine, 184
(1941) p. 645 - 654; Julius Emspak, "Labor -Management War Production Councils," Science
and Society, 7 (1943) p. 91; Local 206 Labor Bulletin, February, 1968, p. 3.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SPRINGFIELD ECONOMY
Introduction
Springfield's nineteenth and early twentieth century prosperity was
predicated upon a well established, diversified manufacturing base rooted
in a set of industries that required a core of highly skilled workers. This
chapter will examine the city's economic development and pay particular
attention to its metalworking industry. A review of the 19th century will
be followed by sections on the development of several firms, including
the Springfield Armory. The Armory is included because machine tool
innovations and worker skill and union issues influenced events in other
firms in the region. Springfield's industrial development and workforce
structures will be compared to those of Holyoke, Lowell and Worcester,
Massachusetts. Finally, the federal government conducted two detailed
studies of the New England economy, one in 1929, the other in 1951, that
will be discussed. Each posited that a critical aspect of economic
development was the region's vibrant metalworking industry.
Early History
Springfield secured its manufacturing history during the Civil War
primarily because it was the sight of the Springfield Armory. Congress'
decision in 1776 to locate a weapons production armory in Springfield
meant slow, steady growth. At the conclusion of the Revolutionary War
the government intended to move the armory across the Connecticut
12
River to West Springfield, where a facility was to be built to harness the
power of the Agawam River. But West Springfield farmers protested,
Springfield got the Armory and its economic stimulus. 1
The investment helped the Connecticut River Valley gain a
reputation for precision metalworking and machine tool building, and
fueled industrial expansion in the city. By the 1830s Springfield had 73
machine shops, six cotton factories, three paper mills, four printing
concerns, two tool factories, one saw factory, and several saw and grist
mills. Development was coupled with population growth, especially a
large pool of skilled labor. The city grew to 18,000 in 1850 from 1,500 in
1790. In the early 1840s rail line connections to Boston, Worcester,
Hartford, and Albany sparked further growth. 2
The Armory's engineers and skilled craftsmen worked diligently to
design machine tools and develop the production techniques necessary to
manufacture rifles that defied existing standards. This innovative,
problem - solving approach sunk deep roots in the fertile Connecticut
River Valley. Challenged to produce weapons faster and cheaper during
the Civil War, the Armory improved plant efficiencies. In addition,
rigorous standards were developed for small, area subcontractors
including the use of precision gauges and fixtures. Output jumped an
incredible 400 percent in the war's first year, while the cost of producing a
rifle fell to $12 from $20. Throughout the 19th century local firm owners
1 Michael Frisch, Town into City. Springfield, Massachusetts and the Meaning of
Community, 1840 - 1880 (Cambridge, 1972) p. L6.
2 Frisch, p. 15. The city grew 400 percent between 1820 and 1850, third highest in the state
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studied these designs, manufacturing techniques and methods of
organization, helping improve their plant efficiencies immensely.3
Civil War-induced demand fostered relationships between the
Armory and other regional firms. Historian Michael Frisch quotes an 1861
letter from Springfield mayor Daniel Harris to Armory Director Ripley,
which amplifies this point. The James T. Ames Company, one of the
biggest suppliers of large cannon to the government during the war, made
production machinery for the Armory as well. Mayor Harris learned that
the firm was scheduled to make several large cannon for the Armory, and
asked Ripley if he "might like to have carriages manufactured here to go
with them." He then asked "whether Wason's car shop here is not just
the place to get that work well and expeditiously done." Ripley concurred,
and the carriages were built locally. Inter-firm collaboration strengthened
the regional economy, boosted the city job base, and established the river
valley as a national manufacturing center. This would not be the last time
that war-related boosts to the regional economy launched rapid industrial
growth.4
From the 1830s forward Springfield enjoyed a comparative
technological advantage based on Armory manufacturing practices and
their diffusion to area firms. Historian David Hounshell cites the work of
Nathan Rosenberg who closely analyzed how production techniques
perfected at federal armories and small arms manufacturing plants
diffused to several other industries. Rosenberg established that the
3 Frisch, p. 74; Derwent Whittlesey, The Springfield Armory (1920) p. 265. For an in-
depth look at the Armory and how its production methods and shop floor organization
influenced manufacturing see Michael Best, The New Competition (Cambridge, 1990).
4 Quoted in Frisch, p. 79. As succeeding chapters will show, production and jobs increased
dramatically during both world wars and the Korean and Viet Nam wars.
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transmitters of ideas and innovation were the makers of machine tools,
who worked with manufacturers in various industries as they
encountered and overcame production problems. He called this
technological convergence. States Hounshell, "As each problem was
solved, new knowledge went back into the machine tool firms, which
then could be used to solve production problems in other industries."
Between 1830 and 1860 the Armory engaged in widespread diffusion of all
that it was learning about mechanized production, especially the
utilization of gauges, fixtures, jigs and dies to insure uniformity of
machined parts. "The Armory acted both as a clearing house for technical
information and a training ground for mechanics who later worked for
private arms makers or for manufacturers of other goods," Hounshell
found. 5
The 'Industrial Beehive' Grows: 1880 - 1930
Aided tremendously by the region's technological convergence,
Springfield became an important industrial center. Its prime location on
the Connecticut River provided easy transportation down river to New
York markets and beyond. By 1880, it led the region in the manufacture of
heavy equipment and machinery, with 437 mills and shops employing
* Nathan Rosenberg, "Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry, 1840 - 1910/'
Journal of Economic History (1963) quoted in David Hounshell, From the American System
to Mass Production, 1800 - 1932 (Maryland, 1984) p. 4. Hounshell points out that two keys to
Armory success were an early reliance on private arms contractors as a source for innovation
and the perfecting of various ways to inspect parts in the process of manufacture. This
concept spread to other metalworking establishments in Springfield and over time added
to the region's reputation for high quality work (Hounshell, p. 33 - 34, 44). Hounshell also
cites Felica Deyrup's Arms Makers of the Connecticut Valley (Smith College Studies in
History, 1948) for its documentation of instances when the Armory's patternmakers and
skilled foundrymen made "castings of valuable machines developed by contractors"^^)
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7,000 workers. Between 1885 and 1890 alone, machine production rose 158
percent. In 1910 the city had 251 manufacturing plants employing 12,361
workers, and by 1930, even though industrial employment in
Massachusetts declined, it increased in Springfield. Foundries, machine
shops, machine tool builders and electrical machinery firms led the
growth.
In the early 1900s trolley lines extended outward from the
downtown center to new neighborhoods. Hundreds of homes were built
and streets laid out between 1900 and 1925, many carrying the names of
well-known automobiles - Chalmers, Packard, Ford, Duryea. Residential
neighborhood growth resulted in population increases of 5,000 to 10,000
people every five years.6 New manufacturing centers started in East
Springfield and the city's North End. East Springfield would become
home to the Stevens-Dureya Car Company, the first automobile factory in
the country, and the Westinghouse Company, while over a dozen of the
city's most important manufacturers soon gravitated to the North End. 7
Nicknamed the "Industrial Beehive of Massachusetts," by 1930
Springfield was a diversified manufacturing city with over 300 firms and
18,000 workers producing a variety of machine tools, assemblies, and
components for the country's machine tool, automobile, steel, and
electrical equipment industries. The North End, bordered by the
Connecticut River to the west and Chicopee to the north, was dotted with
large metalworking companies employing mainly skilled and semi-skilled
machinists, machine operators, and precision assemblers along with small
6 For photographs of early factories see D'Amato, Springfield - 350 Years: A Pictorial
History (Virginia, 1985) p. 138.
7 D'Amato, p. 139.
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tool and die shops and foundries specializing in the production of
fixtures, tools, and spare parts needed to keep production lines running.
Occupational Stmctiirp
A comparison of Springfield's occupational structure with near-by
Holyoke, Massachusetts and other mill cities in the state demonstrates this
skill base, as well as the distinction between Springfield's workforce and
that of textile mill communities across Massachusetts (Table 2.1) 8
Table 2.1: Occupations in Springfield and Holyoke, 1885.
Springfield Holyoke
Gun makers 250
Machinists 219 225
Iron workers 154
Steam car builders 174
Woolen mill operatives - 1,125
Cotton mill operatives - 2,205
Paper mill operatives 2,820
With the exception of machinists, the cities are mirror opposites.
Holyoke never had significant numbers of metalworking firms, and those
it did have produced machines and attachments for its local textile and
paper industries. As mills began to exit Holyoke after World War I this
skill base contracted as well. Springfield's richer, more diversified
industrial base was a source of innovation and renewal, and its reputation
served as a magnet for skilled workers in the late 19th and early 20th
8 Figures from the 1885 Massachusetts Census for occupations employing 100 or more workers
show the following: Massachusetts Census, 1885.
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centuries. Skilled, foreign-born workers would play a significant role in
union and political affairs in Springfield along with making a vital
contribution to industry.9
By 1939 17 percent of Springfield's manufacturers and 57 percent of
its manufacturing workforce were in metalworking. By comparison,
Worcester, Massachusetts, another large and well diversified
manufacturing center located approximately 50 miles from Springfield,
had 28 percent of its firms and 46 percent of its workforce in
metalworking. The two cities accounted for over half of the state's
precision metalworking industries. Employment grew slowly in both
cities during the early 1930s, but by mid-1936 employers reported shortages
of skilled metalworkers and were scrambling to establish training
programs. Observers were impressed with the city's diversity, rich legacy
of skilled work, and the innovative qualities of firm owners.
From 1939 to 1947 Springfield's manufacturing employment
increased 62 percent, much of it in metalworking. However, in just 40
years, factories that employed thousands of workers and produced both
the machines and components vital to the successful war effort, were
shuttered or hollow shells. Firms that remained were smaller: The
y Evidence of the impact immigrant skilled labor had in Springfield is evident through an
analysis of the in-plant jobs many union leaders had. This will be discussed in detail in ch.
5. The Bosch company newsletter aptly titled The Craftsman contains evidence of the role
highly skilled workers played in production. The December, 1948 issue carried the names
of forty-nine workers who had reached twenty-five years seniority in the factory.
Seventeen of the forty-nine were foreign born, including six from Germany and four from
Italy. Among the group were four toolmakers, three die makers, two set up men, a
production engineer, and the foreman of the experimental machine shop(Craftsman, Vol. 5,
no. 8). Issues of the Craftsman from 1944 - 1958 are located in the Pioneer Valley Historical
Society company archives, Springfield, Ma. For an important analysis of the role
immigrant, skilled workers played in the formation of the United Auto Workers see
Babson, Building the Union: Skilled Workers and Anglo-Gaelic Immigrants in the Rise of
the UAW ( New Brunswick, 1991) esp. ch. 1 and Appendix A.
18
average Springfield-area manufacturing firm fell from 79 to 35 workers
from 1947 to 1977. This is partly explained by the fact that the total
number of firms in the Springfield-area metalworking sector increased to
355 from 200 while the workforce fell to 15,570 from 22,071 in this period.
In greater-Springfield, metalworking firms employing over 500
workers had been plentiful through the immediate post-war period. By
1958 there were less than 20. Close to 90 percent of all metalworking
establishments employed fewer than 20 workers. 10 The once strong and
vibrant greater-Springfield labor movement, dominated throughout the
post-war period by industrial unions representing skilled and semi-skilled
machinists and metalworkers, was no longer recognizable. 11
Major Firms in Springfield on Eve of World War TT
On the eve of World War II the city was well integrated into the
nation's mass production economy, while it continued to derive a great
deal of work from military production. Integral to this success were two
historical continuities; the region's ability to design and build machine
tools, and the large numbers of skilled machinists in the Connecticut
River Valley. 12
Arms production dominated the regional economy from the Civil
War to World War I. In addition to the Armory, the Smith and Wesson
Company and Savage Arms employed hundreds of assemblers and
10 United States Department of Commerce Manufacturing Censuses. In Worcester average
firm size fell from 90 to 30 workers.
11 Data on firm size and workforce is taken from United States Department of Commerce
Census of Manufacturers and Population Censuses for the years under review.
12 Planning Services Group, The Regional Economy; Federal Population Census, 1920, 1930,
1940.
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machinists. By the 1870s a second industrial concentration had grown up
around the Wason Car Manufacturing Company. Founded in 1846,
Wason produced railroad cars for virtually every major rail line in the
United States and exported to China, Brazil, Venezuela and Canada. At its
height in the 1870s Wason employed close to 700 people. The Smith
Carriage Company built carriages and wagons sold across the country and
in Europe. In 1892 it built the body for the first gasoline powered
automobile built in the United States. In 1895 the first major U.S.
automobile corporation, the Duryea Motor Wagon Company, turned out
its first cars. The Knox Automobile Company and the Indian Motorcycle
Company were also incorporated. Both firms were owned in part by the J.
Stevens Arms and Tool Company, which built several of the production
machines and tools for both companies. Other firms engaged in the
development of many new processes and products. A cylinder paper-
making machine was built and operated by Ames and Company in 1822
that revolutionized the industry. Envelopes, dictionaries, lawn mowers,
elevators and motorcycles were also made in city factories. 13
New firms incorporated and began to design and build machine
tools for these and other local industries. Products were also sold in
national markets. The fact that these machines were built locally gave
area firms a competitive edge as they were the first to gain the productivity
advantages new technologies provided. The Stacy Machine Works
invented an upright drill. Bauch Machine Tool Company specialized in
threading machines and worm gears, universal joints and cutting tools.
The Hampden Grinding Wheel Company developed and produced its
13 Orra Stone, History of Massachusetts Industries, Vol. 1 (Boston, 1930) p. 7 - 10.
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own brand of precision grinding wheels. By 1930, Moore Drop Forging
Company, incorporated in 1900, was one of the largest firms in the city,
with 1,400 workers producing machine beds for the mid-West's huge auto
plants. Storms Drop Forge's 1,000 employees manufactured forgings for
export world-wide out of steel, brass, and bronze. 14
Other machine tool builders and precision metalworking firms
found in Springfield on the eve of World War II included: the Perkins
Gear and Machine Company with 350 skilled machinists producing gears
and other precision parts; the Baldwin-Duckworth Company, a maker of
high-grade transmission chains for several machine tool builders; Van
Norman Machine Tool Company with 500 workers manufacturing
grinding and milling machines and a machine capable of grinding ball
bearings; Chapman Valve Company, operating three foundries to produce
the castings for hydrants, pipe fittings, sluice gates and valves ranging
from one-quarter inch to nine feet in diameter; and Package Machinery,
builder of automatic package wrapping equipment.
Incorporated in Springfield in 1890, Van Norman initially
employed 25 workers, producing bench lathes, molding dies, engravers'
equipment and other small hand tools. In 1910 the firm's engineers
designed and built the first milling machines with adjustable cutter heads
and the first cutter grinders. There were ready buyers for these machines
in Springfield. The First World War helped Van Norman gain a national
reputation for designing and building a machine that produced ball
bearings. Through 1915 ball bearings were largely imported from
Germany. U.S. war production would have been crippled without this
14 Stone, p. 489 - 495.
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engineering success. The company continued to grow after the war and
through World War II with employment reaching 1,500. Production
focused mainly on machine tools for the automotive industry and multi-
purpose milling machines. 15
Chapman Valve was founded by John Chapman in the 1870s and
quickly developed an international reputation for custom valves. Its only
competitor was the Chicago-based Crane Corporation, which mainly built
general purpose valves. On the eve of World War II the U.S. Navy built a
$3.6 million foundry adjacent to the Springfield Chapman plant to insure
a steady supply of valves, and soon employed 3,600. At war's end the
foundry was sold to Chapman for $916,000.! 6
Package Machinery formed in 1912 as the result of a merger of
several smaller companies based in Springfield, Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
Louisville, Kentucky, Chicago, Illinois and New York City and Brooklyn,
New York. The merger was designed to eliminate costs associated with
each firm's pursuing parallel technology and to establish greater
production efficiencies. First year sales were $140,000; by 1930 they
approached $2 million. 17
The Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company was the
city's largest manufacturing firm in the early 1930s, with employment
averaging 3,000. It received its first contract in 1915 to build one million
rifles for the Russian government. When the government collapsed
during the revolution, production quickly shifted to Browning Rifles for
the U.S. government. Here, as with the Armory, a manufacturer that was
15 Forrant, Plant Closings and Major Layoffs in Hampden County, 1967-1986 (Springfield,
1987).
16 Forrant, Plant Closings.
17 Stone, p. 539.
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to play a dominant role in the city, had its impetus in war and military
spending.
At the conclusion of World War I Westinghouse turned to the
production of small motors and automotive equipment. Employment
grew to 4,500 workers by 1930 up from 500 in 1920, an astonishing nine
fold increase. In addition to motors, the pant now produced commercial
radio apparatus, electric fans, and washing machine parts. Westinghouse
purchased $800,000 a year in local materials and spent $335,000
transporting raw materials and shipping finished goods in and out of the
city. The American Bosch Corporation, started in 1911 by Germans,
manufactured fuel injection equipment for diesel engines, gas water
heaters, and magnetos and other ignition devices for the automobile. It
needed 10,000 miles of wire monthly to produce magnetos, which kept
area wire-producing firms very busy. The firm employed approximately
1,000 workers in the early 1930s. 18
By the early 1940s Van Norman, Chapman Valve, Westinghouse
and Bosch workers were affiliated with the United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers Union, giving it a powerful voice in the affairs of the
most significant manufacturing plants in the city, and by implication a
significant voice in the development of the Springfield economy. 19
18 Stone, p. 547.
19 D'Amato, p. 140. One of the best sources for information about early industry
development in Massachusetts is Orra Stone's two volume study, Massachusetts Industries,
published in 1930. The book devotes chapters to each of the state's largest industrial cities
including Worcester, Lowell, Lynn, Haverhill and Springfield.
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The Artman Report: Metalworkers Importance to SpringfiplH
Almost immediately after the October 1929 stock market crash the
United States Department of Commerce commissioned a study of the New
England economy as part of a national effort to "marshal and analyze
pertinent facts bearing upon the economic life of the Nation." William
Cooper, Director of the U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
stated in the report's forward that one of New England's greatest
industrial assets was it supply of skilled workmen and seasoned factory
operatives. In a theme repeated in other observations of the region
Cooper remarked that "With long experience in business management
and in labor organization, New England appears to be increasing
harmonious relationships between labor and industry. According to
Cooper, "the large number of successful firms, including Van Norman,
Chapman Valve, Westinghouse, and Bosch relied on worker skills to
design and build new equipment and products. This rich skill base,
combined with a group of innovative and forward-looking employers
provided the region with an advantage over the rest of the nation. 20
Charles Artman, an economist employed by the U.S. Department of
Commerce to prepare the New England study, determined that between
1910 and 1920 Hampden County had the highest percentage increase in
population of any county in Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire and
Vermont. Over the same period Hampden County's manufacturing
20 Cooper, forward to Charles Artman, The Industrial Structure of New England
(Washington, D.C., 1930) p. xi. The report is based on information gathered from close to
5,000 manufacturers regarding methods of manufacturing, plant organization and marketing
strategies supplemented by Federal manufacturing census data. It contains richly detailed
analyses of the metalworking, machine tool building, textiles, leather, paper, printing and
publishing and wood and furniture industries.
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value added increased 150 percent. Artman attributed this to increased
employment in manufacturing, mainly in the Holyoke's textile and paper
mills and Springfield's metalworking and machine tool firms. However,
by decade's end, and into the 1920s growth waned. Across all of New
England the decline set in earlier, as from 1914 - 1925 manufacturing value
added and average manufacturing wages fell below the national average. 21
A massive, negative restructuring of the manufacturing economy
took place that continued until war-related production picked up in the
late 1930s and early 1940s. The once dominant textile and boot and shoe
industries were in decline as production shifted to mills in other parts of
the country and abroad. For textiles, the crisis was in the making before
World War 1. However, increased demand during that war resulted in an
expansion of production capacity. Old plants were reopened and new
plants built to meet European export demands. At the conclusion of the
war textile material consumption dropped sharply and "there were radical
changes in the types of textiles which the market demanded. Staple lines
gave way, in large measure, to fancy specialties and novelties, in which
style was the primary consideration... ." New England mills, organized for
quantity production, found it difficult to alter shop floor methods that
new market demands required. Artman described the implications of this
for New England mills:
The periodic ordering of large quantities for a whole
season which had been the prevailing practice has
given way in recent years to smaller orders for
current requirements, repeated at frequent intervals,
whereas orders were formerly placed twice a year for
21 Artman, p. 147 - 149.
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four to six months ahead. Difficulties in adjusting
production plans to these new conditions, account,
in large measure, for the depression of the New
England textile industries.22
The number of active spindles in place is normally used as an
indicator of mill production capacity. In 1927 Hampden County had ten
cotton textile mills with 663,000 spindles, fifth highest of all New England
counties, behind Bristol and Middlesex counties in Massachusetts and
Providence, Rhode Island and Hillsborough, New Hampshire. Bristol
County, with the cities of Fall River, New Bedford and Taunton, had
7,157,574 spindles and 93 mills, by far the largest such concentration in
New England. New England mills contained 43.6 percent of all the active
cotton spindles in the nation in 1927, down from 50 percent in 1922. A
more accurate measure, one that Artman used, is active spindle hours.
Here, too, New England was declining, falling from 40 percent of the
nation's total in 1922 to 31.5 percent in 1927. Intensified national
competition resulted in decreased cotton mill activity and employment
fluctuations of some 30,000 workers a year out of a workforce that
averaged around 200,000. 23
Like cotton, the woolen and worsted industry had contributed
significantly to the New England economy: By the mid-1920s 443 mills
employed 106,155 workers, with 42 percent of the mills and 52 percent of
the workers in Massachusetts. From 1880 to 1925 the industry was stable:
22 Artman's observation that the failure to shift production strategies to respond to changes
in the demand for good produced is an important one and it is picked up again in the 1950s
when the federal government commissions another study of the New England economy
(Artman, p. 280).
23 Artman, Table - New England Compared with Rest of United States in Cotton Spindles
in Place 1880 - 1927, p. 290; For workforce levels, p. 294.
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There were just five fewer firms in Massachusetts in 1925 than in 1908,
while the state's share of total U.S. output rose slightly. Firms and output
diminished however, as a result of changes in the internal structure of the
industry. Consumers wanted to purchase ready-to-wear goods. This
meant a greater portion of mill sales were directly to garment makers,
something New England mill owners were slow to recognize. Mills now
resorted to sharp price-cutting to keep customers, ultimately weakening
the entire industry in the state. 24
Artman was pessimistic about the prospects of every New England
industry with the exception of metalworking: "The industries which
depend primarily upon metals for their raw materials comprise the most
important group of all New England manufacturers when regarded as a
source of revenue to the region." The industry's average wage of $1,347
exceeded all other manufacturing sectors by 16 percent, and 33 percent of
all manufacturing value added in New England in 1925 was generated by
its 3,662 metalworking firms. The value added of the electrical
machinery, and foundry and machine shop products sectors in
Massachusetts now exceeded $280 million, higher than any other New
England state. While manufacturing value added in cotton goods and
boots and shoes still exceeded metalworking, the gap was narrowing. 25
^4 Artman, p. 354. Artman was able to gather detailed information from 1,100 New
England firms engaged in metalworking to shape his discussion of the strengths and
weaknesses of the industry.
25 Artman, p. 155, 158, 197. Firm size differed as well, with metalworking and textile
companies averaging 86 and 160 workers respectively. The top five value added industries
in 1925 were: cotton goods - $252M; boots and shoes - $163M; electrical machinery - $153M;
worsted goods - $133M; foundry and machine shop products - $133M. Artman, comparisons
by state in Tables, p. 178 - 180.
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Artman probed further, asking owners to indicate the origin of
their sales and identify their competitors. Fifty-three percent sold in the
Middle Atlantic states, and 27 percent indicated that they had competition
from there. Almost 10 percent had customers abroad, and close to four
percent indicated they had overseas competitors. Artman concluded that
metal manufacturers had nation-wide markets and faced strong and
growing national competition. 26
Artman next inquired about the relative importance of various
factors in starting a firm in New England. Labor skills ranked first and
markets second among the responses. The more complicated and precise
the product or part being produced, the greater was the importance of
access to skilled labor. "With the heavier and less highly fabricated metal
industries, location of markets was given as the principal reason for plant
location. This includes such enterprises as foundries, structural iron
work, sheet metal and wire work. In several machinery lines, particularly
textile machinery, the near-by market afforded by other industries was the
principal reason for the given location."27
26 For these figures see Artman, "Location of Markets and of Competitors as Indicated by
New England Metal Manufacturers," p. 198. It is important to note the level of competition
metalworking firms already perceived from the Middle Atlantic states and abroad in the
mid-1920s. When plant relocations and sizable shifts of work took place after World War
II economists, labor unions, and political officials expressed a great deal of surprise at this
turn of events. They should not have been caught so off guard.
27 Artman, p. 199.
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Artman and Mptalworking
Artman's review of four metalworking sectors - electrical
machinery and appliances, textile machinery and equipment, machine
tools, and foundry and machine shop products - is very important since
these made up the core of Springfield metalworking by the 1920s.
Electrical Machinery. The manufacture of electrical machinery and
appliances accounted for 15 percent of the total value of all products
produced by metalworking industries in New England and employed close
to 41,000 workers in 1927. Such firms made equipment for the electrical
power industry such as generators, transformers, control apparatus,
batteries, electric motors, electric lamps, radio apparatus, insulated wire
and electrical appliances. Product value increased slightly over eight times
between 1904 and 1925, comparing favorably to the country as a whole
where value increased nine times. The largest concentrations of
companies were in Southwestern Connecticut, around Providence, Rhode
Island and in the Northeast and Western portions of Massachusetts, with
just eight such firms in all of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont. The
sector was expanding rapidly and was firmly rooted in Springfield. 28
Textile Machinery. Textile machinery production was dependent
on a healthy and expanding textile industry. Artman developed location
maps to indicate where textile machinery plants existed and found that
many were in Bristol County, Massachusetts - where textile mill cities Fall
28Artman, p. 203; plant location map, p. 202.
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River, New Bedford and Taunton are located - and directly across the state
line in Providence, Rhode Island. Other machine builders were located
near mills in Lowell, Massachusetts.
Artman asked owners why they believed they were successful.
Their responses included:
"Better accounting methods have added materially in
controlling purchases;" "Standardization of products,
materials, equipment, and performance have been of greatest
importance to us;" "Reduced costs have resulted from
standardization of products;" "Expenses have been cut by
reduction in number of executives;" "We have built new
and better machines to meet changes in styles."
They were clearly grappling with several of the key issues central to
maintaining a profitable enterprise. 29
Machine Tools . In the machine tool sector output, wage rates, and
employment increased steadily during the 1920s. By 1927 New England
firms produced 25 percent of the country's machine tools, tools, and
attachments. Average annual wages of $1,501 were the highest of any
New England industry. Several owners indicated they were doing
research to develop better designs, standardize tools, and gain a greater
understanding of customer needs. Firms also invested in new machine
tools to increase productivity through "greater speed and accuracy, which
remove bottle necks in the flow of production." One response captured
29 Artman, p. 206 - 210.
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this well: "Much of our work is special; improvements in design to reduce
cost or increase efficiency of machines claim most of our attention. "30
Foundries and Machine Shops Foundries and machine shops
relied on subcontracts from larger manufacturers to supply them with pre-
designed castings, highly specialized tools, fixtures, jigs, gauges, and
machine tool attachments. Firms were referred to as 'job shops' because
they solicited work a job at a time, and often one part at a time from their
customers. Eight hundred and fourteen such shops were located in New
England, with slightly over 60 percent in Massachusetts. The Northeast
region of Massachusetts had the largest cluster of these firms, with
additional large concentrations in Worcester and Springfield. One
hundred and twelve firms supplied Artman with detailed information.
Of those, over half employed less than 25 workers, while 75 percent had
less than 100. Sixty-four firms had more than half of their sales in New
England, the rest had a geographically diverse customer base. Foreign
markets were insignificant. Firms placed emphasis on continuous plant
maintenance. Since the ability to produce a customized part quickly for a
customer is a good measure of shop performance, this makes sense. Shops
could not afford to have equipment down for lengthy repairs.31
30 Artman, p. 213 - 215; plant location map, p. 212.
31 Artman, p. 222 - 227. The geographically diverse customer base is surprising in an
industry that relies heavily on contact with customers and is most likely indicative of the
precision work done by Massachusetts shops.
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The Springfield Labor Force
On the eve of World War II greater-Springfield had close to 200
specialty machine shops and metalworking firms producing precision
components and machine tools. There were close to 400 manufacturing
enterprises overall in the city. Figures taken from the Fifteenth United
States Census show that the three largest sectors were the iron and steel
industry with 4,900 workers; the electrical machinery industry with 2,710
workers; and miscellaneous manufacturing with 4,400. According to a
1941 Work Projects Administration Study of Springfield:
Springfield's products have been for the most part the
essentials of other industries, the machines, the tools, and
units that turn the wheels of industry the world over.
Because of this inter-relationship and the diversification of
her industries, Springfield has suffered less from economic
upheaval than single-industry cities of New England.32
Skill Levels and Ethnicity
"Without the Armory, Springfield was destined to become a
transportation center, and the coming of the railroads would have brought
with them commercial and perhaps industrial development of the place,"
wrote Armory historian Derwent Whittlesey in 1920.
The character of the city's industrialism, and the
nature of the commodities produced has, however,
been largely determined by the activities of the
32 Works Progress Administration, Springfield, Massachusetts, p. 57.
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Armory. Highly skilled labor, producing fine grade
steel goods, has given Springfield an economic life
which has fewer drawbacks than that of most
manufacturing cities.... As a consequence,
Springfield is neither a sleepy village resting on its
past glories, nor is it a coarse factory town,
conspicuous for its slums and tired workers.33
Springfield's skilled workforce and perceived labor peace led to the
establishment of a major foreign automobile company. In 1919 Rolls
Royce, Inc. undertook a thorough investigation of potential sights for a
manufacturing facility in the United States, and settled on Springfield.
Reasons given for the choice included access to a constant supply of skilled
machinists and easy access to high quality drop forgings. According to
Rolls Royce's press release announcing the selection:
In 1919, Springfield was chosen for the works of Rolls
Royce of America, Inc., only after the most meticulous
country-wide survey. In addition to being the city freest
from labor troubles in the United States, the artisans of
Springfield - from long experience in fine precision
work - were found to possess the same pride in
workmanship as the craftsmen of England.
Cars costing $20,000 were soon being produced by Rolls Royce's 1,400
workers.34
Seventeen years later Henry Ford had much the same praise for the
region's metalworkers.
33 Derwent Whittlesey, The Springfield Armory, 1920, p. 265; Stone, p. 482.
34 Stone, p. 550.
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The skill of Springfield's engineers and workers is
traditional. Less well known is the fact that in its world-
wide search for never ending improvements, the Ford
Motor Company has found in Springfield dependable
sources for a substantial portion of its equipment and
parts used in building Ford cars.35
These observers were correct: There was a higher proportion of
skilled workers in Springfield than in Holyoke, Worcester and Lowell. In
addition, from 1930 through the 1950s there was a higher ratio of skilled
machinists, toolmakers and millwrights to semiskilled metalworkers in
Springfield than other cities (Table 2.2 - Distribution of Total
Employment). How this affected union organization in Springfield, will
be discussed in later chapters. It is important to point out here that
Springfield's most prominent union organizers and officers during the
late 1930s and early 1940s consistently came from the ranks of highly
skilled workers in firms like Bosch and Westinghouse.
In addition to the skill distinction Springfield's ethnic make-up was
distinct from that of Holyoke, Worcester and Lowell: From 1890 to 1940
the city had a lower percentage of foreign born residents and residents
35 SR, November 21, 1936, p. 13.
34
.2: Distribution of total employment in selected cities 1930 - 1950.
Y ear Holyoke
1930 Manuf./Mechanical 54 percent
Trade 12 percent
Clerical 9 percent
Professional 7 percent
1940 Craftsmen 13 percent
Operatives 33 percent
Clerical/Sales 19 percent
Professional 7 percent
Craftsmen 2,444
Operatives 6,351
1950 Craftsmen 14 percent
Operatives 35 percent
Clerical/Sales 22 percent
Professional 9 percent
Craftsmen 3,244
Operatives 7,989
Springfield Worcester Lowell
38 percent 44 percent 54 percent
17 percent 13 percent 14 percent
14 percent 8 percent 9 percent
8 percent 7 percent 9 percent
17 percent 16 percent 12 percent
21 percent 26 percent 38 percent
26 percent 22 percent 17 percent
7 percent 8 percent 7 percent
9,631 11,091 4,182
12,089 17,964 12,870
16 percent 16 percent 14 percent
24 percent 26 percent 37 percent
26 percent 23 percent 18 percent
9 percent 10 percent 8 percent
10,884 12,994 5,261
16,404 20,833 14311
born of foreign or mixed parentage than these three cities. Forty-four
percent of Springfield's 1910 population was native born, as against 28
percent in Worcester, 20 percent in Lowell and 16 percent in near-by
Holyoke. In 1910 24 percent of Holyoke and 20 percent of Lowell's
residents were born in French Canada or had at least one parent who had
35
been (Table 2.3 - Ethnicity in Selected Cities). In Springfield, by contrast,
only seven percent could make such a claim.
Springfield had higher percentages of English and German
immigrants than other cities studied. These groups and native born
workers comprised the largest number of skilled metalworkers in the city.
German skilled machinists were found in large numbers at the Armory
during the Civil War. After the war city records show that a number of
small machine shops were started along with a brass foundry and the
largest brewery in the region. High skill levels of German immigrants are
revealed in the 1885 state census as well; of 312 German-born males listed
almost 85 percent were skilled. German-born workers also started two of
the city's earliest labor unions, the Cigar Makers and the Journeymen
Tailors.36
Further distinctions are possible when contrasting the principal
occupations in mill cities like Holyoke and Lowell with Springfield. In
Holyoke in 1880 63 percent of the workforce was engaged as operatives in
woolen, paper and cotton mills, with 57 percent born in Ireland and
British Canada. In Springfield, by contrast, just 13 percent were in textile
mills.3 ?
36 Data for these tables is taken from the US Population Censuses for the years cited. In
1940 distinctions were made for the first time between craftsmen and operatives. On
Springfield's German population see Goff, Springfield's Ethnic Heritage: The German
Community (Springfield, 1976) p. 10-11.
37 Massachusetts Population Census, 1880.
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Table 23: Ethnicity in selected cities by percent of total population
1890 - 1950.
Year Holyoke Springfield Worcester Lowell
1890:
Native Born 17 percent
Foreign Born 83 percent
1900:
Native Born 17 percent
NB/Foreign Pts. 42 percent
Foreign Born 41 percent
1910:
Native Born 16 percent
NB/Foreign Pts. 44 percent
Foreign Born 40 percent
1930:
Native Born 23 percent
NB/Foreign Pts. 48 percent
Foreign Born 29 percent
1940:
Native Born
Foreign Born
1950:
Native Born
Foreign Born
22 percent
49 percent
51 percent
44 percent
33 percent
23 percent
40 percent
34 percent
26 percent
41 percent
37 percent
22 percent
18 percent
31 percent
37 percent
32 percent
28 percent
38 percent
33 percent
31 percent
43 percent
26 percent
21 percent
22 percent
35 percent
43 percent
20 percent
39 percent
41 percent
27 percent
47 percent
26 percent
19 percent
17 percent 14 percent 17 percent 15 percent
A comparison of manufacturing employment in these cities shows
two distinct patterns of development through the first three decades of the
20th century (Table 2.4 - Industry Employment in 1930). Springfield and
Worcester represented one path, Holyoke and Lowell the other. By 1930
Worcester had 23 percent and Springfield 13 percent of its manufacturing
employment in Iron and Steel, Metals and Electrical Machinery, while for
Holyoke and Lowell the figure was eight percent and six percent,
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respectively. Mill occupations comprised
and 11 percent of Worcester's workforce,
Holyoke, and 35 percent in Lowell.3^
only six percent of Springfield
but jumped to 45 percent in
Table 2.4: Industry employment in 1930.
Holyoke Springfield Worcester Lowell
All industry 22,245 66,521 82,993 40,662
Iron and Steel 1,547 5,117 15,932 1,969
Metals 78 962 445 95
Electrical 154 2,710 2,366 252
Mach.
Clothing 176 1,202 1,888 493
Shoes 7 27 2,130 2,880
Paper 4,966 1,179 1,385 227
Cotton Mills 751 424 183 5,274
Woolen Mills 1736 34 1,320 2,268
Other 2,465 1,285 2,360 3,324
Textiles
Statewide Workforce Structure
The state's concentration of metalworking helped it survive the
sharp reduction in mill work between the two world wars and in the first
few years after World War EL The actual location of firms provided
benefits to some cities and not to others, even when communities were
contiguous as in the case of Springfield and Holyoke. Precision
metalworking allowed Springfield to grow and prosper during the 1930s -
late 1950s, after textile mill cities like Holyoke and Lowell had ceased to
38 Massachusetts Population Census, 1930.
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increase their numbers of production workers. From 1939 to 1947
employment gains in Springfield were twice the state average.
Table 2.5: Production workers in the state and selected cities 1900 - 1987.
Year
1900
1905
1914
1919
1929
1933
1939
1947
1958
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
1939-1947
increase wkrs.
1947-1977
decline wkrs.
1947-1987
decline wkrs.
State
438,200
488,399
606,698
713,836
547,509
460,674
601,603
498,612
507,900
416,000
407,000
397,000
348,300
30 percent
32 percent
42 percent
Holyoke
12,519
14,685
17,493
18,904
13,770
10,646
8,539
12,532
8,606
8,100
6,800
5,800
5,500
5,000
46 percent
53 percent
60 percent
Springfield
8,152
10,523
14,240
18,429
17,414
12,490
13,846
22,426
18,811
17,200
13,200
12,900
11,300
7,700
62 percent
42 percent
66 percent
Worcester
22,593
22,796
29,452
44,831
31,636
23,160
31,659
37,834
26,548
24,800
19,700
17,600
14,500
11,100
19 percent
53 percent
71 percent
Lowell
29,254
29,303
29,904
31,154
17,097
13,308
13,828
16,053
13,045
13,000
11,700
10,700
13,300
11,300
16 percent
33 percent
30 percent
Table 2.5 - Production Workers in Selected Cities traces worker
levels in four Massachusetts cities from 1900 to 1987 and demonstrates this
change. These cities reflect the larger trends in the state as a whole.
Holyoke, Worcester and Lowell reached their employment pinnacles in
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1919. By contrast, Springfield surpassed 1919 levels as factory employment
rose dramatically during World War II. However, from 1947-1987 the rate
of job loss in Springfield was exceeded only by Worcester and it was 1.5
times the state decline.
Table 2.6: Manufacturing firms in selected cities 1880 - 1987.
Year State Holyoke
1880 120
1900 10,929 158
1905 10,723 179
1914 12,013 222
1919 11,906 176
1929 9,872 155
1 1115/
1937 8,619 143
1939 9,007 153
1943 148
1947 10,524 164
1954 11,205 163
1958 11,409 162
1963 11,311 165
1967 10,963 144
1972 10,770 143
1977 11,133 138
1982 11,017 130
1987 11,016 115
Firm gain/loss 492 -49
1947-87
Percent 5 percent -30 percent
gain /loss
Springfield Worcester Lowell
437 633
278 465 286
296 470 256
395 606 300
401 618 291
318 533 217
277 474 197
291 516 204
310 542 204
301 491 202
364 574 214
328 595 211
329 575 204
311 537 218
284 501 211
260 452 191
233 437 181
216 377 174
200 342 161
-164 -232 -53
-45 percent -40 percent -25 percent
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Between 1939 and 1947 there was an upturn in the number of firms
in all four cities, but none ever exceeded levels reached in 1919 (see Table
2.6 - Firms in Selected Cities). Locally owned firms started to change hands
immediately after World War II. This was most noticeable first in textiles.
Plant and equipment investments lagged as new owners built factories
overseas and in the South, and shifted work from Springfield to these new
facilities. Forty-five percent of Springfield's manufacturing facilities were
shuttered between 1947 and 1987. Skill counted for very little in the face of
such dislocation, and as chapter 4 will argue, corporate strategic decisions
in the first few years after World War II to adopt production measures less
reliant on production worker skills contributed to this swift decline.39
The Armory's Impact on the Region
Throughout World War II the Armory trained and employed
thousands of Springfield metal workers. Shortages of skilled machinists
and toolmakers had developed in the vicinity of Springfield as early as
1938. In response, the Armory Apprentice School was established in 1939,
with 29 students ages 16 - 21 enrolled in its pilot 4 year program. Evening
education classes were held for apprentices at the Springfield Trade School
in mechanical drawing, math, industrial science and business English. By
1940 the Armory was using the school for night courses for all workers; in
the Fall 500 were enrolled, and by the Spring of 1941 extensive training
39 Forrant, Plant Closings; US Department of Commerce, Manufacturing Censuses. For the
Holyoke story on mill ownership changes and disinvestment see William Hartford,
Working People of Holyoke (New Brunswick, 1990) esp. ch. 8.
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was being given in machine set up and operation to 1000 workers.
Armory wartime civilian employment ranged from 7,500 to 13,500.
Armory production processes made extensive use of gage controls
and powered equipment, complete inspection of parts, and an elaborate
division of skill, with mostly piece-rate-paid labor. In the early years of the
20th century, with industrial productivity receiving national attention
through the efforts of Frederick Taylor and others, the Armory established
new piece rate systems and instituted time and motion studies on most
machine operations. Unlike other armories and large factories across the
U.S. there were few organized protests. Armory practices borrowed from
or influenced by Taylorism included centralized planning for better
routing of tasks and components, improved accounting systems for tools
and raw materials, introduction of high-speed tool steels, and
reorganization of shop floor work flow. This peaceful process of
Taylorization needs to be examined to determine how it may have
influenced shop floor work organization, labor relations and union
formation in Springfield.40
During WW I Armory workers totaled 7,000. The Armory
contracted extensively for gauges from area machine shops. But even
though many operations in the giant plant were standardized, skill levels
remained high according to Armory historian Raber: "Increased
mechanization and decreased handwork had never meant extensive 'de-
skilling' at Springfield. On the contrary, not only was some hand fitting
necessary until World War II, but many machine operations required
40 Raber, Conservative Innovators and Military Small Arms: An Industrial History of the
Springfield Armory, 1794 - 1968, p. 11, 17. Study located in Springfield Armory research
library.
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more skill when components were taken closer to gage."4 * Armory
managers turned to women during World War I and by the Armistice,
women composed about 16 percent of the 5,000 person workforce,
employed principally in filing, inspecting, and packing, with a small
number also in machine work.
Between the wars the workforce was slashed to 1880s levels, to just
over 1,000 workers. The Armory had to bid on other manufacturing work
simply to keep the plant running and retain a core of skilled workers.
According to Armory historian Constance Green this production included
the manufacture of the water meter registers for the new District of
Columbia water works.42
By the late 1920s the improving economy made it difficult for the
Armory to find and retain skilled workers. Records indicate that skilled
workers took jobs in other firms offering higher wages. When the
Armory began replacing machinery in 1930 to produce its new Ml rifle
there was fear that the requisite skill workers could no longer be found in
the city to manufacture it. For the first time in Armory history machine
tools were purchased - some from Springfield firms - with jigs, fixtures,
and tools already attached. The shift to more simplified, single-operation
production machines eased the training of new workers who had little
prior experience operating and setting up metalworking equipment.
The increasing presence of military officers on the shop floors after
1935, created sporadic disagreements. In 1937 an officer from the Federal
Inspector General's office was scheduled for a visit to Springfield to hear
41 Raber, p. 19.
42 Constance Green, History of the Springfield Armory, Vol. 2, 1948 (unpublished
manuscript located in Armory museum) p. 24.
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complaints on pay issues. "When the stipulated hour of the day named
arrived, a line of workers stretched from the door of the office in the
Administration building in Armory Square out the door and down
through the grounds into the street. Armory officials were clearly taken by
surprise. The obvious impossibility of the Inspector's hearing all
complaints that afternoon led many of the men to return unheard to their
work benches" Within weeks workers turned to organization, and in
June 1937, bypassing the small National Federation of Federal Employees
Local 101 in the Armory, the American Federation of Government
Employees Lodge 431 (AFL) was established.
This new local represented a significant challenge to Armory
management because it raised a number of unanswered questions with
regard to federal workers' rights to collective bargaining. Lodge 431 also
challenged the American Federation of Labor; local union leaders insisted
that, rather than organize just craft workers, every Armory employee was
eligible for membership upon payment of a dollar initiation fee and 50
cents a month dues. The lodge withstood efforts throughout 1938 by
Springfield Machinists, Electricians and Carpenters unions to split off the
crafts.43
The union's first activity was a regional wage survey. By federal law
Armory workers' pay could not exceed the average pay for similar skilled
work in surrounding communities. The union's investigation
determined that payments in 45 job categories were too low; each was
upgraded as a result. By mid-1941, as pre-war production picked up, 4,900
workers were employed around the clock, five times more than in 1936,
43 Raber, p. 21; Green, Vol. 2, p. 69b.
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and by December, 1941 7,500 workers packed the shop floor, producing
thousands of rifles a month. Just as in the late 1930s, the presence of
military officers on the shop floor caused conflicts with the civilian
workforce and led to worker protests throughout the war. Wartime
civilian employment ranged from 7,500 to 13,500 and by mid-1943 women
composed 43 percent of the workforce. Worker turnover rose steadily
from 26.7 percent in 1939 to 34.5 percent in 1941, 38 percent in 1942, and 42
percent in 1943. An interview with Lodge President Alexander Cardinal,
determined that in 1943 4,600 workers, only 40 percent of the total
workforce were paying dues. Rapid employment growth and high
turnover rates may have contributed to this.
In 1944 union-management problems were reported in the local
newspapers regularly. Central to a long simmering dispute was the
union's determination to establish a labor-management committee with
authority over labor policy in the plant. Union president Cardinal saw
this an opportunity to set up a scheme of management-worker
collaboration, which could serve as a model for all Government
establishments and benefit labor in private plants as well. Armory chief
Colonel Allan Wody offered to set up four advisory committees - one for
each major production unit in the plant - but in March, 1944 the union
rejected this idea, insisting that more than an advisory role was warranted.
Negotiations dragged on through the summer on this issue.
While this tug-of-war was being played out Armory management
transferred fifty workers from the Inspection Department to the
Manufacturing Department as part of an overall effort to reorganize work
in the sprawling facility. While the job duties were virtually the same,
conditions changed because, as Cardinal indicated, the inspectors would
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now perform their work on the factory floor. The union viewed the
switch as an arbitrary demotion of a group of workers. Substantiating
evidence has not been found, but it is likely such unresolved, highly
publicized disputes In the city's largest metalworking company did little to
heighten unionism in Springfield.44
A Second Look at Metalworking :
The 1*^5 1 Commission on the New England Economy
Twenty-two years after Charles Artman's study of manufacture
President Truman's Council of Economic Advisers launched a similar
effort. Truman and the Council were deeply concerned that job loss
occurring in New England in the early 1950s would have a deleterious
impact on future defense mobilizations requiring the rapid production of
military hardware.
Westinghouse employment climbed to over 4,000 during World
War II as production shifted from refrigeration and air-conditioning
equipment to shell fuses and tank parts. "In 1929, 47,700 people worked in
city factories. In 1941 the number reached more than 54,000 and
Springfield was designated one of 32 war production centers."45
However, between August and late December, 1 CM5 Armory employment
dropped sharply: on V-E Day there were 9,900 civilian employees, by V-J
Day 4,440, and by end of 1945 only 1,700 workers remained. Bosch,
Westinghouse and others laid off thousands of workers as well. A skilled
44 Raber, p. 21; Green, Vol. 2, p. 155; Green, interview with Local president Alexander
Cardinal, Vol. 2, p. 335; Green, p. 445 - 448.
45 D'Amato, p. 141.
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labor shortage quickly became an excess, and skill, by itself, was not
enough to sustain a vibrant manufacturing region.46
The Council appointed a committee of distinguished scholars,
including Seymour Harris of Harvard University, labor historian Philip
Taft of Brown University, and Charles I. Gregg, a professor in the Harvard
Graduate School of Business Administration to conduct the study. By the
time the project got underway the Korean War had broken out,
heightening interest in the Committee's findings since factories in the
region played such a significant role in World War II weapons
production.47
Members wasted no time zeroing in on what they believed to be the
major problem confronting New England industry. Late 19th and early
20th century industrial leaders often attained success only after
considerable struggle with competitive forces, they reasoned. Successive
generations became more conservative, "turned their attention away from
industrial progress" and exhibited greater "interest in the preservation of
the status quo." This led to deep-seated problems that threatened the
existence of a strong manufacturing economy. In the report's introduction
they wrote:
To some extent manufacturing success in the 19th century
and the early part of the 20th century seems to have bred
lethargy and complacency among New England industrialists
which handicapped the region in its competition with newer
regions. The gap between ownership policies motivated by
46 Green has a lengthy description of these training efforts. Green, p. 413 - 416; Springfield
Armory Historical Summary of Activities 2 September 1945 - 30 June 1951, p. 103.
47 Committee on the New England Economy, The New England Economy (July, 1951) , p. iii
- iv.
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short-run financial considerations and the need for long-run
modernization, research and product development has also
intensified manufacturing problems in New England."48
Technological innovation, and the dispersion of new production methods
and approaches that historians David Hounshell and Nathan Rosenberg
viewed as a key to the region's 19th and early 20th century success, the
President's Commission found sorely lacking by the early 1950s.
The 1919 Rolls Royce location study, the 1929 Artman report for the
Department of Commerce, the early 1940s WPA analysis and Henry Ford's
laudatory comments about Springfield workers had posited a bright
economic future for Springfield. The downward spiral in boot, shoe, and
textile employment across New England had challenged the resiliency of
Holyoke and Lowell, not Springfield. Its dominant manufacturers -
American Bosch, Westinghouse, Van Norman, Chapman Valve, Moore
Drop Forge, Smith and Wesson and the Armory - produced for steadily
growing national and global markets, and made gigantic output leaps
during the war years. Though there were downward adjustments in late
1945 and early 1946 as war production stopped, city officials, business and
labor leaders could not help but be optimistic. However, the 1948 - 1949
recession hit New England harder than any other region of the country,
and Commission members called this optimism into question.
There were significant numbers of aging multi-story plants with all
their inherent problems whenever a plant manager wanted to reorganize
production lines to get better work flow and limit the amount of material
handling. Newer one-story facilities, like those being built across the
Committee, p. xxii.
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South, made this easier. New England competitors benefited, as well,
from their acquisition of new plants built with federal money during
World War II.
The lack of managerial foresight and strategic thinking, along with
the overall failure to invest in new plant and equipment alarmed
commission members. The report's authors frequently used phrases like
"inflexibility in thinking," "resistance to change," "inflexibility of thought
and action," to describe industry and labor leaders. The Armory's
ingenuity during the Civil War, Van Norman's engineering ability, the
Bosch's core of highly skilled precision machinists, had dissipated.
Regional solutions lay in recapturing that production advantage by
"adapting its existing manufacturing industries to changing technologies
and new products and diverting its resources into newer and expanding
industries which involve a higher ratio of value added to value shipped."
Unfortunately, this required precisely the flexibility of thought and action
that the commission found lacking.49
However, the Korean War rearmament boom acted like a pressure
release valve and made it possible for New England firms to ignore
problems identified by the Commission. Between June 1950 and February
1951, for example, defense contracts to New England reached close to $487
million, 10 percent of the U.S. total. Over 50 percent of this was in textiles.
Even though the textile industry was in a precarious position, millions of
dollars in contracts provided the rationale for focusing on the immediate
49 Committee, p. 26. A specific reference to the boot and shoe industry was used to
demonstrate failed leadership: While the boot and shoe industry shed thousands of jobs
there was no shift into what was the most rapidly growing market niche in the country,
baby shoes.
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as opposed to the much needed renovation in business thinking
Commission members advocated. 50
Conclusion: Labor Declines as Defense Sppnding Wanps
and Plant Relocations Begin
The Korean War defense spending boom was not enough to
stimulate sustainable growth and fend off plant closings. The assumption
that highly skilled metalworking plants were somehow insulated from
more familiar textile and shoe mill closings proved incorrect. Indian
Motorcycle failed in the late 1950s. Package Machinery moved its
production facilities out of the city; and the East Springfield Westinghouse
plant which employed 4,600 people in 1950 - one of every seven workers
in the city - began a slow, painful 12 year phase out. Its gates were finally
locked in 1970. Even the Armory, the city's third largest employer, and
symbol of manufacturing innovation, finally closed down. The plant that
had helped establish the city's identity as a high skill, precision
metalworking region ceased operations in 1968 costing the local economy
2,000 jobs. Political leaders and workers and their unions had no answer
for this massive job and revenue loss.51
John Cumbler uses Trenton, New Jersey's motto - "Trenton Makes-
The World Takes" as indicative of the manufacturing prowess of the city
in the early 20th century. For Cumbler, Trenton's downward spiral is part
of a much larger set of political and economic events, the clash between
what he terms Civic Capitalism and National Capitalism. The loci of firm
50 Committee, p. 56. Here, as during World War II, such contracts helped mask
weaknesses in the industry 's ability to compete in commercial markets. These contracts
only allowed the industry to 'buy time'.
51 D'Amato, p. 145 - 146.
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control
- the board rooms where investment decisions were made and
labor negotiation strategies set - slowly migrated from Trenton. "The
social system put together by the entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century
was a dynamic system. It was part of a process of social change; once in
place, it continued to change both itself and society. The move from civic
capitalism, or entrepreneurial individualism, to bureaucratic corporatism,
or national capitalism, began in the late nineteenth century and engulfed
not just Trenton, but all of the United States in the first half of the
twentieth century." 52
William Hartford found a similar dynamic in Holyoke. The Lyman
Mills, a major employer in the city, were closed in 1927 after a vote by the
stockholders - the majority of whom were Boston bankers. Southern
competition made it unprofitable to invest further in Holyoke. Hartford
quotes Old Colony Trust, the major shareholder: "The amount to be
received per share through liquidation conservatively invested would
seem to afford better possibilities of return than an investment in the
Lyman Mills." During the 1930s several more mills closed in the city. In
1938 Farr Alpaca, the city's largest mill with 4000 workers, was liquidated
in spite of union wage concessions and an offer of tax abatements if the
mill remained in the city. As with Lyman Mills, critical decisions were
not made in Holyoke, but by stockholders with no attachments to the city.
By 1940 machines had been sold to southern manufacturers and the mills
were shuttered. Hartford makes a very important point about these two
closings: "... neither company ceased production because of an inability to
52 John Cumbler, A Social History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics and Work in
Trenton (New Brunswick, 1989) p. 5.
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make
.1 profit. Rather, faced with the need to modernize existing
operations, a majority of stockholders believed that the distribution of
assets following liquidation would generate proceeds substantially in
excess of the current value of company stock."53
In Springfield 'The Industrial Beehive' became The City of Homes'.
But what happened was neither spontaneous nor inevitable. The city and
the Bosch plant's history unfolded against the backdrop of significant
national and international changes in the economy. Union leaders
attempted to deal with issues of job loss and plant shutdowns in, what
they believed to be, a very aggressive manner. They also worked hard to
defend basic trade union principles like seniority, and were unwilling to
give in to management attempts to alter payment systems and job
classification structures. Workers were surely aware of closings and layoffs
since Springfield was small enough for everyone to have a friend put out
ol work. How, then, could a small union local respond to the massive
changes in the global economy commencing after World War II?
53 Hartford, Working People of Eolyoke, p. m - L93.
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CHAPTER 3
THE AMERICAN BOSCH TAKES SHAPE: 1930 - 1954
Introduction
Immediately after World War II Germany and Japan began to
rebuild their devastated industries and soon challenged U.S.
manufacturers in such sectors as steel, automobiles, electrical equipment,
machine tools, and farm equipment. The ingenuity and ability of
American firms was now put to the test as markets virtually guaranteed
during the war slowly opened. Springfield corporate leaders now
believed that cheap labor elsewhere in the country and around the world
posed the biggest threat to the city's economic viability. As a consequence
corporate strategies were now designed to drive down Springfield's labor
costs as much as possible. This was done at the expense of good labor
relations.
At the American Bosch, for example, management eliminated a
union-management production committee that met monthly since 1942
to discuss and resolve shop problems, prompting a sharp rebuke from the
union. During the 1950s Bosch management also made large expenditures
on labor-saving technology and constructed a new factory in Mississippi.
The decision to be build a production facility in Mississippi and relocate
work done in Springfield to it was predicated on available, lower-cost and
non-union labor.
These and other decisions drove a wedge between the union and
management at a moment when leading competitor nations were
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beginning to establish mechanisms to forge closer relations between
workers and managers to resolve production problems. The unilateral
elimination of the Bosch committee epitomized shop floor relationships
during the 1950s and 1960s.
Bosch management resolved that workers were not going to utilize
their skill and knowledge of the production process to gain control over
the flow of work. However, the fact remained that high seniority workers
in the plant were the ones who could get products out the door on time,
but only when and if they wanted to. Eliminating a problem-solving
committee could do nothing to resolve this situation, nor would it gain
the foremen in the various production departments any greater ability to
control the pace of work and monitor the effort workers applied. In fact, as
we shall see, the opposite took place as workers ridiculed their supervisors
for their lack of production know-how. 1
Business historian William Lazonick makes the point that because
of the production boom during World War II and the competitive
advantages U.S. producers like the Bosch had after the war, "firms could
amply afford cooperative shop-floor relations." While he locates the
collapse of cooperation in the late 1960s, it appears that in the Bosch it
came earlier in the 1950s. It was worker skill, coupled with engineering
success, that allowed Springfield firms to prosper and achieve spectacular
output gains before and during World War II. By discounting skill and
devaluing worker input management denied itself the utilization of a
1 For a discussion of this issue and its implications as Japan and Germany grappled with
ways to integrate workers more fully on the shop floor see William Lazonick, Competitive
Advantage on the Shop Floor (Cambridge, 1990) esp. chapters 7, 9, 10.
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knowledge base essential to long-term firm success. What sense could it
make, when increased, and high quality output was the objective, to not
engage the shop-floor intelligence of men like the 50 who joined the
Bosch 25 -year club in 1948? The ten tool and die makers and set-up men
in this group had production experience in the plant totaling over 250
years. 2
Once management adopted this strategy a self-fulfilling prophecy
was set in motion. Believing workers would not produce unless they
were rigidly supervised and pushed, U.S. managers, Lazonick notes, "had
little reason to believe that, if the necessary skill and authority were vested
in shop-floor workers, the rejects would not pile up."3
Union interests seemed to belie such fears, however. In February,
1951 for example, an editorial in the union newspaper read:
We note that European unions have been guaranteed
the right of co-determination which implies union
participation in corporate financing, pricing, supply, and
all other functions of management. This theory has
been covered in some of Walt Reuthers's writings and
we hope in some future issue to bring you a report on
this tremendous advance in union responsibility.4
Workers were also concerned about quality. In 1954 the union
newspaper contained an extended discussion about the importance of
quality work, and in an editorial asked "Scrap - What Is it?" The writer
understood the importance of quality as it related to in-plant costs as well
2 Craftsman, December, 1948. Management thought highly enough of these workers to
place each of their photographs and a small biography in the newsletter.
3 Lazonick, Competitive Advantage, p. 291.
4 Labor Bulletin (LB), February, 1951, p. 2.
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as long-term customer satisfaction. These are concepts that many U.S.
corporations only began to realize and articulate in the last ten years.
It means time wasted, money wasted, material wasted
and it's like water going down the drain. Each person
from any level in the American Bosch should take time
to analyze why a certain piece of work was scrapped and
that it actually means money out of their pocket, plus
maybe eventually loss of jobs, because we cannot meet
the necessary standards and commitments of our
customers.5
In the "Stray Bits" section of the Bulletin a milling machine
operator in Department 191 commented, "Production here has always
been a head ache. Be sure to make your new foreman understand that you
know more about the work than he does." Workers in Department 180
complained that: " The machines are so old it is not possible to produce
products to blueprint tolerances." They asked management, "Why put
employees on a spot?" 6
By 1960 union leaders were still concerned about the quality issue
and counseled workers to "Exercise utmost care in the manufacture of
parts or in assembly. Take pride in your craftsmanship." In the same
front page article the union articulated its vision of how things should
work in the plant. "The business is there, it won't come to us, we have to
secure it by quality, fair pricing, and dependability. It can be done with the
same people that led Bosch on top once - the members of Local 206." 7
5 LB, November, 1954, p. 4. This issue will be discussed again in ch. 6 as the union reacts to
management reorganization plans that limit union involvement.
6 LB, April, 1954, p. 3.
7
"Our Jobs," LB, April, 1960, p.l.
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By the mid-1960s the shop floor sense that union members had a
vital role to play in improving quality, solving shop floor production
problems, securing new work, and keeping customers satisfied had waned
considerably. Piece work rate cuts and deep layoffs drove a wedge between
the union and management. A Bulletin editorial, "Morale - And No
Bread", contained this:
Let's go back five years before the Hot Shots took over the
Bosch via New York City. Machines not so fast; parts good.
Local 206 members were in the main contented to give a good
week's work for a good week's pay and good parts to boot.
Morale was high, the Bosch wasn't the worst place to work.
Today, morale is what you can get a cup of coffee for if you also
have a dime.... The human has a strange knack for adapting
himself to any situation. If you have 2,000 people with
problems and no attempt is made to correct these same
problems you will have 2,000 people adapting themselves, if
you follow. 8
Union leaders and workers spent several years demanding that they
be allowed to participate in improving the shop floor in a more
meaningful way. Skilled workers did not want to simply take orders from
foremen and supervisors they had little respect for or confidence in when
it came to producing quality diesel pumps and fuel injection components.
Management turned a deaf ear to these overtures, as after World War II
the single Springfield plant grew into a world-wide corporation.
8
"Morale and No Bread," LB, June, 1966, p.l.
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American Bosch: 1911 - 1945
Early History: 1911 - 1940
The Springfield plant was built in 1911 on what had been
prosperous farm land along the banks of the Connecticut River by Robert
Bosch, founder of the Bosch Magneto Company in 1886 in Stuttgart,
Germany. From the early 19th century the Connecticut River Valley
metalworking region boasted highly skilled workers, firms responsible for
innovations in machine tool design, and many small foundries and tool
and die shops complementing large producers by providing services to
them. Robert Bosch chose wisely when he built in Springfield. 9
Old photographs show lab-coated machinists utilizing their skills to
produce parts for the emerging automobile and truck industry. By 1920
the four-story plant turned out 50 percent of the all of the electrical starter
parts required by the U.S. vehicle industry and employed almost 3,000
workers, up from 800 in 1917. In the late 1920s the company began to
make radio equipment in the Main Street factory as well. During World
War I the plant was seized by the U.S. government for security reasons
and sold at auction to local buyers. Robert Bosch bought back controlling
interest in the firm in 1930 and changed the name to the American Bosch
Company (AB). In 1938 AB began to manufacture fuel injection
equipment for the aircraft and automotive industries. Even during the
9 For an overview of this development in the Connecticut River valley see Michael Best,
The New Competition (Cambridge, 1990) esp. ch. 1 and David Hounshell, From the
American System to Mass Production, 1800 - 1932 (Maryland, 1984) ch.l.
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Depression the firm made money; sales increased to $7.5 million from $6.1
million between 1935 and 1936. 10
In the early 1930s workers approached management on issues of
wage and vacation improvements and seniority protection. A company
union was established and tried to negotiate pay raises and some
protections for high seniority workers against arbitrary layoffs. Little
headway was made, and workers eventually contacted and met with
representatives of United Electrical Workers Local 202 from the near-by
Springfield Westinghouse Electric plant. Signatures were slowly and
secretly collected, and on October 16, 1936 Local 206 was chartered and
recognized by the Congress of Industrial organizations as the bargaining
agent for workers. The local became the second in the region to be
recognized by the CIO and one of many significant metalworking plants in
the Connecticut River valley to be organized by the U.E. 11
The War Years
The outbreak of World War II led to the rapid expansion of the
plant. In 1941 the U.S. Office of Production Management (OPM)
authorized Bosch officials to build a $700,000 facility for aircraft magnetos.
The Federal Defense Plant Corporation (FDPC) provided $400,000 worth of
new machine tools for the expansion. In addition, the company opened a
production facility in Providence, Rhode Island that employed close to 600
workers. Growth might have been greater, but the OPM blocked a
10 Orra Stone, History of Massachusetts Industries, (Boston, 1930) p. 543.
H The development of Local 206 will be discussed in chapter 5. A great deal of
information on the early history of the local is contained in the 25th anniversary special
issue of the Local 206 Bulletin, Sept. 1963, Local 206 Collection, UMass Archives.
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$2,000,000 appropriation to more than double Bosch's production
capability. OPM wanted magnetos built in plants shifting from
automobile production to war-related activity. Even with the more
modest expansion, profits for the first six months of 1942 were four times
greater than in all of 1941. 12
Just as during World War I, the government was concerned about
the loyalties of Bosch management, and at the end of 1941 the US Treasury
assumed operation of the plant, seizing control of 77 percent of the stock
owned by Swedish interests. It was later learned that the Swedish
stockholders were serving as a front for German industrialists closely
associated with the Robert Bosch Corporation. Responsibility for the day-
to-day management of the plant shifted to the federal Alien Property
Custodian's Office (APC), with Donald Hess installed as president.
The APC's Leo Crowley became the owner of what had been
foreign-owned stock, and had the authority to sell it at his discretion. Also
in 1942, at the urging of the Treasury Department, 23 employees - all non-
US citizens - were terminated as "security risks". Twelve of the 23 came
from the Engineering Department, including the vice president in charge
of product development. With ownership and citizenship issues
satisfactorily resolved, the plant received $4,000,000 more in leased
machine tools from the FDPC in the Spring of 1942 to further expand
production. 13
Bosch was now immersed in the military - industrial complex, a
connection that would contribute to wild employment swings during and
after World War II, and the Korea and Viet Nam Wars. By 1942 every
12 Springfield Morning Union (SMU), February 14, 1941; Springfield Daily News (SDN),
March 15, 1942.
13 SDN, March 27, May 7, 1942; SMU, March 27, June 22, 1942.
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purchaser of its magnetos and fuel injection equipment worked directly
for the Defense Department. These firms also benefited from direct
government investments in machine tools throughout the war years.
Economist Ann Markusen indicates that close to 92 percent of the
investment in aircraft and related manufacturing capacity came from the
federal government at this time. Rapid war plant growth dramatically
reduced the country's unemployment according to historian David Noble.
In 1939 there were 63,000 workers in the aircraft and parts industries.
"During the war employment reached an all-time peak of 1,345,000 and
then dropped to 237,000 in 1946." Noble found that the machine tool
industry boomed as well. "In 1940, only 28 percent of machine tools in use
were less than ten years old; in 1945 the ratio had risen to 62 percent." 14
Connecticut River Valley machine tool builders like Van Norman
in Springfield, Massachusetts and Jones and Lamson, Fellows Gear Shaper,
and Bryant Grinders in Springfield, Vermont owed their explosive growth
to government efforts to retool military contractors. Federal expenditures
stimulated employment gains in smaller metalworking companies as
well, in Athol, Greenfield and Millers Falls, Massachusetts, located forty
miles north of Springfield, Massachusetts, near the Vermont boarder.
Greenfield Tap and Die, Millers Falls Tool, Union Twist Drill, and another
dozen firms manufactured tools and excessories for machine tool builders
and engaged in direct sales to greater-Springfield, Massachusetts war
producers like the Bosch, Westinghouse, and the Armory.
The United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union, aware
of the job growth in the Connecticut River valley, made a concerted effort
14 Ann Markusen, Dismantling the Cold War Economy (New York, 1992) p. 42 - 43; David
Noble, Forces of Production (New York, 1986) p. 5, 8.
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to place organizers in the region. For example, employment growth in
and around Springfield, Vermont prompted U.E. organizer Hugh Harley
to call for the union to establish itself in the city "on a permanent basis
and go to work convincing the town of our program." But, at war's end,
over 300,000 machine tools were declared surplus by the government and
dumped on the U.S. market at bargain basement prices, forcing machine
tool builders to curtail production and layoff thousands of workers. 15
Since parts produced in the Bosch plant were critical to the war
effort, tool room, machine tool set up, and other skilled workers routinely
received deferments and remained on the job throughout the war. By
1942 Bosch magnetos powered virtually every plane, including those
produced by Boeing, Gruman, Vultee and Sikorsky Aircraft. Battleships,
aircraft carriers, destroyers and submarines sported engines with Bosch
fuel injectors. Highly skilled machinists, operators and assemblers were
turning out precision parts with tolerances as close as 39 millionths of an
inch, far less than the width of a human hair. A 1945 issue of Steel
Horizon, an industry trade publication, praised this quality work. "In the
manufacture of diesel fuel injection equipment tolerances are measured
not just in thousandths of an inch, which is generally accepted as precision
manufacture, but in hundred-thousandths, a degree of accuracy not found
in the finest of watches... ." 16
To maintain magneto production during the war Bosch managers
and engineers established a wide-ranging network of companies to
15 Markusen, p. 42 - 43; Noble, p. 5, 8; United Electrical Workers Archives, University of
Pittsburgh Library, Hugh Harley Files, File Folder (FF.) 440. This folder contains a series
of letter between field organizer Hugh Harley and James Matles, UE's national director of
organization. Letter quoted is a hand written note dated July 17, 1943.
16 The article, "Top Notchers in Production" was quoted in SMU , April 6, 1945; SMU, June
7, 1944.
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contribute various components to the final product, Engineers worked
Willi the Whitin Machine Works in Whitinsville, Massachusetts winch
normally built textile machinery and in the Fall of 1942 it began producing
magnetos. Other firms involved included Rogers, Lunt and Bowlen, a
Greenfield, Massachusetts silversmith and the Sacco-Lowell Shops in
Biddeford, Maine. Bosch engineers set up quality control programs at each
participating site to encourage mutual interchangability of all parts
produced. 17
To further bolster and insure output Local 206 took a no-strike
pledge for the duration of the conflict. A Labor-Management War
Production Committee formed, with the aim of eliminating scrap to
insure a steady shipment of high quality parts to final assemblers of
planes, tanks and other equipment. At one point 27 workers stayed in the
plant around the clock for four days to produce fuel injection equipment
for several battleships damaged in the battle of Midway. In August, 1944
the local was awarded the Army and Navy "E" award for production
excellence. 1 H
Sales and employment rose spectacularly throughout the war on
the strength of such capabilities: Sales were $13 million in 1941, reached
$31 million in 1942 and climbed to $50 million by the end of 1943. Over
the same period employment jumped to 6,700 from slightly under 1,000 in
1941. Sales and employment peaked in 1944 at $61.2 million and 7,300.
The Al'C paid out small stock dividends during these years, but chose to
set aside close to $2 million in cash to assist in what it anticipated would be
a costly adjustment to peacetime production. These cash reserves would
17 American Bosch Company, A Story of Teamwork (Springfield/ 1977). It is looted in the
business files of the Pioneer Valley Historical Society.
18 LB, Vol. 12 ^September, 1963.
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figure prominently in the return of the plant to civilian ownership in
1948. 19
At war's end the Main Street facility was swiftly demobilized and
the Rhode Island plant closed. National predictions were for five million
jobless workers by late Fall, 1945. The Navy alone canceled just over $7
billion in orders by the end of August. In Western Massachusetts and
Connecticut 823 contracts worth $250 million were abruptly halted on
August 16. Firms losing work included Bosch, Cogswell Machine, Gilbert
and Barker, Package Machinery, Smith and Wesson, and Westinghouse.
One hundred thousand greater-Springfield jobs were now at risk. Several
firms began immediate layoffs while they attempted to plan for the future.
Jet engine maker Pratt and Whitney in Hartford closed a plant it had
opened in East Longmeadow, Massachusetts during the war, laying off
1,200 and curtailed all production for two weeks, a move that affected
25,000 workers. Perkins Machine in Springfield and Westinghouse each
laid off 1,500 workers. 20
Between June and September 1945 Bosch employment plummeted
to just under 3,000 from 7,300 and dipped in 1946 to about 2,000 as the APC
wrestled with what to do with the workforce and the plant's precision
metalworking equipment. Bosch order cancellations totaled $15 million
by the end of August, 1946. Company hopes were now attached to two
things, a speedy shift to what was perceived as pent up demand for
automotive products, and new product development taking place in the
19 LB, March 23, June 2, 9, 1943. Profits in 1943 were almost $4 million, however the APC
held on to $2.5 million of it. LB, April 5, 1944, March 21, 1945.
20 SR, August 3, p. 19, August 15, p. 1; August 16, p.l; August 17, p.l; August 20, p.l. These
layoffs were abrupt because as late as August 3rd local newspapers were running help
wanted advertisements for area metalworking firms.
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plant's research and engineering laboratory, called "the most complete of
its kind for any company of its size in the country." 2 !
The Emerging Electrical Manufacturing Industry
Bosch emerged from the war as part of the electrical machinery and
components sector of the manufacturing economy. Output in this sector
declined by 12.2 percent between July, 1948 and June of 1949 before making
a rapid recovery during the Korean War. Electrical machinery sales
increased 106.2% between 1949 and 1950 to $16.7 billion from $8.1 billion,
by comparison all manufacturing increased sales 50 percent over the same
period. The entire industry contracted again during the 1953-1954
recession that followed the Korean War build-down, then recovered again
as output increased 22.7 percent between 1954 and 1957. Output dropped
again in 1957 and 1958. Economist Jules Backman characterized the
industry in the 1950s as follows: "Production in the electrical machinery
industry swings wildly during the business cycle. This is typical of the
behavior of durable goods industries."22
Demand volatility, in turn, caused employment instability. This
was exacerbated by significant productivity gains per worker throughout
the industry. Between 1939 and 1954 output per man-hour increased 65.5
percent compared to 40 percent for all manufacturing. Backman attributes
this gain to three things: capital investments, managerial know-how, and
research and development expenditures. The percentage increase of
21 Springfield Evening News, September 19, 1945, p. 1.
22 Jules Backman, The Economics of the Electrical Manufacturing Industry (New York,
1962) p. 36. Output figures are taken from tables in Backman, p 33 - 36. Firms in this
industry numbered 7,066 in 1958 up from 1,979 in 1939, an almost 360 percent increase
(Backman, p. 77).
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capital expenditures in electrical machinery far outdistanced the increase
for all manufacturing from 1939 to 1960. 'Trior to World War II the
amount of capital invested per production worker in the electrical
machinery industry was $4,627. By 1958 the amount invested per worker
had more than tripled to $14,248. This placed the sector third, behind
automobiles, instruments, and machine tools in investments per
production worker. 23 Electrical machinery research expenditures in 1957
amounted to 4.85 percent of total sales compared to aircraft, 2.62 percent,
and textile machinery, 1.75 percent. 24
The impact of research expenditures on hiring is apparent when
changes in the numbers of production and salaried workers in the
industry are analyzed and compared to other industries and
manufacturing generally. Electrical machinery employment increases
substantially in both categories, while production workers decline. In all
industries reviewed the number of salaried workers grows, but electrical
machinery percentage gains are double. (Table 3.1 - Percentage Changes in
Number of Workers). Salaried worker growth reflects the substantial
hiring of engineers and technicians.25
By 1960 the electrical machinery industry employed 1.3 million
persons, third highest among manufacturing industries. The sector had in
excess of a half a million more jobs than either aircraft or motor vehicles
li Capital investments per worker were as follows: automobiles, $19,591; instruments,
$15,540; machine tools, $14,942; electrical machinery, $14,248; textiles, $8,950; apparel,
$3,400 (Backman, p. 191-194).
24 Backman, p. 180-185. Backman calculated 1957 expenditures on research and
development and found the following : aircraft, $2.54 million; electrical equipment, $1.17
million; machine tools, $688 thousand. Automobile research and development expenditures
were calculated with a broader group of industries including rubber products, tobacco,
furniture, and printing. This entire group's outlay was just $921,000 (Backman, p. 189).
25 Backman, p. 202-203.
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Table 3.1: Percentage changes in numbers of electrical
1947 - 1960.
production
Electrical machinery 22.5
Machinery except, electrical -6.2
All manufacturing
-4.1
Automobiles
-5.5
Blast furnaces /steel
-11.0
and provided more than twice as many jobs as the basic steel industry.
This was the context in which the Springfield Bosch took shape during the
1950s. 26
The AMRA Connection Is Made
It took until the middle of 1948 for the ownership issue to be settled.
Until then the seven-person board running the plant was dominated by
five lawyers. Only one local manufacturer, Roger Putnam, sat on the
board and he spoke out for the sale of the firm to manufacturers. The
Morning Union also pointed out that "in as much as Bosch is a
manufacturer of metal products rather than legal briefs it might be well to
get more persons familiar with the former production on the board."27 In
July the APC's 77 percent share was offered in a sealed bid procedure.
Interested bidders included Detroit diesel pump manufacturer Excello
Corporation, stockbrokers Lehmam Brothers, Electric Auto Lite of Toledo,
Ohio, and Belk Simpson, a small Greenville, South Carolina
manufacturer. The plant was sold to top bidder Allen and Company, an
26 Figures from Backman, p. 19.
27 SDN, September 19, 1945; SMU, April 7, 1948.
industry workers
salaried
107.5
57.7
63.2
32.3
52.1
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investor group representing the New York-based financial holding
company AMRA Corporation for $6 million, or $11.28 a share. Since in
April assets of the plant had been valued at $13.5 million, or $13.64 a share,
the price was indeed right.
AMRA was a two-year old financial holding company whose board
of directors consisted of partners in several Wall Street law firms and the
presidents of the American Securities Corporation and the American
Overseas Development Corporation. It was the principle owner of
Brooklyn and Garden City, New York based ARMA Corporation, a
manufacturer of gyroscopes and precision electrical measurement
equipment, in business since 1918. ARMA had serious problems at the
time of the Bosch acquisition because of the loss of sizable defense
contracts. Its workforce of 1,800 was down from 9,000 at the conclusion of
the war, a staggering 80 percent decline. The company remained highly
dependent on military contracts to finance research and development of
new products, including control systems, computer devices, and search
lights and gun control technology for the Navy and Air Force. This caused
problems after 1945, and now AMRA was determined to find commercial
applications for products built in the two production facilities. An
immediate effort was launched to manufacture a first-of-its-kind
computer controlled lathe, the Arma-Matic. The corporate relationship
with Bosch, and the establishment of a manufacturing presence in greater-
Springfield, was part of a strategy to gain access to the machine tool
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building market and high-skilled precision machinists capable of
manufacturing the lathe. 28
Readers of area newspapers were reminded that Charles Allen had
done business in Western Massachusetts before. Allen acquired stock
control of the Wickwire Spencer Steel Company in the late 1930s and
subsequently merged it with Colorado Fuel and Iron, ceasing area
operations. When asked, Allen said moving Bosch out of Springfield
would be "unthinkable". AMRA would now run the two companies,
American Bosch and ARMA, as divisions of a 2,000 worker corporation. 29
Two weeks after the sale it was revealed that AMRA may have
actually put up less than $1.5 million in cash to acquire the company. The
cash reserves the APC had salted away during the war totaled close to $5
million, augmented by a retooling fund of $500,000. The Springfield
Union questioned the way the sale had gone, concerned that a local buyer
had not been found. It wrote that:
The cash figure is of particular interest because it is contended
in some quarters that ownership of the American Bosch
could have been brought to Springfield if there had been 10
men willing to put up $150,000 each. But it was conceded that
the days are apparently gone when that amount of money
could be raised locally because of what seems to be a present
lack of interest in such ventures.30
In 1949 the holding company was reorganized into a new
corporation, American Bosch-ARMA (ABA), with headquarters in New
28 SMU
,
July 10, 1948. Noble, p. 88-89. When job loss in both companies is analyzed, the
merged firm went from a combined 16,300 to 3,800 employees. At the time of the merger
employment was 23 percent of what it had been at the height of war-time production.
29 SMU, July 10, 1948. - v
30SM!i, July 22, 26, 1948.
69
York City. ARMA's Brooklyn plant employed 1,800 workers, 500 oi them
engineers. Ostensibly the plan was to ship production work from the
Brooklyn plant to Springfield so it could locus exclusively on military ami
machine tool research and development. Under the reorganization Bosch
became the owner of ARM A, which made Bosch's substantial (ash
reserves of $7 million available to the merged corporation. These reserves
had grown in 1946 and 1947, when in spile of Bosch's showing a profit, the
directors paid out no dividends to stockholders. In a bold stroke, the
merger statement detailed how $6.5 million in cash would be used to pay
off all bank loans including the $3.5 million AMRA had borrowed to buy
Bosch just the year before. A plant with assets valued at over $1,1 million
had changed hands. The purchaser made a tidy profit on the deal and
corporate control, though never firmly rooted in Springfield, shilted
permanently to New York C ity. 11
Donald Hess, head of Bosch since 1938, became director of the
merged ABA while keeping his title as president of the Bosch plant.
ARMA was to be led by Herbert (iuterman, an electrical engineer with
considerable manufacturing experience at General Hlectric and Raytheon.
Men who understood production were in charge, and the merged
corporation's manufacturing future appeared bright.
Indicative of the factory floor strategy ABA would pursue
throughout the 1950s, the Arma-Matic lathe received special attention and
became a symbol of management's emphasis on research and
development and labor cost controls. The lathe had been developed by
11 Workforce levels arc found in Local 206 membership and seniority lists, UMass Archives.
Manufacturing valued added in the industry rose from $ lM I million on the eve of World
War ll to almost $4 billion in L949 and $io.6 billion in 1958 (Schatz, The Electrical
Workers, p. 8).
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology-trained physicist Frederick
Cunningham. According to historian David Noble, Cunningham closely
examined job orders for existing lathes in the ARMA plant, and
determined that an automatic lathe could boost production considerably.
Cunningham wrote that the objective was "to make a machine which
would be converted quickly from one job to another. It was intended to
take only seconds to change a piece of stock and the tape, and only a few
minutes to prepare the tape." Business Week reported that the real value
of the new machine tool is that "A man doesn't have to be skilled to run
stock through a machine. And, he could also run up to four machines
simultaneously."
Throughout the 1950s Bosch and other area manufacturers looked
to similar solutions to cut labor costs. Machine tool builders made direct
appeals to their customers that in order to stay competitive in the global
economy, automatically controlled machine tools designed to perform
several manufacturing processes simultaneously, needed to be utilized.
Bosch corporate management hoped that the firm would play a significant
role in the transformation of not just their own shop floor, but others
across the country. 32
Old-style drill presses, turret lathes, and grinding machines required
the focused concentration of a worker who had to utilize both hands and
eyes to insure the successful completion of a machining task. Now, for
example, the Kingsbury Corporation offered a line of machine tools that
could take the place of several operators. "You need several general-
purpose machines and several operators to keep up with one Kingsbury
and one operator... . You pay for more operators, more supervision, more
32 Business Week quoted in Noble, p. 90.
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handling and more space." The Bosch plant would purchase several
machines like this from Kingsbury during the late 1950s and early 1960s.33
Work Leaves Springfield: A Southern Strategy Hmprgps
Corporate decisions affected employment levels in a more dramatic
and visible way with the 1953 announcement that a manufacturing facility
was to be constructed in Mississippi. In a letter to workers, company
President Donald Hess stated that such a move to a low-cost area was
essential if the corporation was to maintain its competitive edge in such
large volume goods as voltage regulators, windshield wipers, and small
motors. The Springfield plant recently lost high volume production work
for Ford to southern competitors, and had no intention of losing once
again.34
Mississippi was irresistible to Hess. Referring to economic
development officials in Mississippi he commented: "They will help find
a plant site; they will build a building and rent it to you at a very
reasonable rate. They will arrange to put in railroad sidings; provide good
roads to the plant; run in water and sewers and do everything else you
need to make the proposition attractive." He went on "When one or
more companies start producing in an area where operating costs are
much lower, other competitive companies in the same field also have to
move in order to survive. Its either move or quit." The 1953 decision to
33 The American Machinist and other trade publications are replete with advertisements
promoting machine tools that will lower worker skill requirements, allow several
machining operations to be combined, and create the possibilities for an operator to run
several machines simultaneously. The Kingsbury advertisement is in the American
Machinist, June 12, 1950, p. 26-27.
34 Hess letter quoted in SMU, April 15, 1953.
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establish a facility in Columbus was big news because it marked the first
time skilled metalworking jobs were lured away from Springfield - it
would not be the last.35
To be sure, northern companies had built plants in the South
before. United States Steel decided in the early 1930s to build two new
coke ovens, two cold rolling mills, a continuous strip mill, and a turning
mill in the South 36 a 1951 Business Week (BW) article, "Plant Transfers
Irk Unions," discussed United Auto Workers' attempts to block Ford
Motor Company from shifting production out of Detroit. Rouge Local 600
had already lost 20,000 jobs by work transfers since the end of World War
EL General Motors announced plans to build a new plant in Arlington,
Texas. The BW writer well understood the dilemma these corporate
investment decisions placed unions in. "In expanding times such plants
are additions, not replacements. What bothers the unions is that
ultimately they may result in diminished operations at earlier sites. This
is a greater concern to local unions than internationals."37
Southern Manufacturing Grows
Southern efforts to encourage industries to relocate dated back at
least twenty years. In 1937 the governors of nine Southern states agreed to
establish a $500,000 fund to hire a former secretary of the Democratic
National Committee to coordinate a national advertising campaign in
leading newspapers and magazines extolling the region's cheap power and
efficient and reasonably paid native-born labor. Several Mississippi cities,
35 SMU, April 15, 1953, p. 1.
36 SR, October 17, 1936, p. 18.
37 Business Week, "Plant Transfers Irk Unions," December 1, 1951, p. 36.
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overzealous in their recruitment efforts, were charged with misusing
Works Progress Administration (WPA) funds during the mid-1930s. In a
highly publicized case Ellisville, Mississippi spent $26,00 of WPA funds
ostensibly to build a vocational center. Instead it turned the money over
to a hosiery company that had fled Pennsylvania during a strike. The
money was used to purchase knitting machines, and trainees produced
finished goods for the company for $4.00 a week. Mississippi
communities, with state financial assistance, took the lead in perfecting
strategies in the 1930s that other southern states would soon use to entice
textile and apparel mills to the South during the 1940s and 1950s.38
Several states established Balance Agriculture With Industry
programs (BAWI) in a concerted effort to break their dependence on
agriculture. Mississippi issued $5,360,000 in industrial bonds through
BAWI initiatives by 1950. The cumulative direct benefit to Mississippi can
be seen in the fact that by 1958 plants constructed there provided almost
23,000 jobs and paid out $60.5 million in wages. This jumped to 36,000
employees and $100 million in wages by 1959. The Mississippi BAWI
program was responsible for 76 percent of the state's increased
employment and 34 percent of its earnings between 1940 and 1958. The
Bosch move was part of a concerted Mississippi effort to develop a vibrant
manufacturing base.39
Across the south, publicity appeals for BAWI were predicated on the
availability of low cost, non-union labor. States, and even cities in the
same state, competed against each other to attract manufacturers. A
38 The states in the consortium were North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Tennessee,
Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, SDN, October 1, 1937, p. 16; James Cobb,
The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development (Urbana, 1993)
p. 7-8.
39 Cobb, p. 29-30.
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Clanton, Alabama advertisement boasted of "no hostile unions here and
none desired." South Carolina claimed there were no unions or union
activity and that "workers give a day's work for a day's pay." One
Mississippi city extolled the virtues of it's "wonderful labor, 98 percent
native born, mostly high school graduates," who will "lower average
hourly industrial wage rates 5 cents to 49 cents below other Southern states
and from 50 cents to 95 cents below Northern states." During a 1951
campaign to attract the Whirlpool Corporation, Mississippi Governor
Fielding Wright wrote to Whirlpool corporate officers that "The particular
area you have in mind has an abundance of intelligent native labor and is
entirely free of those conditions that tend to impair employer - employee
relations."40
Managers of unionized firms often alluded to this "Southern
hospitality" when wage issues were discussed during negotiations. Wages
were viewed by companies as their largest fixed cost. Movement to the
South could reduce wages. Companies also used the threat of relocation to
hold down raises during collective bargaining.
General Electric adopted a southern strategy immediately after
World War II to take advantage of lower wages and break up its corporate
concentration in the Northeast. At the end of 1948 factories were closed in
Kokomo, Indiana and Scranton, Pennsylvania. Others adopted global
location strategies. The Syracuse, New York-based Easy Washer
Corporation closed a plant with 1,800 jobs, and opened a new one in South
Africa, while Remington Rand also shut a plant in Syracuse and moved
the work to Scotland. Textron Corporation shifted production out of
40 Cobb, p. 97 - 98, 100.
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Massachusetts to Puerto Rico and closed textile plants in New Hampshire,
relocating in the South.41
In a 1946 report to its members, the United Electrical, Radio, and
Machine Workers (U.E.) union raised three critical issues related to
fighting job and plant relocations. First, every effort needed to be made to
organize the South in order to break the low-wage possibilities the
unorganized region offered to companies, and help eliminate racial
discrimination. Second, as companies shifted plants out of the Northeast
and decentralized production in smaller shops, unions had to develop
organizing strategies that took such changes into account. Finally, unions
needed to develop a community base of support to sustain their strength
in the face of relocation strategies. The U.E. was right to be concerned
about plant relocations out of their stronghold in the Northeast.42
Plant Relocations 1929 - 1954
In an influential 1962 study, Changes in the Location of
Manufacturing in the United States Since 1929, economist Victor Fuchs
analyzed plant and employment location shifts from 1929 to 1954 in
several industries. Felt goods and textile products were two of the top
three in plant movement during these years. What was surprising was
the large-scale movement of aircraft and related components plants. This
shift had implications for the Northeast, particularly Massachusetts and
Connecticut, home to several industries, including United Aircraft and
General Electric, involved in aircraft-related production. When
41 UE News, December 25, 1948, p. 6 - 7.
42 UE News, September 14, 1946, p. 7. Ch. 6 will examine what strategies unions used in
Springfield when faced with plant closing and relocations in the 1950s and 1960s.
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metalworking sectors - forgings, electrical machinery, foundries, and
special dies, tools, and attachments - are included plant and job loss is
considerable.43
Table 3.2: Location shifts by percent of value-added and percent of total
employment 1929 - 1954.
Industry Value added Total employment
Felt goods 45.8 44.4
Aircraft and parts 45 43.2
Textile goods 44 42.1
Engines, turbines 30.6 30.8
Woolen goods 27.2 23.2
Forgings 22.3 17.9
Textile machinery 19.5 19.6
Electrical machinery, equip. 15.4 14.3
Foundries 14.3 12.6
Special dies, tools, machine
attachments 14.2 14.3
Machinery 11 9.9
Fuchs determined which regions of the country were winners and
losers as a consequence of plant and job movement. New England was the
biggest loser in textile shifts, with the South Atlantic gaining the most
plants and jobs. In dies, tools and attachments, machinery, and electrical
machinery New England and the Middle Atlantic States lost out to the
West South Central, Pacific Coast, and South Atlantic states.44
In a special April, 1953 issue of its newsletter, Local 206 business
agent Jim Manning urged union members to oppose the Mississippi
move, labeling it the 'Mississippi Muddle': "Now we are facing a bitter
fight to maintain a Bosch plant in Springfield and we mean just that."
Hess came in for sharp criticism for betraying workers "in a manner as the
43 Victor Fuchs, Changes in the Location of Manufacturing in the United States Since 1929
(New Haven, 1962). Data taken from tables on p. 128 - 137.
44 Fuchs, p. 240.
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Japanese Ambassadors did just before Pearl Harbor." Ironically, Hess
served as a member of the Board of Directors of Future Springfield, Inc., an
organization working to bring manufacturing to the city.45
In a scene repeated countless times across Springfield over the next
twenty-five years as its principal industries were dismantled, machines
were crated up and loaded on trucks and rail cars for the trip to Columbus
during the Winter of 1954. Gapping holes dotted the factory floor where
machine tools had been. Production lines were curtailed, and 500 workers
received lay-off notices. First to go was the windshield wiper line,
followed by automatic seat motors and voltage regulators. The company
notified union officials that the move would be completed by January,
1955. To minimize any hardship the company and union resolved that all
other openings in the Springfield facility would be filled by workers slated
to lose their jobs, provided they could be trained to do the work. While
the union appeared optimistic that few, if any, workers would end up
permanently out of work, it is difficult to understand the source of such
optimism.
A City's Manufacturing Base At Risk: Westinghouse Rumors
The city's problems were compounded as rumors circulated that
Westinghouse was also considering a move out of Springfield. Open
since 1915, the plant was a cornerstone of the city's industry, like the Bosch
plant. Although the Westinghouse Board of Directors issued periodic
statements that it had no intention of closing the factory, a letter written by
45 LB, April 1953; Hess letter to workers, April 15, 1953.
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plant manager James Weaver in 1955 to the mayor of Springfield worried
city officials and workers. Weaver wrote:
If we (Westinghouse) are to get our share of the going
business the products we build here must be competitive in
price with similar products built by other companies in other
cities and states. If we are burdened with higher taxes than
our competitors, only because we are located in what others
interpret as a listless community, we're in trouble - real
trouble, and in order to even stay in business must create off-
setting economies in other ways.
Weaver was quite concerned that the city was going to pass its tax burden
on to industries that remained in Springfield, and wondered why
Westinghouse should have confidence in the city when a recently released
Springfield Taxpayers Bulletin said the city was 'financially sick'.46
In 1957 and 1958 rumors persisted that the East Springfield plant
would move production to Ohio. By the Summer of 1958 local
newspapers were reporting that a study commissioned by the
Westinghouse Board of Directors recommended the factory be closed as
quickly as possible. Westinghouse now admitted it was contemplating a
reorganization and consolidation of its six consumer products plants into
just two. A corporate press release stated: "There is a continuing survey at
our various Westinghouse plants across the country to determine what
facilities are best fitted or equipped for the various products we
manufacture." Soon after the press release the Daily News reported that a
decision had already been made to ship work to factories in Mansfield and
Columbus, Ohio. The article pointed out that during the recent national
46 DN, July 30, 1958, p. 1.
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Westinghouse strike workers at the Ohio facilities crossed picket lines and
kept the plants open. Since the majority of Springfield's work was
refrigerators and small appliances, workers and local officials now had
cause for concern. More troubling news for the city came when Chapman
Valve announced it was putting pattern makers on a three day a week
schedule because no new work work scheduled.
Finally, on October, 17, 1958 Westinghouse workers learned from
the Local 202 newspaper that a decision to shift work out of the city had in
fact been made. By March, 1959 the workforce dropped to 1,000 from 2,500
in mid-1958. This sharp drop was followed by smaller layoffs through the
1960s as employment fell below 200 before the plant closed entirely in
December, 1970.47
Bosch Workforce Shrinks Further - No New Work Arrives
Despite repeated assurances by management that work appropriate
to the skill levels in the plant would take the place of that shipped South,
new work did not arrive. Business agent Manning's request to allow laid
off workers to transfer to Mississippi was flatly rejected. By April, 1955
optimism dissipated and union officials began to wonder whether the
plant would lose more than just automotive jobs. A leader asked "where
are their so-called new jobs which will tide over the loss of jobs to
Mississippi." The union urged management to think about their
obligation to the community, and in a Bulletin editorial called on the
47DN, July 29, 1958, p. 1; July 30, 1958, p. 1; July 31, 1958, p. 1; August 12, 1958, p. 1. The
union article was quoted extensively in DN, October 17, 1958, p.l. The Lima, Ohio Local 724
president wished Local 202 well and said "I know that it was leaders like you that made it
possible for the scab-infested Ohio plants to receive a contract as good as the one we did in
1956."
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corporation, as "an employer who has prospered and grown in this
community to think of some of the debt it owes to its 44 years in this
locality." Appeals to management's to community spirit fell on deaf ears;
new management, after all, had shallow roots in Springfield.48
As the layoffs continued, floor space in Columbus more than
doubled in late 1957. Early in 1958 management notified the union that
generator and magneto products would be taken from Springfield to
"complete the consolidation of electrical manufacturing at the Columbus
plant, with the Springfield division concentrating on mechanical and
hydraulic products." Claims were no longer made that additional skilled
work would substitute for moved product lines. Alarmed, the Springfield
Industrial Commission appealed to corporate president, Charles Perelle to
reconsider.
As you are undoubtedly aware, the skilled labor and
craftsmen available in this area far surpass any other area in
the country. Any financial benefit that might accrue in
another section of the country would be offset by inferior
workmanship.49
It took eleven days for corporate officers to respond. C.A. Sharpe,
vice president of the corporation, met with Springfield Mayor Thomas
O'Connor on February 25th and assured him that work was expected to
pick up in the plant in the production of diesel pumps for farm
equipment. The increase, Sharpe claimed, would provide jobs for 70 of
48 LB, February, 1954; SMU, March 7, 1954; LB, April, 1954.
49 SDN, February 12, 1958, p. 1; Industrial Commission letter to Charles Perelle quoted in
SDN, February 15, 1958, p.6
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the some 250 laid off workers. O'Connor also learned during the meeting
that plans to move the generator and magneto lines to Mississippi had
been drawn up by a management consulting team in early 1954. In other
words, the 70 jobs available in agricultural equipment production were
entirely fortuitous, not part of a company plan to ease job loss.50
Conclusion: Springfield Industry Suffers
The Bosch announcement that a plant was to be built in Mississippi
added to a lengthy list of closings in Massachusetts and prompted recently
elected Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy to prepare a detailed
analysis of New England's economic problems. His findings, borrowed
from the report of President Truman's Council of Economic Advisors,
were released in a series of late Spring ,1953 speeches on the Senate floor.
Kennedy warned that the "defense contracts in the aircraft and
electrical machinery industries and the inflated Government payrolls and
other activities resulting from mobilization cover up the static position of
the private civilian economy of the region." He pointed out that "Even
after the Korean War boom nearly 40 percent of Massachusetts' textile
workers were jobless... . Instead of declining during the heavy
mobilization year of 1951, unemployment increased 150 percent in Fall
River, 103 percent in Lawrence, and far more in Nashua, New Hampshire,
and in the Rhode Island textile mills."51
Senator Kennedy expressed concern that Southern states were now
successful in encouraging companies with skilled workers to relocate their
50 SDN, February 26, 1958, p. 1.
51 Senator John F. Kennedy, "The Economic Problems of New England," Proceedings of the
83rd Congress, First Session, Vol. 99, (May 18, 1953) p. 5054- 5056.
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plants, referring to the Bosch plant as an example of this. He was prescient
in realizing that New England job loss during the 1950s was not going to
be confined to textiles and apparel as it had been in the 1930s and 1940s.
The Bosch case was sited in a Senate floor speech he delivered.
According to the Springfield Free Press, the American
Bosch Co., a permanent fixture in the industrial life in
the city of Springfield, is leaving its location in that city
for a free plant, free taxes for ten years, and low-wage
labor in Columbus, Mississippi.52
Kennedy spoke against federal tax legislation that allowed the
issuance of rapid tax amortization certificates to corporations that needed
to build new plants to meet defense orders. He argued that the program
simply provided a subsidy to move jobs out of the Northeast. He cited
examples of companies that received certificates, only to build new plants
in the South while closing northern factories. J.P. Stevens obtained such a
certificate in March, 1951 to construct a plant in Stanley, North Carolina
and a few days later shuttered a Haverhill, Massachusetts mill, putting
four hundred people out of work. General Electric secured a certificate for
$20 million to build a jet engine plant in Louisville, Kentucky and then
discovered that it needed a small area in the massive facility to build
engines. It then shut down factories in Trenton, N.J., White Plains, N.Y.,
South Scranton, Pa., and Bridgeport, Conn., moving 19,000 refrigerator,
washing machine and other appliance jobs to the new Louisville plant.
Westinghouse received close to $30 million in certificates, built plants in
52 Kennedy, "The Economic Problems of New England," (May 20, 1953) p. 5233.
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Columbus, Ohio and Raleigh, North Carolina and shifted work to them
from Springfield, Mass., and Newark, N.J.53
Kennedy gained a wider audience in a January, 1954 Atlantic
Monthly essay, "New England and the South: The Struggle for Industry."
Readers learned that close to 70 textile mills were liquidated in
Massachusetts since 1946, and that plant relocations were now taking place
in machinery, electrical equipment, paper, and chemicals. Kennedy
understood that plant shifts were subtle at first and echoed the views
contained in the 1951 BW article on closings. He wrote:
In only a small number of cases does direct migration take
place through closing New England plants and transferring
their operations to southern plants. More often, firms start
by operating mills in both New England and the South, then
tend to abandon their northern plants in periods of decline
and later expand their southern operations when prosperity
returns.54
To stem the job drain Kennedy called for a boost in the federal
minimum wage from its present 75 cents an hour. By comparison, the
average Massachusetts manufacturing wage was $1.64. Kennedy suggested
that a development strategy based on low wages could not be sustained
indefinitely as other regions of the world, including Latin America and
Asia, are developed. Such a strategy could result in the South suffering
"the same pangs of aging now suffered by New England," Kennedy
warned. 55
53 Kennedy, "The Economic Problems of New England," (May 20, 1953) p. 5235.
54 Kennedy, "New England and the South," The Atlantic Monthly (January, 1954) p. 33.
55 Kennedy, "New England and the South," p. 35.
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CHAPTER 4
CORPORATE CONTROL SOLIDIFIED: 1954 - 1960
Introduction
Between 1954 and 1960 management invested heavily in product
research and development, purchased machine tools, and instituted
inventory and quality control programs in an effort to upgrade the 40-year
old Springfield factory and increase its efficiency. At the same time high
volume, labor intensive production for the automotive industry was
relocated to a new plant in Mississippi. Simultaneously, a wedge was
driven between the union and management as every overture the union
made to play a positive role on the shop floor was rebuffed.
Management quite often recognized the importance of skilled
workers. In 1952, for example, the company newsletter carried
photographs of workers in its apprenticeship program at the local trade
high school. The company indicated that these high skilled workers were
essential to firm success, and paid the 44 blue collar workers to attend. But
by decade's end, the only courses being offered were to management, and
most had to do with how to gain increased output from front line
workers. A corporate strategy based on increased control over the shop
floor was put in place, and the plant's historic reliance on the input of
skilled workers virtually came to an end. 1
1
"New Training Program Looks Good," Craftsman (December, 1952) p. 6-7. In 1957 Progress
reported on a one-day a week training program for supervisors studying calibration, timing,
maintenance, and repair of diesel pumps, Progress, "Back to School for AB Staffers,"
August, 1957, p. 4.
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Charles Perelle Arrives in Springfield
In May, 1954 Charles Perelle was named president of American
Bosch Arma. He had an extensive manufacturing background, having
worked at Hughes Tool and Vultee Aircraft. He also had interacted with
labor unions before, having been at Vultee Aircraft during its bitter
confrontation with the United Auto Workers in the Fall of 1940. 2 Perelle
terminated a number of Springfield executives soon after he took over,
including both the production and works managers. In October 1954
Herbert Riddle, vice-president in charge of employee relations, suddenly
resigned. Riddle had worked at Bosch since 1940, and was considered by
everyone in the plant to be fair-minded. He had been given credit for the
establishment of what had been excellent labor-management relations
during and after the war. To replace Riddle, Perelle brought in Kenneth
Leaman, who had worked with him at Vultee Aircraft. James Mote was
named the manager of employee relations. Mote was widely disliked by
machine operators. He had worked in the Bosch for eight years, most of
them as manager of the standards department, where he oversaw the
establishment of production rates and standards rates throughout the
plant. Perelle had to realize that placing Mote in charge of labor relations
would anger the union.3
Next, Charles Tuttle was put in charge of labor relations for the
entire corporation. Perelle and Tuttle had been at Gar Wood together in
the late 1940s. Bosch union leaders wrote letters to several other
2 Workers struck at Vultee and presented a major challenge to the government's desire to
avoid work stoppages at plants engaged in war-related production. Nelson Lichtenstein,
Labor's War at Home (New York, 1982) p. 54, 57; Wyndham Mortimer, Organize: My Life
as A Union Man (Boston, 1971) p. 170-171.
3 SMU, October 25, 26, 1954.
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industrial unions inquiring about Turtle. Frank Fagan, International
Representative for Region 1 of the United Automobile Workers (UAW)
responded that Turtle had been in charge of labor relations for the Gar
Wood Company from 1945 - 1951 and the UAW had definite impressions
of his work. According to Fagan the UAW and Gar Wood had enjoyed
"the very best of relations and our differences were kept to a minimum."
But with Tuttle in charge the union felt a "severe change in attitude on
the part of the Company." Foremen and production superintendents were
no longer willing to settle grievances on the shop floor; foremen who did,
often had decisions reversed by Tuttle. Tuttle also instituted foremen's
classes on how to limit the scope of the contract agreement and turn it into
"a technical document and not a co-operative working agreement."4
As an example of Tuttle's anti-union approach, Fagan noted that he
helped precipitate a costly six month strike at Gar Wood by upholding the
discharge of a worker with 28 years seniority for sitting on a stool while
performing an operation on his job, a practice he had engaged in for over
20 years with the knowledge of his supervisor. Tuttle also discharged the
chief union steward who came to the worker's defense.
The grievance procedure and labor agreement were no longer
viewed as problem-solving tools with Tuttle in charge of labor relations,
Fagan pointed out. Tuttle's objective was to keep the union on-edge and
on the defensive. Fagan warned the I.U.E. that Tuttle tried to bypass
collective bargaining to elicit one-on-one deals with union representatives
and that he "is a dangerous fellow to talk business with on the telephone."
The letter concluded with this character analysis:
4 Frank Fagan Letter to International Union of Electrical Workers, March 1, 1955 (in Local
206 collection, Series 2, Box 5, University of Massachusetts, Amherst Labor Archives).
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He is an outspoken opponent of the Union shop, check-off,
seniority agreements, and other basic Union demands. He
believes that companies must have freedom to operate
without restrictions. He is a cold, arrogant, and highly
technical man. He admits having had no experience with
working people other than in his present capacity as a Labor
Relations man...
. Since Tuttle left us in 1951, real collective
bargaining has been restored and maintained.5
Other changes followed at Bosch. Floor space in the Mississippi
plant doubled, while company officials assured Springfield workers and
political leaders that "American Bosch intends to utilize its main plant in
Springfield to the fullest possible extent for the manufacture of its other
products such as diesel fuel injection equipment, jet engine components
and other defense items which are more highly specialized, not-so-
competitive products and more suitable for the type of operation here."6
In 1953 when the Mississippi plans were first announced local
newspapers quoted a Bosch's vice-president of operations on the
construction of the Mississippi factory. "How can we get panicky if it is
now decided that expansion should be made by manufacturing certain
electrical products somewhere else and replacing them at Springfield with
additional specialized precision products." A year had passed - machinery
was being moved to Mississippi and 450 workers were losing their jobs -
prompting the following from the newspaper: "What additional
specialized precision products the company plans to introduce here after
the move to Columbus, Mississippi have not yet been indicated."7
5 Fagan letter, March 1, 1955.
6 SDN, September 9, 1955.
7 SMUX April 25, 1953, Feb. 25, 1954.
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With Leaman, Mote, and Tuttle in charge of labor relations, union
leaders were forced to discuss grievances and settle shop floor problems
with a labor relations team devoid of any plant history. The company
now avoided past practices in the plant whenever possible, and set out to
establish their own way of doing things.
Disquiet on the Shop Floor
Throughout 1954 the union publicly and pointedly questioned
whether foremen and supervisors knew what they were doing on the
shop floor. There had been little criticism of management prior to this,
but now through the Bulletin writers kept up constant criticism and
ridiculed line supervisors, tagging them with such derisive nicknames as
Dan 'No Answer Today' Sullivan, Art 'Hurry Up' Domilla, Ernest 'I'll
Take Care of it Tomorrow' McLean, Patrick 'Puddin Head'Judd and
Charles 'Cut Rate' McCobb. This derision stemmed from workers'
frustrations that shop floor problems were not being solved in a timely
manner. The union protested that the company was seeking increased
profitability by pushing workers harder. Very much on the defensive,
members ratified a labor agreement containing a modest wage increase
during 1954 negotiations, after agreeing to extend the contract three times.
Workers were unhappy but wanted to avoid a confrontation with Perelle
and his new management team, at least for the moment.8
8 LB, April, May, 1954; SMU, September 18, 1954.
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Labor-Managempnt Committee Eliminated
In his first letter to plant workers Perelle pointed out, "I am relying
on all of you to help in every way you can to increase our business and
overall efficiency so that we can maintain our competitive position
without drastic changes." Workers had to wonder what Perelle had in
mind when he used the phrase without drastic changes. One of his major
decisions was the elimination of the plant's labor-management
committee. It was unclear to the union just how this would help increase
overall efficiency. 9
The committee had been in place for 19 years. It met monthly to
solve problems before reaching the grievance and arbitration stage. The
union's president and business agent were members along with top
managers. While few records of the Bosch committee exist, the union
newspaper frequently reported on its meetings, and the United States War
Production Board prepared a detailed case study on the Springfield
Westinghouse Labor-Management Committee. As the Bosch committee
was modeled after this one, a review of the case study is helpful in gaining
a perspective on worker involvement in production-related decision-
making during World War II. !0
9 Craftsman, Vol. 11, no. 2, August-September, 1954, p.l
10 vVar Production Board (WPB), The Labor Management Production Committee of the
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, Springfield, Massachusetts and the
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, CIO, Local 202 (Washington,
July, 1944). The Westinghouse study was one in a series that the Board prepared. In the
introduction it was noted that "the Committee here described is so well set up and
permeates the entire factory organization in such a way that a full description of its
activities was deemed advisable."
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Westinghouse Toint Production Committpp. The committee was
established in March, 1942 with a top advisory group, eight activity
committees, six division committees, and 46 department committees.
Impetus for the committee came from the union in late 1940 and was part
of a U.E. national effort to establish such committees in all its organized
plants. Initially management rejected a proposal to establish a Victory
Council with many of the same features the joint production committee
eventually had. In 1942 close to 300 management and union employees
were members of various committees directed by an eight person
executive group co-chaired by the union president and company
superintendent of production. A Labor-Management office was set up in
the Industrial Relations Department to handle the work of the various
sub-committees. 1
1
The committee was governed by ten general operating principles
including:
• Place emphasis on the solution of production
problems by insisting that department subcommittees
solve their own problems.
• Keep collective bargaining and grievance issues out of
committee meetings.
• Work in an atmosphere of mutual confidence.
• Give credit to workers in the departments and keep the
Advisory Committee in the background as much as
possible. 12
The Committee undertook plant-wide projects in 1942 and 1943 on
material conservation and quality improvement. During the first few
months significant gains were made. In one department alone, material
11 WPB, p. 7.
12 WPB, p. 2.
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conservation resulted in the salvaging of 25,000 pounds of aluminum, 57
pounds of copper, and 112 pounds of brass in the first year. A chrome
plating method put into practice saved $9,000 worth of dies in just three
months. Department committees met weekly to reduce rework and
rejected parts which had reached almost 13 percent of total output in early
1942. A plant-wide "Make it Good" campaign was launched that resulted
in the percentage of scrap being reduced to 6 percent in the first two and
one-half months of the effort. 13
Department committees got directly involved whenever a new war
project was started. Designers and engineers met frequently with
members of production department teams to determine the best sequence
of steps in machining the parts, the amounts of material needed, and
production time required. With the parts were in production follow-up
meetings were held to insure the quality of the work.
When the WPB analyzed the subject matter of 12 department
committee meetings over a six month period in 1944 it became apparent
how focused shop floor group were on mastering the manufacturing
process in their respective work areas: Out of 239 agenda items, 229 were
explicitly production-oriented, including such issues as product and tool
design, quality, process changes, work flow between departments, and
machine maintenance. A typical department meeting went like this:
The committee members gather around a table or group
themselves in a room in such a way that it is difficult to tell
who represents management and who represents labor. One
suggests, 'Could we try this method?' Another says 'How
about trying that?' Finally some recommendations are agreed
upon. When the minutes of the meeting are written up, the
13 WPB, p. 25 - 28.
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name of the member responsible, or of the person to whom
the matter is to be referred, is placed in the left-hand margin
beside each topic. 14
Results were impressive at times. In a department producing large
radio cabinets for the Navy more than four tons of material was saved
each week by properly sequencing all sheet metal work starting with the
largest pieces to be produced and utilizing trimmed sheet metal for
smaller parts. Past practice had been to discard all trim to salvage. In
another department where radio transmitters were assembled it was
customary to wheel needed parts to the work area some loose, in boxes,
and cloth bags. The assembler would have to sort through piles of parts to
find what he or she was looking for, often handling each part several
times. The production committee designed and built a new cart with
shelves and drawers for smaller parts that could be wheeled to a work
bench, loaded with enough parts to build 20 - 30 transmitters at a time.
Sorting and handling were eliminated and while one cart was in use in
the department, a worker could be off filling another one. The union
publicized these results in its weekly newspaper, The United Front. 15
WPB members asked workers and managers to discuss problems
they saw with continuing the committee at war's end. Both groups
wanted to see the effort continue, although each had reservations.
Workers expressed concern over the issue of job elimination when war-
stimulated demand ceased. Management worried about the percentage of
cost savings that should be paid out to workers. Workers believed that
14 WPB, p. 12-14.
15 WPB, p. 16. The full title on the mast head of the union newspaper read "A United Front
of Labor with no Division Because of Race, Color, Creed or Craft.
"
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management would discount their improvement suggestions, only to
implement them later without compensating workers for their ideas.
Implicit, here, was a lack of trust between the two groups. 16
Reactions to the Bosch Committee's Elimination
In early 1955 the union viewed the committee's elimination by
Perelle as proof that good labor relations were a thing of the past. The
union newspaper challenged, "If the company wants trouble all they have
to do is start. We wonder who will be hurt the most." A Bulletin editorial
stated:
For nineteen years the American Bosch and the Union have
enjoyed good Labor Relations but now they seem to be on the
downgrade. Now it seems we can no longer have an honest
and effective means of settling common problems through
the Labor-Management Committee. Labor-Management
meetings have been held monthly where subjects have been
discussed and issues settled before they became a major
problem. These meetings were beneficial and should be
continued. 17
Iii order to achieve the shop floor productivity and cost reduction
gains he sought, Perelle actually needed union support and a workforce
willing to share their skills to solve problems. Unilaterally discarding an
historically proven communications and problem-solving mechanism
16 WPB, p. 21. These are real concerns and ones that current union-management cooperation
proponents wrestle with regularly. The issue of job security is perhaps the most difficult to
resolve. The Westinghouse Committee functioned well because demand on output was so
great, and jobs in the area were so plentiful, that union members, particularly those with
high skill levels, did not fear job loss.
17 LB, January, 1955, p. 1.
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would, in the long run, frustrate other decisions Perelle made. What
Perelle was attempting here - the drive for management control - was
short-sighted, but typical of what was occurring in manufacturing facilities
across the country. 18
Labor historian David Montgomery describes the consequences of
worker gains in the late 1930s and 1940s in this way: "The power which
unionizing workers won on the job at this time was far more significant to
them and to their employers than whatever wage gains they won. Shop
stewards and committee men and women, backed up (often physically) by
the employees in the departments they represented, translated the
inextinguishable small-group resistance of workers into open defiance and
conscious alternatives to the directives of the management."
Montgomery views the late 1940s and early 1950s as a time when
management sought to extinguish the 'shop floor dance' and establish
relations that would guarantee absolute control on the shop floor. Getting
this control came at a price, however, beyond the wages and benefits paid
to workers. The 'conscious alternatives to management directives'
Montgomery referred to were often the clever ideas to improve a product
18 The issue of corporate management's determination to gain greater control on the shop
floor after World War II has been the subject of several recent books and articles. An early,
pioneering work is Joel Seidman, American Labor From Defense to Reconversion (Chicago,
1953). Recent works include: Sanford Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions,
and the Transformation of Work in American Industry 1900-1945 (New York, 1985); Steve
Jefferys, Management and Managed: Fifty Years of Crisis at Crysler (New York, 1986);
Nelson Lichtenstein, "UAW Bargaining Strategy and Shop-floor Conflict," Industrial
Relations, Vol. 24 (Fall 1985) and "Auto Worker Militancy and the Structure of Factory
Life, 1937-1955," Journal of American History, Vol. 67 (1980). The 'struggle for control' will
be discussed in ch. 6-8. It is important to note here that while unions believed they were
being made scapegoats when the companies they worked for charged that labor agreements
were weakening U.S. industry, companies were losing out as well by turning workers,
especially skilled workers, away from levels of participation on the shop floor that made
plants productive during World War II.
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or machining processes, or the first hand knowledge and experiences i
setting up machine tools that made the plant run smoothly. Perelle's
abrupt elimination of a long standing labor-management committee v\
clear signal that management had no further interest in the union
assuming a problem-solving role on the shop floor. Many skilled
workers' withdrew their cumulative production wisdom and 'clever
ideas' and in so doing guaranteed Perelle a hollow victory. 19
Lines Harden in the Plant
In four years Perelle had alienated union leaders and workers. A
shop floor poet caught the plant mood well with a poem that appeared i
the Bulletin. 20
Perelle Psalm
Perelle is our shepherd. We are in want
He maketh many to lie on park benches
He leadth many beside his still factory
He restoreth our doubt in his administration
(Yea, though we walk through the valley of
unemployment)
We will always remain hungry.
He clobbers our rates with new methods
Our expenses over-runneth our income.
Surely poverty and hard living shall follow us, all the
days
Of the Perelle administration.
And we shall dwell in a rented house forever.
19 Montgomery, Workers Control in America, p. 164 -165.
20
"Perelle Psalm," LB, February, 1958, p. 2.
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The poem's tone represents a sharp break from attitudes toward
cooperation expressed earlier. For example, in a report on the results of
the May, 1951 Labor-Management Committee meeting it was announced
that high seniority workers volunteered for transfers to the second shift to
help solve a production problem with a new fuel injection part. During
the same meeting there was a discussion of production problems in a
department. Rather than deal with various assistant foremen to solve the
problem the general manager "consulted one of the set up men who
found the trouble and explained how it happened and how to eliminate
this in the future." The Bulletin reporter wryly closed the article: "This
will illustrate that our people have the know-how and will gladly serve in
a Supervisor's position if they are asked."21
In June, 1951 in an essay "Rip Van Winkle Wake Up!" union
members were challenged to participate regularly in the affairs of the local,
not just when they feel hurt, "fancied or real". Union members were
urged to view the union as more than an instrument to fight
management. "Our stake admittedly is as great or greater in American
Bosch than the stockholder... . Make suggestions, better the product, give
them a dollar's work for a dollar's pay! Don't kid yourself. There are
union's more militant than ours that recognize that increased assumption
of responsibility leads to increased benefits."22
Even in November, 1954 in the midst of the redirection of work to
Mississippi, the Bulletin urged workers to make quality products.
However, six months into Perelle's taking control of the company, strains
began to show. In the business agent's and president's November reports
21 LB, May, 1951, p.4.
22 LB, June, 1951, p. 2.
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to the membership management was criticized for arbitrary rate cutting
and unilateral changes in the way workers were paid for machine tool set
ups. 23 By 1956 in an open letter to Perelle, "How Blind Can You Get-
management was castigated for the new inspection system it was installing
and in a related article the company was taken to task for its new
suggestion system. According to the union the new quality control
system, by taking inspectors off the shop floor, weakened the ability of
machine operators to detect defects at their machine. Rate cuts, layoffs,
and a stress on greater output per worker pushed operators to cover up bad
work and led department foreman to pass bad work out of their
department to meet production goals. When management persisted, with
no consideration for worker input, the union stepped up its criticism of
the plan. A front page Bulletin cartoon 'Foremen Solve Scrap Problem'
depicted a sweaty and nervous foreman filling a hole he had chopped in
the floor with scrap. An accompanying article sharply attacked Perelle and
his management team for the quality control program, and offered a
union plan for a more effective one. Management quality control
analysts, under the company plan, would submit a report and meet after
they determined why a part was rejected.
This is all of a very limited nature, because it does not
correct the reason for the Scrap or Rework at the source
when it is being made or before, but is a statement as to
the reasons (AFTER THE BULL) [emphasis in original]
has been made. Past experience here at Am. Bosch has
taught that Scrap can be repeated after all precautions
23 LB, November, 1954, p. 1.
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have been taken unless the source, at the time of
machining, is protected. 24
The union was also angry that workers were no longer equal
members of the plant's suggestion committee. In Perelle's new committee
structure the union's two representatives could attend only four monthly
meetings a year, where previously they participated in every one. The
union now urged that "suggestions authored by members of Local 206,
which incidentally amount to about 95 percent of all submitted, be delayed
until representatives are allowed to return to the meetings." In the same
article, however, since the desire to constructively solve problems was a
powerful one, the union offered ideas for improving the suggestion
program.
The average factory worker has good ideas but usually
has trouble expressing them in 25 words or less, which is
the average on the blanks provided. Also sketches are
not always clear, so it is our belief that a short talk with
someone trained in methods or drawing would
definitely increase the value of a good suggestion
tremendously. 25
In September, 1955, in the midst of these changes a contract was
negotiated with Local 206. Talks began just as Springfield expansion plans
were announced and a building was acquired to produce coils, magnetos
and generators for truck and farm equipment. The Springfield workforce
24 LB, April, 1956, p. 2; May, 1957, p.l It is important to note here that the concept that
quality control is mot effective at the machine itself, and not in a quality control lab after
the parts are off the shop floor, was embraced fully in Japan and was eventually recognized
in the U.S. as a revolutionary management principle.
25 LB, April 1954, p. 3; April, 1956, p. 2.
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had jumped to 3,500 from 2,600 since the start of the year, and sales and
profits for the first half of 1955 matched 1954 levels. The union knew
Mississippi was in full production. They also knew that with work
plentiful in Springfield, at least for the moment, there was an opportunity
to make contract gains. 26
This time, unlike 1954, there was no contract extension and the
negotiating committee received a strike authorization vote from the
membership well before the contract's expiration date. The committee
informed management that if the current agreement expired on
September 1 there would in fact be a strike, the first one in the 19-year
history of the local. A two-day walkout ensued and resulted in a two-year
agreement with a wage and benefit package hailed as the best in Western
Massachusetts. Each side could claim victory. The walk-out took place
over a week-end so only overtime work was disrupted. Important for the
company, the new two-year agreement broke a nineteen-year history of
one-year contracts. Establishing control over labor costs was essential to
long-term corporate planning; negotiations once a year made this
difficult. Just one week after the contract was signed Perelle surprised
union leaders by announcing a Mississippi expansion designed to double
manufacturing floor space to meet soaring demand for automotive
products. The announcement was Perelle's way of letting union leaders
know he was still in charge.27
26SM(i, August 3, 1955. The wild swings in employment run through the history of the
plant up to its closing. The agricultural, automotive and defense industries had sharp ups
and downs and the Springfield plant was a seat-mate on the roller coaster.
27 SMU, September 2, 6,9, 1955.
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Plant Modernization Program-
Meeting the Competition Hear!-On
Between 1955 and 1960 with a loyal management team in place, and
longer contract that made wage planning possible, Perelle set out to
reorganize the factory floor, and invest in new productivity-enhancing
machine tools. Employment levels remained erratic, giving workers
mixed signals about their future. Added to this, by attempting to
introduce new manufacturing methods, while asserting control in a way
that alienated workers and the union, Perelle made a difficult task an
impossible one.
By January, 1956 500 recent hires were laid off because of a
reduction in orders for tractor fuel injection pumps. Annual sales were
down but 1955 profits rose slightly. The ARMA Division was gaining
military orders and had a $195 million defense sales backlog at the start of
1956, but none of this work found its way to Springfield. Then in May
workers finally received some good news: Perelle announced that $1.5
million would be spent to modernize the main plant. 28
Research and Development
The plant continued to spend money on product research and
development. In the late 1940s and early 1950s Springfield increased
research and development expenditures as a portion of total sales to
approximately 7 percent. Efforts began right after World War II to produce
new fuel pump that required fewer parts, and had a simpler assembly
28 SMU, April 3, 1956; LB, May, 1956. The corporation began publication of its own monthly
newsletter, Progress, in 1956. Progress, May, 1956, p. 2.
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process. The new PSA pump weighed 13 pounds compared to the model
it was replacing, the APE which weighed 26 pounds.
In 1951 the Craftsman ran a series of articles discussing various
departments in the plant. "Designing our Products" described how a new
product was developed in sequential processes, from draftsmen and
engineers, to the laboratory for tests, to manufacturing engineers, and
finally to sales. At the sales stage a 'Manufacturing for Price and Delivery
Analysis' was done to determine the total costs connected with
production, including any investments needed to purchase new
machines, fixtures, and tools. "If the cost of manufacturing and tooling
will be so high as to necessitate a selling price that is out of the question,
an attempt must be made to redesign the new product toward attaining a
lower cost." Once costs were acceptable, the new product was to be released
to the Production Section of the Engineering Division where for the first
time discussions were to be held on how to produce the product in the
needed quantities in the factory. Several new products and improved
designs on existing ones originated in Springfield using what could be
fairly be called a trial and error approach to product design. The approach
was time-consuming, and it added significantly to the cost of products,
especially when new designs were not accepted by customers.29
Cost Improvement Program
In addition to research and development efforts, a manufacturing
cost improvement program was started. All plant employees were
encouraged to submit ideas that "lower costs, improve working conditions
29 Craftsman, April, 1948, p.4-5; Craftsman, February-March, 1951, p. 8-11.
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or in some way improve the quality of American Bosch products." In the
first month of the plan 50 suggestions were proposed. Stan Bubien, a
planner in the office, was paid $140 for his suggestion to switch the
manufacture of a particular part from an expensive casting to
commercially produced bar stock. Progress reported Bubien was going to
use the money for a vacation, breakfast at the Yankee Peddler (a local and
expensive restaurant) and a bicycle for his son. The suggestions program
continued to enlist the energies of workers in spite of the union urging
workers to withhold ideas until full representation was regained on the
committee. Close to $1.5 million in cost savings were generated by the
plan between May 1955 and the end of 1956 as monthly awards for quality
and manufacturing improvements were made.30
Shop Reorganization Plans
Perelle believed that for the plant to be more efficient all
departments in the factory needed to work together. Industrial
Engineering manager Willard Kelly was placed in charge of a program to
insure that Manufacturing, Engineering, and Sales personnel were in
constant communication with each other.
When Manufacturing sees fit to ask Engineering to alter
drawings and specifications in order to realize economies it
often means that Sales is required to contact our customers. It
is necessary to discover how the change will affect the way in
30 progress, reported that $712,900 in savings were generated in just 17 weeks. Payments to
workers remained small overall, averaging less than $50.00 (June, 1956, p.l). The
November, 1957 Progress reported on eight proposals, two that eliminated machine
operators, one that reduced set up times, and the others that had a direct effect on
machining times. The total payout for the eight was $350.
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which our customers use our product. He (the customer)
frequently requests changes which demand a new approach to
tooling and manufacturing methods and lead to a switch in
plant layout.31
Kelly established procedures to design new layouts for every
production department. Department 210, which became one of the first to
be redesigned, started producing new pumps in early November, 1956. An
article in Progress described the "smooth flow of parts and assemblies,
greater efficiency because of conveyors and power tools, and better
working conditions" resulting from the changes. The new layout
guaranteed "skilled craftsmanship without drudgery."32
Quality Improvement Programs
Management now stressed the importance of building quality
products. The firm's Quality Manager was profiled in the November, 1956
issue of Progress discussing the concept that "quality cannot be inspected
into a product.... Quality must start with the design and then be
maintained through tooling, purchasing, fabrication, assembly, testing and
shipping." This approach was consistent with the union's critique of
earlier quality programs, but once again union ideas received no
recognition. Insuring good work became a constant theme throughout
1957 as management stressed the links between quality and shop floor
31 Progress, September, 1956, p. 1
32 Progress, November, 1956, p. 4. A photograph of the department shows all the machine
tools in Dept. 210 linked through a series of conveyors to facilitate the movement of work
from one work station to another. Machine tools are also arranged in a sequence that
follows the actual operations to be performed to insure that parts are not handled numerous
times in the department.
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organization, and preached good housekeeping. A housekeeping plan was
launched in March, and the shipping department was completely
reorganized to insure that orders got out to customers on time. These
coordination and planning efforts appeared to be having a positive impact
in the plant. It was reported, for example, that in October, 1956 of 3,129
automotive generators built and shipped all were on time.33
Machine Tool Program
From 1957-1960 $10 million was spent on machine tools.
Automated turret lathes replaced lines of pre-World War II vintage screw
machines and small lathes, while automated, multi-spindle drill presses
replaced production lines of single spindle drilling machines. A worker
could now run several machine tools at a time by simply loading stock
into a fixture and starting the machine's drilling cycle. Multi-tool
chucking machines were introduced, and with their automated
machining cycles, permitted an operator to run two or more machines
simultaneously. The new machine tools had mechanical, electrical
and /or hydraulic controls, making it fairly easy for management engineers
to measure the time to produce a finished part. This helped greatly with
scheduling. Production bottlenecks often resulted in parts not being
available in the assembly area to produce finished products. Management
believed the more they could control work flow from machine tools the
33 p r0gress, November, 1956; January, March, 1957. Clean up programs were instituted in
several departments and unused machine tools were removed to reduce cluttered work areas
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better they would be able to attack this problem and complete products on
time.34
Automatic milling machines were purchased for Department 200
with dual cutting heads and air clamp fixtures to speed up the loading and
unloading of parts. Several automatic lathes were acquired and equipped
with powerful drive motors and tungsten carbide tools. These lathes
could cut stock to finish dimensions, eliminating several secondary
machining operations, and jobs. Burgmaster multi-spindle automatic drill
presses were also purchased and located throughout the plant. These
machines were capable of performing a number of drilling operations on a
part once it was placed in a fixture. An electrically controlled indexing
head centered each new tool in sequence, the tool was brought down into
the work, automatically raised, the turret holding the tools indexed and a
new tool performed its required operation. Burgmasters could hold from
four to eight tools. "No attention is needed," Progress reported, "except to
load, press the start button, and unload. This permits the operator to
operate a second machine...
. It's obvious that outdated machine tools are
a handicap which AB cannot afford." In May, 1959 several Kingsbury
horizontal drilling and tapping machines were installed. "Working back-
to-back," according to Progress, "the two units are capable of drilling,
counter-sinking, and tapping up to 26 holes simultaneously. Internal to
the drilling time on the first machine, the holes are being threaded by
tapping in the second machine. Versatile quick-changing fixtures and
tools provide a means of rapid changeover for various parts." Kingsbury's
own marketing information stated: "You need several general-purpose
machines and several operators to keep up with one Kingsbury and one
34 Progress, March 3, April 8, May 22, 1959.
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operator." To conclude this round of machine tool purchases automatic
chucking machines appeared in Department 300 to take the place of
several lathes. With air-operated chucks to enhance loading and
unloading, and automatic cycling "the machine tools are operated back-to-
back by one operator."35
U.S. machine tool builders intensified their marketing efforts
during the mid-1950s in the face of increased international competition.
Tool builders promoted the ability of their machine tools to diminish the
need for skilled workers. The November, 1954 American Machinist, for
example, contained advertisements for machines whose names alone
indicated the builder's marketing strategy, e.g. Bullard Mult-Au-Matic,
Acme Gridley Chuck-Matic. Machines 'eliminated two grinding
operations,' had 'automatic control of cycle time,' were 'easy to set up and
retool,'. The Chuck-Matic "does not require skilled labor - one man
operates as many machines as the cycle times of jobs permit."
The December, 1954 American Machinist promoted machines
designed to cut the number of operators and set-up personnel a company
needed. The Monarch Mona-Matic advertisement had the following line:
"Many grinding operations eliminated, set-up times reduced, tool costs
cut;" the Lo-Swing Automatic Lathe: "Drills and reams simultaneously
with turning and facing operations;" Gisholt Automatic Lathes: "Lower
costs, less dependence on operator skill"; Cincinnati Grinders: "Operator
Responsibility Reduced."36
35 Progress, March, 1959, p.l. Management said that the new machine tools now allowed
workers to move up from 'the Model T to a Lincoln'. Progress, May, 1959, p. 1; June, 1959, p.l
September, 1959, p.l. For a typical Kingsbury ad see American Machinist, June, 1950, p. 26.
For an excellent history of U.S. machine tool builder Burgmaster see Max Holland's When
the Machine Stopped: A Cautionary Tale from Industrial America (Boston, 1989).
36 American Machinist , November, 1954, p. 8, 9, 32, 39; December, 1954, p. 33, 52-53.
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The November American Machinist contained an editorial
"Getting the Most Out of Your Machining" that argued for the use of these
new machine tools. It read in part: "Many managements have resorted to
the intelligent action of putting before their workers the economic facts of
life as they affect the company's business." Automating machining
operations and forcing operators to run more than one machine tool were
two of these facts.37
Unionists reacted angrily to the machine acquisitions. Employment
ups and downs already presented an unstable job picture. These machines
made matters worse. "Battery of new Operator-Eliminator machines being
set up rear of Department 160," read a 'Hits and Bits' comment in the
Bulletin. Another read:
There will be so much new machinery by July of next year that
there will undoubtedly be fewer people working here.
Automation means - Meet the market competition by fewer
Union Members. Without a doubt this definition should be in
Webster's dictionary.38
Springfield Output Projected to Grow
At the end of 1956 Perelle hosted a plant tour for Springfield and
Chicopee elected officials to discuss modernization plans. He explained
that the plant used 1,112 New England suppliers for purchases of
everything from tool steel to cutting oils, to rags, to tooling and fixtures,
37 American Machinist, November, 1954, p. 15.
38 LB, October, 1959, p. 2.
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and that 34 are from Springfield. Close to $1 million was paid out to local
suppliers in 1956. While on the tour, management took the opportunity
to announce that employment would increase to 2,700 from 2,400 during
1957. Backing up this optimism was the fact that 1956 sales and net
income were the highest in the history of the merged corporation. Sales
climbed to $122.23 from $73.8 million in 1955 while earnings went to $4.63
million from $3.38 million. Perelle attributed these gains to
improvements in operating efficiency.39
In April, 1957 Perelle announced that he intended to double output
in Springfield and Columbus, Mississippi by 1961. He said in part:
"Incidentally we now have a larger volume in Springfield than we did
when we started to build the Columbus plant in 1954. That seems to be an
effective answer to those who were worried then that Springfield might
lose employment because of the Mississippi plant." His optimism was
predicated on two things: research and development gains made in
designing a fuel injection system for passenger cars; and ongoing efforts to
turn the experimental machine shop and tool design departments into a
machine design and building unit for the entire corporation.40
In July, Detroit car makers Ford, Lincoln and Packard indicated that
systems developed in Springfield would be available options in their
higher priced Fall, 1956 models. Mercedes Benz was now equipping some
of its cars with systems built in Springfield. Bosch managers believed that
fuel injection work could carry the Springfield plant to a new industrial
peak. Carried away with enthusiasm Perelle and others turned a blind eye
to the problems car makers confronted persuading customers to invest in
39 Progress, December, 1956, p. 1.
40 Progress, December, 1956; SMU, March 4, April 9, 1957,
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fuel injection. Difficulties in obtaining work from Detroit auto makers in
the recent past should have tempered the initial enthusiasm in
Springfield.41
Chevrolet had installed fuel injection systems in several of its
models, but well publicized mechanical failures soured car buyers on the
option. Seeing this, Ford reduced its program to introduce fuel injection.
Mississippi expansion hopes were attached to another technology break-
through developed over a four year period, push button transmissions. It
was anticipated that 500-600 units a day would be shipped to Ford by
September, 1957 for installation in its new Edsel models. But, in a serious
blow to Perelle's growth projections, neither automotive development
resulted in production contracts and the research expenditures and time
spent in prototype production were never recovered.42
The second more modest gain was an effort to turn the Springfield
plant's highly skilled tool room and experimental machine shop into a
machine tool building unit for the corporation's own internal needs and
then to the wider manufacturing world. A machine was designed and
built for the Columbus, Mississippi plant to automatically locate and cut
slots in small parts assembled in electric motors. By early 1959 the tool
room was building an average of one machine a month. External
customers never availed themselves of the highly skilled group, however.
While the work kept many of the plant's highly skilled machinists and
engineers busy it never generated volume sufficient enough to assist the
company in its plans to double Springfield production by 1961 43
41 In 1948 workers were notified that a large Ford contract was ending sooner than
anticipated and this would cause sharp production declines an worker reductions (February,
1948, p. 2).
42 SMU, July 9, September 24, 1956; April 9, May 21, August 28, 1957.
43 progress, January, 1957; January, December, 1959.
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Ventures Outside Springfield
Meanwhile the company, keeping its options open in the event that
new automotive parts and machine tool production activities failed to
generate orders, entered several joint production ventures. In July, 1956
Bosch licensed Thompson Product, Inc. of Cleveland, Ohio to
manufacture fuel injection systems developed by Springfield engineers.
The Cleveland firm had complete manufacturing privileges, and
competed head-to-head with the Bosch. Perelle had put the corporation,
not the Springfield workforce, in a win-win situation. Whenever
Thompson won a bid Bosch collected royalties on the sale. Perelle
effectively established a competitor in the field that could be held up to
Local 206 during contract negotiations as a more efficient, lower cost
producer of the same products.44
Sales were lower than anticipated by the middle of 1957 as the
failure of automotive fuel injection and push button transmissions hurt
Springfield growth. In addition, defense work at the ARMA Long Island
plant decreased. Springfield faced deep layoffs as fuel injection products
faltered. In August the union extended its expired contract so that a wage
agreement could be worked out and a walkout avoided. The 1955 'no
contract-no work' philosophy gave way in the harsher economic climate
and after two extensions a settlement was reached for a total package
worth 11.8 cents an hour with a wage reopener scheduled for August, 1958.
Union leaders were not happy with the wage settlement, but saw little
44 SMU, September 24, 1956; April 9, 1957.
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alternative in the face of continued slumping sales. They could only hope
conditions improved by the time 1958 wage reopener talks commenced «
Perelle continued to pursue a merger and acquisition strategy by
purchasing Philadelphia, Pennsylvania-based Tele-Dynamics in 1960. The
company was a leader in the field of research and development of airborne
transmitting and ground receiving equipment. Tele-Dynamics was
developing electronic systems to monitor the performance of missiles in
flight. Tele-Dynamics was to be operated as a separate division of ABA 4 6
In 1960 ABA established a joint venture with DeHavilland
Holdings, Ltd. of England to acquire SG. Brown, Ltd., also of England.
DeHavilland was part of the Hawker Sidney Group, a major British
industrial organization that owned several companies in aircraft, missiles,
transportation and diesel engines. S.G. Brown, deeply rooted in the
British defense industry, was a major producer of precision navigation
and gyroscopic equipment. A production licensing agreement was also
made with RCA Victor Argentina to manufacture Bosch wiper motors
and assemblies with production anticipated to begin in January, 1961.47
The Union Responds
The Bulletin hammered away at management throughout this
period. In the August 1957 issue the cost improvement program was
castigated as nothing more than a ploy to get workers to participate in their
own speed-up and job elimination. The shop floor reorganization was
also seen as a cleverly disguised effort to eliminate jobs, and was dubbed
45 SMU, August 31, 1957;
46 SMU, Februarys I960.
47 SMU, June 11, I960; Progress, August, 1960.
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the "consolidate effort - eliminate personnel" campaign. A lead editorial
titled "Reap the Harvest" blasted Perelle and his management team.
We all have a certain amount of pride, hidden or out in the
open as to our accomplishments, our work, etc. Today, thanks
to Operation Speedup, gone is the pride we had. Through no
fault of the workers who can still produce quality unparalleled,
the system installed allows for too much leeway, too many
reworked parts and a bungling of operations out of sequence...
.
In the union's view the plan resulted in excessive scrap, rework,
and field rejects. The Bulletin ran a front page cartoon depicting the Bosch
with a railroad car streaming toward it carrying a cargo of rejects, while a
truck sped away from the loading dock filled up with junked parts.
Workers worried about this because they well understood the key for
them, the "acid test, the Public's reaction, acceptance or rejection, through
familiarity of our products" is what keeps the plant going.48
In October they expressed concern that high inventories coupled
with moves to automate production, could lead to more permanent job
loss. Automation was causing upheaval, and labor was relegated to being
a spectator at best. "The manufacturer and investor is forced into
automation to survive through competition and the race for quality and
price for his goods. We can see his problem, is he blind to ours?" The
union urged the establishment of a joint committee to study automation,
work flow in the plant, and ways to improve quality.49
To back up the call for the establishment of this committee, the
union proposed a program to reduce scrap. The local argued that it made
48 LB, August, 1957.
49 LB, October, 1957.
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no sense for the company to boost output per worker if the increase
resulted in scrap that canceled any realized productivity gains. They called
for more floor inspectors to assist workers at their machines, as well as
time study adjustments to put more inspection time in the rates on jobs.
The Bulletin placed responsibility on machine operators as well. "We,
the workers, must try to stem this flow of bad work even though in our
hearts we know the largest share of the blame rests elsewhere. Even
though conditions are far from ideal, be more alert, take a little more time
even if it means a reprimand from your foreman and do a good job."50
Workers wanted the opportunity to make a difference on the shop
floor. The plant had large numbers of high seniority workers. The drill
press department, for example, averaged twenty-five years in the plant.
Workers knew their jobs, had been lauded many times for the close
tolerances they handled, and wanted to share that knowledge in an effort
to right the employment picture. A brief review of the careers of three
employees reveals the high level of service and the depth of skill in the
Bosch plant.51
James O'Neill was retiring in 1959 after 40 years. Born in Holyoke,
his first job was in that city's Farr Alpacca textile mills. He eventually got
hired at Bosch as a drill press operator, worked in the radio department
during World War II, and for the past 23 years worked as set up man and
group leader in one of the grinding departments. Hans Krueger, with 35
years service, was born in Germany and started at Bosch in 1923. Albert
Bailey, jr. also had 35 years service. Born in Birmingham, England, Bailey
50 LB, October, 1957.
51 Progress, January 11, 1957. One hundred and forty union members attended the classes out
of a bargaining unit of approximately 1,500 with close to two hundred turned away because
of a lack of space. This meant that almost 20 percent of union members expressed an interest
in the training program {Progress, December 26, 1958).
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was
attended trade school and took engineering courses at night. He spent
over 25 years as a toolmaker in the Development Department. There
no substitute for the familiarity such workers had with the products and
various manufacturing processes required to make them right the first
time.52
Eschewing a confrontational style since its founding in 1937, the
union believed its members' skills and knowledge were essential if the
firm was to succeed. Workers were attempting to bolster plant efficiencies
in the belief that anything less ran counter to their own economic well-
being. But just as with their 1954-1955 call for the restoration of the labor-
management committee, the union's call was ignored and in a direct
affront Perelle set up a technical advisory committee consisting only of
engineers and scientists to study corporate reorganization and research
programs.
Defense Work Offers Hope Again
By mid-January 1958 layoffs reached 700 as orders for tractor pumps
declined. In February Perelle announced that the production of magnetos
and generators was going to be moved to Mississippi as quickly as possible.
Vice-President of Manufacturing Sidney Miller said that the move was in
keeping with the corporation's view that Springfield was a precision
manufacturing center. A glimmer of hope came when the Springfield
plant received a small order to build test equipment for a government B-
52
"Five Men Reach Total Service of 180 Years," Progress, January, 1959, p.l.
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52 bomber program. However, first half earnings for the year were off
more that 50 percent from 1957.
By the summer of 1958 Springfield managers determined that
defense work held the best hopes for the plant. In November a 60-
member military engineering group was established. "It is our intention
to originate new products, to accept specifications, do the research and
development and proceed through construction. This is something that
will take time to do," Vice-President Miller told local newspapers. The
engineering program focused on design simplification, miniaturization
and simplified service. One result was the introduction of a new, more
efficient fuel injection pump with 100 fewer machined parts, making
assembly easier, and the pump less expensive than competing models.53
Conclusion: So Much Change. So Little Gain
To hold down production costs, improve quality and increase the
firm's ability to move into new markets Perelle ordered significant
changes on the factory floor beginning in late 1957. He was soon hailed for
this effort as the man responsible for taking a "nondescript merger of two
older firms and whipping them into one of the country's leading defense
contractors." Success was possible because Perelle had carefully blended
defense and commercial work. The commercial work was produced in
Springfield and accounted for about a third of AB-ARMA's sales and half
of its profit after taxes.
53 SMU, January 13,14, February 12, 26, 1958; Progress, June 27, 1958; SDN, November 10,
1958; Progress, November 21, 1958; SMU, January 30, 1959.
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Fortune contended that Perelle's concern for Bosch "is logical in his
total strategy because Bosch is normally a solid money-maker and a
balance wheel for more speculative military ventures." The article stated
that in 1957 Bosch earned $2.4 million on sales of $35.5 million, or about 7
percent; ARMA earned $2.6 million on total sales of $98.8 million, or
about 2.6 percent. For 1958 sales at Bosch declined due to a recession in
truck, farming and automotive markets to $28 million while ARMA
overall sales climbed to $83 million. Bosch earned 5 percent on its sales,
ARMA just 2.3 percent. Based on all of these figures Fortune concluded
that the Bosch plant was Perelle's "highly convenient ace in the hole."54
Some production lines were redesigned, relocated, and simplified
and a new quality control program was established in each production
department. Figures were reported on a monthly basis showing the cost of
scrap and rework as a percentage of direct labor costs. Visual displays
documented scrap parts and indicated why they were defective.55
In addition, a state-of-the-art material and inventory management
system was installed. The system eliminated hundreds of paperwork
transactions. Now a component could be scheduled in the computer
system with required stock allocated for production in as little as three
minutes. Once the production order reached the floor a computer card
traveled with the work and each time a machining operation was
completed a worker entered the information at a computer terminal
located in each department. "We felt it necessary to have a data processing
system sensitive enough and fast enough to react to our modern factory
and distributing facility," said Perelle. "A bottleneck in the processing of
54
"Charles Perelle's Spacemanship," Fortune, Vol. 59 (January, 1959) p. 113, 115, 122.
55 Progress, April 4, 1958.
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our paperwork could not be tolerated" Orders were now directly tied to
production schedules. This helped eliminate excessive set ups and
machine down time. The jobs of those workers responsible for moving,
recording and keeping track of work were eliminated.5 ^
Yet the old patterns of fluctuating sales and profits continued. Sales
went up from 1955 - 1957, dropped for three years, jumped in 1961 to $133.6
million and fell through the mid 1960s to $70.6 million in 1964. Profits
followed a similar trajectory, reaching a high of $5.1 million in 1957,
falling thereafter to a low of $1.5 million in 1964. Over this period ABA
had five major customers: Alco Products, Allis Chalmers, Caterpillar
Products, Ford Motor Company, and Mack Truck. These five accounted
for 60 percent of all the products the corporation sold, and 83 percent of
these products were manufactured in Springfield. All five were in
industries influenced by the ups and downs in the national economy
during the 1950s: agriculture, defense, transportation, and construction.57
As a result employment never stabilized in Springfield. For
example in April, 1958 management announced a program to "attain
employment stability in Springfield". By December, 1958, plans were
made to add a 100 worker third shift and go to full Saturday production to
keep up with orders for fuel injection systems. It was predicted that
employment levels would go to 2,300 from 1,800 by April, 1959, but early
in 1960 the entire plant was on a four-day week and by March, 1961
employment dropped below 1,500.
56 Progress, May 24, 1960.
57 Sales and profit figures are found in issues of Progress covering the years under review.
For all of BoschArma 75 percent of 1957 sales were in the highly volatile defense sector
according to a financial forecast prepare on the corporation by Paine, Webber (SMU,
September 20, 1958) p. 4.
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In 1960 the Springfield Bosch plant was part of a world-wide
corporation. The corporation attempted to make the Springfield facility as
efficient as possible, but was unwilling to put any of the new military
electronics work in the plant. Nor was it willing to keep any large volume
work in the city that could be done cheaper in Mississippi. The British
acquisitions provided ABA with manufacturing facilities in Europe, home
to its chief competitors in the field of diesel fuel injection, Robert Bosch
Corporation in Germany and Lucas, LTD., in England. The Springfield
plant's future was tied to holding onto the diesel and fuel injection
equipment business while attempting to capture additional market share
as new products were developed in its research facility. Perelle was never
able to figure out how to schedule production to eliminate wild
production swings. As a consequence, the corporation could never take
full advantage of the investments it made. For after all, fast machines
with no work were just pieces of metal.58
In a letter sent to every worker's home in mid-1959 management
warned that "American Bosch's foreign competitors enjoy a greater and
too frequently a decisive cost advantage over us.... A major cost factor is of
course labor costs." The letter informed employees that plant sales of fuel
injection parts were only a third of what they were five years ago in spite
of increased world-wide demand for diesel products. "For every dollar
earned by an AB employee an employee of a foreign competitor is paid an
average of only 25 cents." The letter went on, "This means that where
our average hourly rate is $2.66 the comparable hourly rate in West
Germany is 66 cents, in Japan 27 cents and only 80 cents in the United
58 vVorker levels were taken from membership dues lists found in Local 206 Records, UMass
Amherst Labor Archives.
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Kingdom." The letter arrived at workers' homes just before 1959 contract
talks were scheduled to begin. Earlier in the decade high volume runs of
parts mainly for the domestic automobile industry were shipped to
Mississippi because it was no longer cost effective to produce them in
Springfield. Workers were now being warned that it was not cost effective
to manufacture the more highly specialized fuel injection nozzles, holder
bodies and pumps.59
In early 1960 Perelle had a management team consider whether it
would make sense to purchase all needed components from German,
Japanese and English suppliers and simply assemble the pumps in
Springfield with a drastically reduced workforce. Perelle believed that the
fuel injection market was at stake when he ordered the feasibility study.
By June, 1960 Springfield had lost 70 percent of its fuel injection work to
German competitors, including Robert Bosch, and the plant went on a
four day week to avoid massive layoffs. At the end of the year Perelle
decided to maintain production in Springfield, but animosities caused by
management's one-sided approach to solving shop floor problems called
the plant's future into question.60
59 Letter reprinted in SMU, June 9, 1959.
60 SMU, June 3, 1960.
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CHAPTER 5
LOCAL 206: 1936- 1945
Introduction
In 1934 almost all large metalworking firms in the region, including
Moore Drop Forge, Indian Motorcycle, Smith and Wesson and American
Bosch were non-union. When efforts were made in 1933 to organize the
Chapman Valve Company the Central Labor Union, an American
Federation of Labor affiliate, cautioned workers "that the word strike be
removed from their thoughts at the present time... . The intelligence of
the workers and employers in this territory was adequate to cope with
labor difficulties." 1
These sentiments were fueled, in part, by the fact that Springfield-
area wages were higher than many parts of the state. This was do in large
measure to the concentration of machine shops, foundries, machine tool
builders, and metalworking manufacturing establishments in the region.
Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries wage surveys showed
that Springfield average wages were generally in the top five in the state
throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. For example, between 1925 and 1927
Springfield's average weekly pay for manufacturing workers was $25.42
while Holyoke's and Lowell's were $21.79 and $19.13, respectively.
Worcester, another metalworking center, was the highest at $26.38. Bosch
1 The statement was made to Chapman Valve workers by Kenneth Taylor, president of the
Springfield Typographical Union. Taylor also urged workers to form two separate unions,
one for skilled pattern and moldmakers and the other for machine operators and foundry
hands (SDN, August 23, 1933).
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and other skilled metalworkers in the area initially believed they could do
well without a union. 2
However, several Springfield metalworking firms were organized
by UE between 1936 and 1941 as organizers used this base to launch
organizing efforts up and down the Connecticut River Valley from
Bridgeport, Connecticut to Springfield, Vermont. By 1939 UE represented
workers in manufacturing plants responsible for the output of 80 percent
of U.S. electrical goods, from the smallest appliances like toasters and fans
to the largest electrical generators built in the world.3
For the first twenty-two years of the American Bosch plant's history
there was no labor organization. A worker's life on the job was left to the
complete discretion of management. Foremen determined who worked
and who did not, who received well paying jobs and who did not.
Historian Maynard Seider cites a Sprague Electric worker from a North
Adams, Massachusetts plant who commented, "I had to walk two miles to
work and I couldn't punch in until the work came down my line.
Sometimes I wouldn't even work at all and they'd send me back home.
Then, I would no more than get back home and they would send for me
again." This kind of treatment fostered organization.4
In 1933, as union organizing activity heightened plant
superintendent Donald Murray established a company union in an effort
2 Massachusetts Department of Labor and Industries (MDLI), Annual Report for 1938, p. 49.
3 UE News, (l/EMJanuary 7, 1939, p. 4 - 5. For example, in 1939 the union represented
workers at the following: Emerson Electric, General Electric, Westinghouse, Delco-
Frigidaire, Edison Storage Battery, Phelps Dodge, Allis Chalmers, Singer Sewing Machine
and Pratt and Whitney. Gross sales of the top 26 corporations UE had at least one local in
were almost one billion dollars.
4 Maynard Seider, "The CIO in Rural Massachusetts: Sprague Electric and North Adams,
1937 - 1944," Historical Journal of Massachusetts, 22 (Winter, 1944) p. 55.
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to give workers a voice while blunting independent organization of the
plant. Bosch management refused to accede to initial worker requests
from the company union. The welfare capitalism subscribed to by
corporations like Ford Motor Company was never contemplated and the
company union gained no improvements whatsoever in working
conditions. High seniority workers bristled under an employment system
that allowed foremen to pick who would work. Production cycles in the
plant were not well regulated, and as a consequence large numbers of
workers never knew from one day to the next whether they would have a
job. Aside from a core of highly skilled tool and die makers and machine
set up specialists, men and women lined up outside the plant as early as
5:00 AM each day in hopes of securing a pay check. Regular raises, holiday
and vacation pay did not exist. These were the conditions Matthew
Campbell, president of United Electrical Workers Local 202 in the huge,
near-by East Springfield Westinghouse plant, three other Local 202 officers,
and a UE national organizer found during the summer and fall of 1936
when they conducted secret meetings in private homes to convince Bosch
workers to unionize.5
Organizers were fired, supporters were laid off days before
management conducted a 'recognition survey', and the company
attempted to hold elections for officers of the company-sponsored union
even after close to 70 percent of the plant's 1,200 workers had signed union
cards. With each new challenge and company provocation union leaders
and Campbell's organizing team responded in moderation as they
5 For a discussion of Ford see Stephen Meyer's The Five Dollar Day. Labor Management
and Social Control in the Ford Motor Company, 1908 - 1921 (New York, 1981); Daniel Raff,
"Ford Welfare Capitalism in its Economic Context," in Jacoby, Masters to Managers (New
York, 1991).
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sought wide support on the shop floor before confronting Bosch
management. But the rapid pace of union organizing resulting from the
National Recovery Act and the Wagner Act swept over the Bosch
company union and led to the establishment of United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers (UE) Bosch Local 206 in 1936.
Matthew Ca mpbell and Union Organizing
in Western Massachusetts
When Matthew Campbell began efforts to organize an industrial
union at the Bosch he had few allies in the city. A highly skilled
toolmaker, Campbell worked for fifteen years at Westinghouse before he
became active in union organizing efforts and labor politics. He
eventually led successful organizing drives at many Western
Massachusetts companies including Milton Bradley, Van Norman
Machine, Package Machinery, and Worthington Pump.
Campbell was born in Scotland in July, 1890 and lived in Springfield
for 25 years. A disabled World War 1 veteran, he belonged to American
Legion Post 21, the largest post in Western Massachusetts. Married with
three children, Campbell owned his own home. The 1934 Springfield city
directory lists his neighbors as a tester for the telephone company, an
electrician for the city, a post office worker, and a clerk at Westinghouse.
He was a part of the city's skilled working class, that could afford a single
family home during the 1920s, and confident that metalworking plants
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would continue to provide employment for the machinists and tool and
die makers residing in and around Springfield.*3
Campbell played a leading role in the 1933 Westinghouse work
stoppages that led to the creation of Local 202 and was elected president of
the local in 1934, a position he would maintain until his sudden death in
1941. In 1935 he was elected regional vice-president of the United
Electrical Workers and eventually led the local out of the American
Federation of Labor-affiliated Springfield Central Labor Union and into
the Congress of Industrial Organizations where he became a state vice-
president. At the time of his death he had just led a successful organizing
campaign at Colt Firearms in Hartford, Connecticut. Colt had resisted
union drives for over 100 years, but agreed to recognize the U.E. after
Campbell engineered a two-day walkout of 5,000 workers to protest speed-
up and low pay rates. Campbell was also engaged in negotiations with
Westinghouse as chair of the national Westinghouse Conference Board. 7
The United Labor Party
In addition to union organizing, Campbell was instrumental in
developing a labor electoral strategy in Springfield, and in 1935 became the
United Labor Party's (ULP) first candidate for mayor. The party served as a
rallying point for many newly formed industrial unions. According to a
party spokesman, "The organization of this labor party is a logical step
b Springfield City Directory, 1934. Copies of directories are found in the Pioneer Valley
Historical Museum, Springfield, Ma. Directories were useful in determining the
occupations of union organizers and early in-plant activists.
7 SDN, June 2, 1941, p. 8. UEN, May 19, 1941, p. 1; June 7, 1941, p.l.
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accompanying the development of labor unions whose voting strength is
now so great it demands true representation."
At the first ULP meeting an organizing committee was established
to seek support from club, civic organization, and other unions.
Committee members worked for large manufacturers in the city,
including Westinghouse, Chapman Valve, Spaulding, and Bosch. Party
organization created an opportunity for workers to discuss conditions in
their plants, and it afforded Campbell a way to showcase his organizing
skills and meet workers from a number of plants across the city. From the
outset the city's A. F. L. - affiliated Central Labor Union, led by John Gatlee,
publicly opposed the United Labor Party's efforts and endorsed the
Democratic Party's candidate for mayor.8
At the end of September the ULP platform was adopted. Campbell
declared that the party was born out of the dissatisfaction and frustration
workers had with the two parties and their failure to "assist workers in
securing just wages and decent living conditions." The ULP called for the
public ownership of all city utilities, the reorganization of all city offices to
avoid worker duplication, cash relief or work at prevailing union wages
for the unemployed, and support for state and national legislation that
would reduce the work week and secure old age pensions. Finally, the
party sought to shift the city tax burden away from small-home owners
through more equitable taxation of the city's large industries. In its first
public meeting to announce the platform party leaders directed their
appeal to a broad coalition of "small-home owners, office employees,
professional men and women and the unemployed as well as factory
workers." The platform pledged the ULP "shall always give preference to
8 Springfield Union, Sept. 5, p. 1; Sept. 10, p. 6; Sept. 11, p.6, 1935.
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local products in its purchases, provided prices and labor conditions are up
to our local standards."9
Campbell and his party allies sensed the weak political position of
industrial workers in the city. Their platform was designed to create a
broad-based coalition to insure that workers' concerns would be heard
during the 1935 election. Indicative of this strategy is the fact that
Campbell's nomination papers contained the names of both
Westinghouse supervisors and foremen. Occupations of ULP candidates
also reveal the type of coalition being cobbled together as well as the
important role that skilled workers played in Springfield. Included were a
plater and assembler from Chapman Valve, a toolmaker from Fiberloid
Corporation, a machinist from Spaulding, and a machinist, mechanic, tool
grinder, final inspector, pattern maker, and a production supervisor from
Westinghouse. Throughout the 1935 campaign Campbell maintained his
solid support among workers in the Westinghouse plant and was
returned to the local's presidency unopposed at a September 30
membership meeting while every other office in the local was contested. 10
While making their appeal to office workers, small business
owners, and home owners, the ULP also declared it wanted nothing to do
with the Communist Party by voting not to endorse any Party members or
supporters. Karl Gustafson, a machinist at the Fisk Rubber Company and
aldermanic candidate, withdrew from the ULP at the meeting where this
decision was made. Campbell publicly declared that he was not a
Communist and led the discussion to keep Party members off the ULP
9 SU, Sept. 24, 1935, p. 6.
10 SU, Sept. 24, 1935, p. 6. The Sept. 13 Springfield Union reported the signatures and
addresses of residents who signed Campbell's nomination papers. Using the 1934 city
directory it was possible to determine place of employment and occupation for ULP
candidates and many who signed nomination papers.
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ticket. At the same meeting it was agreed that the ULP would not support
any candidates nominated by the Republican or Democratic parties, either.
In spite of this decision, the CLU refused to endorse ULP candidates. In a
public statement Gatlee indicated that the CLU would not "be swayed or
swerved into any political action by a mixed group of members and non-
members, affiliated and non-affiliated unions, and by some individuals
not members of any union." 11
Undeterred, the ULP appealed to Springfield workers. "We believe
that the rank and file, now that they have the opportunity will vote the
way they strike, shoulder to shoulder, united in a tremendous vote for
themselves at last." The president of the Painters Union, a CLU affiliate,
supported Campbell and the ULP, arguing that the current thinking that
labor should 'defeat our enemies by electing our friends' needed to be
updated to 'defeat our enemies - elect our own.' The ULP appeal fell on
deaf ears however, and two weeks before the election the CLU endorsed
the Democratic candidate for mayor. 12
In one final blast Gatelee labeled Campbell "self-anointed, self-
appointed, and self-seeking." He warned that Campbell's efforts would
"lead the people of Springfield to judge the strength of labor by the sorry
results you are about to achieve". Local 202 members, outraged at
Gatelee's highly personal attack on their president, marched on the
Sunday afternoon November 3rd meeting of the CLU. According to
newspaper accounts there were several near-fights when Gatelee and
David Goggin, president of the plumbers union, threatened to fight any
Local 202 member present. 13
11 SU, October 1, p.4; October 7, 1935, p. 3.
12 SU, October 8, p. 4; October 24, 1935, p. 1.
13 SU, November 1, p. 14; SU, November 4, 1935, p. 1
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On Election night Gatelee's prediction that Campbell's showing
would embarrass labor and show it in a weak light proved accurate as
Republicans swept every office in the city by wide margins. Campbell
came in a distant third in the mayoral race, receiving just 2,152 votes
while the Republican winner garnered 22,762, and his Democratic
challenger 17,565. But the loss did not distract Campbell from his
organizing campaign, nor did it turn him from politics. Two years later he
played a pivotal roll in the successful mayoral campaign of Democrat
William Putnam, one of Springfield's leading industrialists. Putnam had
embraced the UE as a needed voice for labor when Campbell mounted an
organizing campaign at Putnam's Package Machinery Corporation in the
spring and summer of 1936. 14
According to historian Ronald Filippelli, Campbell was close to
James Carey, Harry Block and others who eventually turned against the
union's national leadership in the late 1940s, for among other things,
being pro-communist. Filippelli partly bases this claim on a vote at the
1936 UE founding convention that Campbell cast with Block and Carey
against a resolution in support of a labor party in the United States. The
convention passed the pro-labor party resolution 35-10. Since Campbell
had unsuccessfully run for mayor of Springfield just a year earlier,
motivations are probably more complex than this one vote can
determine. 15
14 SU, November 6, 1935, p. 1.
15 Ronald Filippelli, "UE: The Formative Years, 1933 - 1937," Labor History, Vol. 17
(1976) p. 366.
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The Bosch Gets Organ izprl
By 1936 Westinghouse Local 202 was an integral part of a
burgeoning plant by plant movement directed by UE to organize the
Westinghouse and General Electric corporations. Each company
discouraged union organization through the selective use of paternalistic
labor relations and periodic purges of union activists from their plants.
However, by 1936 local unions had been formed through grassroots
initiatives at GE electrical transformer plants in Schenectady, New York,
Lynn and Pittsfield, Massachusetts, and at Westinghouse radio and
appliance plants in Springfield, Massachusetts and Buffalo, New York.
In early 1936 UE claimed to represent approximately 15,000 of the
300,000 workers in the electrical, radio and home appliance industry in the
country. By 1939 the union would represent workers in plants producing
80 percent of U.S. electrical goods, from giant industrial generators to the
smallest home appliances, in Emerson Electric, Delco-Frigidaire, Edison
Battery, Essex Wire, Pratt and Whitney Machine Tool and Singer Sewing
Machine plants concentrated mostly in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio
and Massachusetts.
Historian Ronald Schatz determined that the electrical industry
concentrated most of its manufacturing facilities in U.S. cities of between
30,000 and 175,000 people, avoiding large metropolitan areas. In 1930
twelve communities stood out as centers of the industry including:
Schenectady, New York, Erie, Pennsylvania, and Lynn and Pittsfield,
Massachusetts, where General Electric located plants; Wilmerding, Turtle
Creek and East Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Westinghouse; Bridgeport,
Connecticut which had large General Electric, Westinghouse and Singer
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Sewing Machine plants, along with typewriter makers and machine tool
builders; and the Springfield-Holyoke, Massachusetts area with the
General Electric, Westinghouse, and Bosch plants, and several machine
tool builders, and precision metalworking companies. The industry was
also characterized by the rapid growth of production workers, climbing to
343,000 in 1929 from 92,000 in 1909. The number would drop to 164,000 in
1933 but rebound to 306,000 in 1937, an 86 percent gain. This growth soon
caused a skilled labor shortage in Springfield, something union organizers
used to their advantage. 16 Bosch workers were joining a national
movement to organize labor into industrial unions and were about to
challenge Rolls Royce's 1919 observation that Springfield was "the city
freest from labor troubles in the United States". 17
In April, 1936 Campbell was informed by UE President James Carey
that efforts would begin in earnest to organize the Bosch plant. A first step
was to be regular distribution of UE's newspaper, the People's Press, at
plant gates. During organizing meetings and in articles in the union paper
Bosch workers learned their Westinghouse counterparts received pay
increases each month between May and October, 1936. Local 202's contract
called for pay adjustments based on company profits: Workers were to
receive a one percent increase for every $60,000 a month the company
16 Ronald Schatz, American Electrical Workers: Work, Struggles, Aspirations 1930 - 1950,
(diss., 1977). Figures in Backman, The Economics of the Electrical Manufacturing Industry
(New York, 1962) p. 328.
1 7 Local 206 Bulletin (LB) September, 1963. This special Local 206 25th anniversary issue
of the paper contains a richly detailed history of the Local and is relied on heavily for a
history of the early years of the local. Local 206 records for the period 1936 -1948 were lost
so this anniversary issue is invaluable for the information it provides. Schatz, The
Electrical Workers (Illinois, 1983) p. 62-64. UEN, January 7, 1939, p. 4. The quote is
contained in a Rolls Royce plant location study that resulted in a car assembly facility
being constructed in Springfield in the early 1920s, appears in Stone, p. 550.
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made over a base figure of $600,000. With the economy beginning to
improve, workers saw wage gains of between nine and thirteen percent
each month between May and October, 1936. 18
These pay gains opened the eyes of area workers, most of whom had
received no raises for several years. Average annual earnings for
manufacturing workers across the state dropped sharply between 1929 and
1933, plummeting 45 percent between September 1929 and September 1930.
Though skilled metalworkers tended to have higher wages, they too saw
income drop during this period. By 1939 average manufacturing
compensation in Massachusetts still failed to exceed 1929 levels (Table 5.1 -
Massachusetts Earnings).
Table 5.1: Massachusetts average annual earnings 1927 - 1939.
1927 $1,221
1929 $1,246
1931 $1,091
1932 $953
1933 $889
1934 $963
1935 $1,006
1936 $1,068
1937 $1,121
1938 $1052
1939 $1,124
A study commissioned by the state legislature demonstrated that
even with Springfield's comparatively high average earnings, income in
1927 fell below what was needed to maintain a family of four. The
18 SR, Oct. 14, 1936, p.12. Carey to Campbell, April 24, 1936, UE District 2 Archives.
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or $1,568: Male average annual earnings were $1,410. Even with their
slightly higher earnings, Bosch workers were feeling the pinch as they
contemplated signing union cards. 19
Winning Acceptanrp
Eventually 52 percent of Bosch workers signed membership cards
and the union went public October 12, 1936 with the announcement that
elections for officers would be held Friday, October 16. The union charter
was to be issued that day as well from the UE national office in New York
City. But before the charter could be hung on the office wall the local was
embroiled in its first confrontation. On Thursday, October 15
management terminated three workers, two of whom were running for
union office - Leo Goulet, a toolroom group leader with fourteen years'
seniority, and Viola Theriaque, an assembler. Goulet was fired for
allegedly allowing workers to smoke on the job, while Theriaque was let
go for a 'lack of work'. In spite, or possibly because of the terminations,
Goulet was elected vice-president and Theriaque, recording secretary. The
day-old union now had two officers out on the street.
Campbell demanded reinstatement of the workers and threatened
to file labor board charges. The following Tuesday the local papers
reported that the union was still seeking a meeting with management to
protest the termination and demanded resolution before Friday, October
19 MDLI, Annual Reports for 1938, p. 40 and 1939, p. 43; Special Commission on Stability of
Employment, Final Report (Boston, 1933) p. 61, 105, 125. By sector, the highest average
wages in 1929 were: Printing and Publishing, $1,850; Foundry and machine shop products,
$1,552; Machine tools and metalworking machinery, $1,510; and Electrical machinery,
$1,422. The lowest were: Cotton mills, $927; Paper mills, $1,014; Knit goods, $1,015; and
Woolen mills, $1,145. The Commission was chaired by Stanley King, president of Amherst
College.
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23rd. The deadline came and went with union leaders expressing
confidence that the issue would be "resolved amicably;' in the words of
newly elected Local 206 president, Robert Shields. Julius Emspak, UE
Secretary-Treasurer, supported Campbell's approach to resolving the
terminations and gaining union recognition. In an early November letter
he noted: "Since you have a majority of workers enrolled in the union,
you will have no difficulty whatever in getting the Labor Board to act in
this matter."20
Company effort to intimidate the local were not unique. Robert
Zieger recounts a similar episode in a Madison, Wisconsin battery factory
during the Spring of 1936 when two union officers were dismissed.
However, unlike Local 206, the members of Federal Union 19587
authorized a work stoppage against the company unless their leaders were
reinstated. Two and a half weeks after the strike vote Local 19587' s leaders
returned.
Peter Friedlander discusses the intimidation management
employed to keep the United Auto Workers out of the Detroit Parts
Company. In one such incident, after a secret organizing meeting, the
plant manager walked out onto the shop floor and pointed out each
worker who had attended the house meeting, to let union supporters
know they were being closely watched. The creative lengths workers
would go to protect themselves against retaliation for union activity is
revealed in an article by historian Maynard Seder. In rural North Adams,
20 SR, October 12, 1936, p. 7; SR, October 17, 1936, p. 1. SDN, October 24, 1936, p. 4. Emspak
to Campbell, November 10, 1936, UE District 2 Archives.
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Massachusetts, "the workers fashioned their petition (for a pay increase)
into a circle, leaving no single name at the top. "21
Plant workers were cognizant of the organizing going on around
them. Strikes and sit-ins, mostly for union recognition, were on the
upswing in the state and across the country. The local press was reporting
on a strike of 4,000 workers at several textile mills in Fall River,
Massachusetts. There was also auspicious economic news. Local
metalworking establishments were working double shifts and
employment had jumped to just over 20,000 in September from 16,000 in
January, 1936. Skilled workers, tool and die makers, mold makers, all-
around machinists, were now in a far more advantageous bargaining
position than they had been two years earlier. 22
Machine tool manufacturers had dramatically expanded sales, due
in large measure to innovations in the structure and design of the
equipment being produced. New materials, especially steel alloys, and
new cutting tool designs "make it possible to produce machines doing
accurate work at much higher speeds on a greater variety of materials."
These machine tools were stronger, made of lighter yet sturdier materials
and used less energy. In Springfield Van Norman's milling and ball
bearing grinding machines were in heavy demand by car makers, and Pratt
and Whitney Machine Tool could not produce its lathes, shapers and
vertical grinders fast enough to keep up with domestic and foreign
demand. 23
21 Robert Zieger, Madison's Battery Workers ( Ithaca, 1977) p. 25 - 28; Peter Friedlander,
The Emergence of a UAW Local (Pittsburgh, 1975) p. 12. Maynard Seider, "The CIO in
Rural Massachusetts: Sprague Electric and North Adams, 1937 - 1944," Historical Journal
of Massachusetts, 22 (Winter, 1944) p. 54.
22 SR, October 6, 1936, p. 1;
23 SR, October 11, p. 18; October 14, 1936, p. 5.
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With the surge in industrial production came a skilled labor
shortage, leading Springfield employers to establish training programs
to get workers off welfare rolls and into their plants. Company
presidents at Westinghouse and Van Norman were instrumental in
getting the collaborative program established with the Springfield
vocational high school. Training consisted of classroom instruction in
shop mathematics, blue print reading and hands-on operation of drill
presses, engine lathes, grinders, and milling machines. According to one
of the sponsoring firms "Skilled mechanics who understand their
machines have this year been at a premium. Specialization over a period
of many years has led to a large group of just machine operators. They
could pull a lever but that was about it." Owners were alarmed by the fact
that an estimated three hundred skilled machinists traveled to greater-
Hartford, Connecticut each day to work. Sixty out of sixty-five graduates of
the first program found permanent employment with an additional forty
slated to begin training in October. The program achieved a national
reputation and later became a model program, with requests for
information from as far away as Japan. 24
Area newspapers continued to report favorable economic news.
Pay increases and year-end bonuses went to area textile and rubber
workers. Package Machinery boosted wages five percent and provided
workers with two weeks' paid vacation as a result of a profitable year. It
was reported that manufacturing job gains in Springfield were greater
than those of thirteen other industrial cities in the state. "Plants Run Full
Tilt Under Heavy Unfilled Orders" cheered a Springfield Republican
24 SR, October 11, p. 18; October 14, p. 5. See "Skilled Mechanics at a Premium," SR,
October 25, 1936, p. 2e.
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headline. Factories could not get orders out fast enough because they had
failed to modernize over the past six years. Pratt and Whitney Aircraft in
Hartford strained to machine and assemble aircraft engines to meet
escalating demand. Orders for Bosch radios and automotive parts went
unfilled. Foundries were running at full capacity. 25
Bosch workers were in an enviable position to make demands on
management: The economy was rebounding and the labor market for
skilled workers tightened further. Campbell now questioned whether his
'go-slow' approach was the proper one in a late November letter to UE
President Carey. Carey responded as follows:
...the procedure outlined in your letter is very
satisfactory. The success of this procedure to a great
extent depends on the patience of the workers involved,
and care must be taken that they do not assume that
everything possible is not being done to result in a
satisfactory adjustment. It has been my experience that
the management of companies like Bosch often waste a
lot of time without reaching any suitable agreement
unless pushed by the organization. In a previous letter I
advised you that those on the ground floor in a case of
this sort are better able to determine the proper course
than I would be at this distance.
Carey urged Campbell to persist with efforts to get the Labor Board to rule
on recognition.26
25 SR, November 16, p. I; November 17, p. 4; November 18, p. 11; November 21, p. 1;
November 29, p. 17; November 22, p. 18a, 1936. At the end of 1936 the Springfield
Republican reported that the output of local manufacturers was strong. Gilbert and Barker,
Greenfield Tap and Die and Van Norman were running at full capacity and there was
increased activity in Holyoke's Fall Alpaca woolen mills. See SR, December 27, 1936, p.
14a.
26 Carey to Campbell, November 24, 1936, UE District 2 Archives. The Campbell letter to
Carey could not be found but it appears, from Carey's tone, that Campbell may have been
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UE national staff encouraged local organizers to adopt the strategies
they deemed appropriate for their specific circumstances. In the Bosch case
a go-slow approach was endorsed even in the face of the terminations of
two leaders. A memo from organizer Hugh Harley to James Matles
amplifies this further. In 1943 UE was locked in a difficult campaign to
organize 3,000 workers at the Sprague Electric North Adams,
Massachusetts plant. The two tactics utilized were a town-wide
educational campaign on the benefits of the UE and a campaign inside the
company union to win its leaders over to the UE. 27
Management still refused to meet with representatives of Local 206
to begin negotiations for a first contract, and instead announced a poll in
mid-December to determine whether there was worker support for the
union. Shields and Campbell warned management that the union
considered the poll illegal. Murray responded by laying off 200 workers
three days before the poll. Local 206 protested that every dismissed worker
was a union supporter. Campbell now stated that a "walk-out was
unavoidable as long as management's anti-union attitude continues." He
added that he was not agitating for a strike and cautioned against it until
the labor board could rule on the legality of the company poll. A union
representative was sent to the Boston office of the labor board to launch a
protest and call for an NLRB supervised representation election. In the
same press interview Campbell revealed that organizing drives were now
underway at four more area plants, Moore Drop Forge, Sickles, Gilbert and
Barker and Indian Motorcycle.
having some misgivings over not having adopted a more militant strategy to gain
recognition. Carey appears to be subtly pushing Campbell with his "unless pushed" phrase
but he clearly left strategy and tactics in Campbell's hands.
27 Harley to Matles, July 13, 1943 in UE Archives, District 2 files, U. of Pittsburgh.
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On December 12 it was reported that the union scheduled a meeting
for December 16 to discuss a company proposal. On December 17 the
company and union finally met to discuss outstanding issues between
them. At a meeting organized by the chairman of the New England Labor
Board, management agreed to recognize Local 206 and indicated that it was
ready to negotiate a contract with whomever the union designated as its
representatives. 28
By the end of 1936 and in the first two months of 1937 Springfield
workers heard on the radio or read in the local press about sit-down strikes
and organizing victories across the country. Thousands were on strike at
the Ford River Rouge plant in Detroit and Pittsburgh Plate Glass and
Libby Owens-Ford Glass. Strikes at key auto parts plants were causing
shutdowns of assembly facilities. "Labor Front Seething" read one local
headline discussing wholesale walkouts affecting the entire country,
"Bayonets Rule Anderson, Indiana" read another. Closer to Springfield,
across New England shoe workers struck for recognition of the C.I.O.-
backed United Shoe and Leather Workers. Large walkouts took place in
Brockton and Haverhill. Finally on February 24th twenty-seven plants
settled, and granted a 15 percent wage increase to 12,700 jubilant workers.
Timing was critical to this success according to chief union negotiator
28 SR, December 10, 1936, p. 1 December 12, 1936, p.5; DN, December 10, 1936, p. 2. In the
midst of this turmoil the union opened a storefront office on Main Street, just a short walk
form the plant. Monthly dues were now being collected for the first time, $1 for men and 50
cents for women. DN, December 14, 1936, p. 9. M. Campbell to fames Carey, December 17,
1936, District 2 Archives. In the same letter the untiring Campbell informed Carey that
"there are quite a few plants here who would like to be organized." Campbell added that
"if you could get a steel worker organizer or auto worker organizer I could help him quite a
lot."
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William Mahan: "Shoe companies which haven't already signed, on the
basis of annual Easter demand, will have to capitulate before Friday. "29
Bosch contract negotiations were inconclusive through the first two
months in 1937 and Local 206 and management clashed for a third time in
mid-February 1937, when the company proceeded with a plan to conduct
officer elections for the company union. Previous union unwillingness to
confront management more forcefully may have emboldened
management to proceed with this provocative activity. The company's
continued recognition of both unions while refusing to negotiate a
contract with Local 206 represented a serious challenge to the union's
contention that it alone spoke for workers.
The union response remained measured, though more aggressive
than its response to the October terminations and December mass layoffs.
Quietly and confidently Shields and others organized what they hoped
would be an effective in-plant protest to convince management to
negotiate a contract. On Monday February 15 at a prearranged time
workers shut off their machines in silent protest against management's
determination to hold elections. Shields stated "We simply knocked off
work at one o'clock and resumed again at 2 o'clock. Everything about the
demonstration was orderly. They know our attitude and it now rests with
them whether any more labor trouble develops." After exactly 59 minutes
machines were restarted, metal was ground, drilled, turned and stamped
and magnetos and fuel injection equipment began to make its way
through the plant again. Almost immediately the company recognized
29 For examples of coverage see SR, "Lewis Seeks Showdown in Auto Industry," December
19, 1936, p.l; "Big Glass Strike Likely to Extend Beyond Holidays," and "Steel Workers
Form New CIO Council," December 21, 1936, p. 1; "12,700 Shoe Employees Jubilant at
Victory," February 25, 1937.
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Local 206 and bargaining began for a first contract. "There is no question
that the majority of the employees at the plant are members of the
Electrical workers union/' Shields asserted. "Any more labor trouble is up
to them. "30
Skilled Workers and Union Organization
Matthew Campbell's union career is similar to that of other skilled
workers analyzed in several recent studies of industrial union formation
as well as a fictional account written by machinist and UE member Ben
Field in 1946. Set during World War II Piper Tompkins tells the story of a
20 year old who moves from rural Connecticut to take a job in an East
Hartford metalworking company. With no shop experience at all, Piper
Tompkins slowly learns the trade from other workers, and is eventually
befriended by UE union president, Scotty Stevenson, after having several
run-ins with a shop foreman who labels the UE as "an outfit of Jews,
niggers, and Reds." Piper is upset with his supervisor because he sees
workers providing the foreman with food and other small gifts to insure
that they are placed on well-paying jobs and are given overtime when it is
available.
Born in Scotland, Stevenson is a skilled machine repair mechanic
able to move about the whole factory with relative ease as he performs his
job. Field describes Stevenson's work area in detail. It is not difficult to
imagine Campbell's work area as similar.
30 SR, February 17, 1937, p.l; February 18, 1936, p. 1. Campbell was quick to point out that
events in the plant should not be interpreted as a sit-down strike. DN, February 16, 1937, p.
2.
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Not only was Scott's corner a union headquarters, but
it was also a sort of library. Over his tool cabinet and
boxes Scotty had built shelves for books and
magazines. Here were the American Machinist,
manuals on pumps, hydraulics, and air compressors,
and magazines the like of Iron Age.31
Campbell was assisted in organizing Bosch by Westinghouse local
officers included Business Agent Wallace Kennedy, a tool grinder, and
vice president Leonard Wade and negotiating committee member, John
O'Connell, both machinists. Two of Bosch's top officers Leo Goulet, a
diemaker, and Robert Shields, a tool designer, were also highly skilled. A
check of the occupations of ten Bosch union offers determined that seven
held skilled jobs while a similar check for Westinghouse found several
tool makers, final inspectors, and set up men had been early union
officers.32
Historian Ronald Schatz found a similar pattern when he examined
the occupations of key organizers and early officers in several UE plants.
Many of these individuals were British or Scottish immigrants. Schatz
found information on 28 early leaders of local unions in Erie and East
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Lynn, Massachusetts, and Schenectady, New
York. Of the 28, 23 were Northern European immigrants or their children;
14 were of Scottish, Irish or English descent. The majority were skilled.33
31 Ben Field, Piper Tompkins (New York, 1946) p. 87 - 88.
32 Occupations found using Springfield City Directories, 1925 - 1935.
33 Schatz, American Electrical Workers: Work, Struggles, Aspirations 1930 - 1950 (diss.,
Pennsylvania, 1977) p. 90 - 100. Schatz states that these men resembled the 'labor
aristocrats' of 19th century England, p. 110. See also Schatz, "Union Pioneers: The Founders
of Local Unions at GE and Westinghouse, 1933 - 1937," Journal of American History, Vol. 66
(December, 1979) p. 586 - 602.
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Steve Babson determined that skilled workers played an equally
dynamic role in the formation of the United Auto Workers. He states that
"tool and die makers were the cutting edge of auto unionism in Detroit.
Production workers provided the critical mass that pushed the UAW
forward, but as they stormed the walls of open-shop Detroit, they moved
through breaches opened by the tool and die makers... ." Babson also
found that many in leading positions were either Anglo-Gaelic
immigrants or their children.34
Further evidence of the role skilled workers played in organizing
campaigns is contained in recent studies of the 1939 General Motors tool
and diemakers strike. Historian John Barnard asserts that this strike
"secured the UAW's position in GM, and therefore in the auto industry."
Auto plants required two types of highly skilled workers, those who
prepared the tools and dies required to manufacture automobile parts and
those who set up and maintained the thousands of pieces of equipment in
a assembly-line paced production plant. When these workers struck, first
at the Detroit Fischer Body plant in early July, escalating to 12 plants and
7,600 workers by July 24, GM conceded that preparations to bring out its
1940 cars were at a standstill. GM attempted to get dies produced at area
job shops but machinists refused to touch the work, forcing GM to
negotiate a settlement with the strikers who were led by Walter Reuther 35
Campbell and other skilled worker - union activists, offered
workers an alternative to the petty tyranny of individual foremen.
Machine operator Art McCollough decried working conditions he
34 Steve Babson, Building the Union: Skilled Workers and Anglo-Gaelic Immigrants in
the Rise of the UAW ( New Brunswick, 1991) esp. chs. 4 and 5.
35 John Barnard, "Rebirth of the United Automobile Workers: The General Motors Tool
and Diemakers" Strike of 1939," Labor History, 27 (Spring, 1986) pp. 165 - 187.
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tolerated daily. 'The company had the goddamned thing so unequal you
know, that a foreman's favorite would be making a hell of a lot more
money than somebody else, and this other guy might be doing more...
.
William Winn related "People bring farm baskets and get good jobs,
overtime, privileges. And you couldn't do nothing abut it. What could
you do?" The theme of unfairness is repeatedly invoked.36
Capable of turning out precision work to exacting requirements,
these men were level headed and systematic in their approach to their
work in the factory. The planning and deliberation of their work carried
over to their union organizing. It was not out of character for these
workers to urge others to produce quality parts, while at the same time
leading the fight against the company for union recognition. In Piper
Tompkins, for example, Stevenson fought a supervisor to no avail when
the supervisor decided to knowingly ship bad parts to the Navy. When
the parts were rejected and returned, the union used the evidence to get
the supervisor fired. Springfield's skilled workers appear to have related
well to organizing campaigns centered on fair treatment, compensation,
and respect for skilled workmanship.37
There is some evidence that, due to the nature of the work
performed, skilled workers in the electrical industry maintained much of
their craft identity well into the 20th century while their counterparts in
industries like steel and automobiles saw this dissipate through, among
other things, the introduction of new technologies. Particularly in plants
36 Quotes found in Schatz, American Electrical Workers, (1977) p. 68. Both workers were
machine operators in Pennsylvania Westinghouse plants.
37 The skill issue is important to consider in analyzing national events that would
overtake UE in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Many Bosch and Westinghouse workers who
led the opposition to anti-communist attacks on the UE were skilled machinists and tool
and die makers, while the first officers in I.U.E. Local 206 were all stock handlers, packers,
and machine operators. This will be discussed in chapter 6.
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like the Bosch, with its multiple products and exacting machining
requirements, tool and die makers, set up personnel, and maintenance
and repair crews were in demand. These workers moved all over the
plant in the course of their day, and were able to stay in contact with large
numbers of workers when running for union office. Their bargaining and
leadership positions were weakened, instead, by corporate developments
outside the plant. Historian Philip Leahey found, for example, in near-by
Pittsfield, Ma., that General Electric's "coordination of a huge network of
integrated production facilities significantly reduced the control which
craft workers had customarily exerted over their labor, even as they
retained the skills which have been depicted as the cornerstone of their
power in the workplace and of their status in life." How the Bosch plant's
immersion into a multi-plant, multi-national corporation in the 1950s
affected skilled workers will be examined in chapter 6.38
Organizing in the Rest of Greater Springfield
Campbell and Local 206 union leaders did not forcefully confront
management with sit downs or lengthy walkouts despite the fact that an
expanding regional economy and increased demand for skilled workers
reduced the risks associated with such job actions. In a 1937 year-end
review of the local economy area workers learned that Westinghouse sales
increased 40 percent, Indian Motorcycles output was up 36 percent and
Chapman Valves sales jumped 25 percent. These companies had all added
workers. Van Norman was exporting grinding machines to Russia,
38 Philip Leahey, "Skilled Labor and the Rise of the Modern Corporation: The Case of
the Electrical Industry," Labor History, 27 (Winter, 1985 - 1986) p. 53.
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England and Japan. On February 27, 1937 the Republican reported that
"industrial output in Springfield was at record levels."39
With such leverage one would expect a surge in organizing activity
across the city, but this did not materialize. Strikes declined in
Massachusetts while they gained more prominence in the rest of the
country. In 1931, 14 percent of striking workers in the U.S. were in
Massachusetts; this dropped to 3 percent in 1937 and 2 percent in 1938.
Strike days idle also dropped markedly as a percentage of the U.S. total,
falling to 3.9 percent in 1935 and 2.1 percent in 1937 from 16 percent in
1931. Moreover, strikes in the country climbed to 4,740 in 1937 from 2,172
in 1936. There was little evidence of this upsurge in Springfield
metalworking firms.40
A review of 1938 strikes shows that Springfield had the fifth highest
man days lost by strikes in the state ( exceeded by Boston, New Bedford,
Lynn and Fall River). Seven industries had three or more strikes that
affected five hundred or more workers. The top four were: teamsters, 20;
boot and shoe workers, 13; garment workers, 11; and textile workers, 10.
This would suggest that workers least secure in employment were the
most willing to exert the pressure of walkouts to gain union recognition
and increased wages, not workers in the industries that were growing
rapidly between late 1936 and 1938.
^y SR, February 27, 1937, p. 5. An Associated Industries of Massachusetts survey released in
early March showed that 84 new manufacturers, employing 5,308 workers opened in
Western Massachusetts between March 1936 - March 1937. A large number of these new
companies represented industrial migrations from other states AIM determined. See SR,
March 8, 1937, p. 7. Year-end review in SR, January 3, 1937, p. H8. Westinghouse
employment jumped from 4,437 to 5,692; Chapman Valve went from 1,000 to 1,400. Overall,
metalworking firms employed 5,000 more workers in January, 1937 compared to a year
earlier.
40 U.S. Department of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics (Washington, D.C., 1974) p. 367.
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In March, 1937 while 2,000 Woonsocket, Rhode Island woolen mill
workers and 3,000 Nashua, New Hampshire and Lowell, Massachusetts
shoe workers walked picket lines, 7,000 Pittsfield, Massachusetts GE
metalworkers received wage adjustments and improved vacation
payments without resorting to protest. General Electric, like Package
Machinery and Westinghouse, tied pay increases to profitability.
According to plant manager Louis Underwood, in an effort to minimize
worker turnover - particularly of highly skilled machinists - GE had a
policy of paying wage rates "equal to or higher than wage rates paid in the
other community industries for comparable work... . If wage rates are
found to be lower than going rates, the company will promptly rectify
them." GE appeared to be flexible and cooperative by entering into talks
with UE aimed at organizing plants across the country, prompting twenty-
five year old national UE president James Carey to remark "I believe that a
very happy relationship will be established between the union and the
management of GE." Philip Murray, Chairman of the Steel Workers
Organizing Committee (SWOC) expressed similar sentiments for U.S.
Steel, extolling the virtues of SWOC's 1937 agreement with the steel giant.
According to Murray, "The strike and lockout are discarded in favor of an
orderly process of settling difficulties at the conference table."41
It was not until late 1939 that a concerted and successful effort was
undertaken to organize Western Massachusetts metalworking firms.
Package Machinery and UE Local 220 reached an agreement, giving the
local exclusive bargaining rights in the plant. UE Local 259 and
Worthington Pump in Holyoke reached an agreement in March, 1940.
41 Frederick Harbison, "The General Motors - United Auto Workers Agreement of 1950",
Journal of Political Economy, 58 (1950) pp.404 - 405; R. J. Thomas, Labor Information
Bulletin (November, 1940); Philip Murray, Labor Information Bulletin, (June, 1939).
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Greenfield Tap and Die Local 274 won a recognition election in September,
1941, 569 to 261 over the management-sponsored Greenfield Small Tool
Association. The International Association of Machinists had made four
previous attempts to organize the plant. Another anti-union stronghold
was captured in October, 1941 when 1,000 workers at Smith and Wesson
endorsed the UE as their exclusive bargaining agent. Newspapers
characterized plant management as having a reputation "exceeding even
Henry Ford's for being bitterly anti-labor." Smith and Wesson had signs at
its gates reading 'No Catholics hired here.' Company efforts to smear the
union as pro-communist failed to deter workers from voting for the
union, and by the end of November a contract was signed.42
Bosch Workers Gain Through Negotiations
Over a five month period between October 1936 and February 1937
in measured steps, eschewing the walk-out or sit-down Local 206
established itself as the legitimate voice of workers, in the plant. When
management fired union leaders, work went on in the plant while
Campbell and others negotiated. When scores of workers were laid off on
the eve of a recognition poll to be conducted by the company, Local 206
leaders remained low-key. They continued to sign up new members, and
publicly stated that they, and not the company union, represented
workers. Its one militant action, "the fifty-nine minute stand-up"
convinced management to discontinue the company union and negotiate
42 UEN, November 18,1939, p. 1; March 23, 1940, p. 8; September 27, 1941, p. 1; October 4,
1941, p. 1. UEN, May 16, 1942. The election was close, with 817 voting for U.E. and 658 for
affiliation with the American Federation of Labor (UEN, June 6, 1942). It appears that at
least for the U.E. organizing gains were the most dramatic after the war began.
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a collective bargaining agreement. For management the fifty-nine
minutes of silence followed by the din when all machine tools were
turned on again, may have posed a greater threat than the walk-out of a
handful of workers in one department in the plant. The unity of action
demonstrated to management that union leaders did in fact speak for all
workers and could command them when necessary. With orders for
radios and magnetos going unfilled, and skilled workers hard to find,
management did the logical thing as it disbanded the company union and
recognized Local 206 as the sole bargaining agent for plant workers
The union won an initial 2.2 percent raise on each worker's base
rate, and Labor Day fittingly became the first paid holiday in 1937. In 1938 a
ten cent base rate increase was obtained, along with time and a half for any
hours worked in excess of eight during the day, 40 for the week, and all
Sunday work. No gains were made in holidays and workers still did not
receive paid vacations. Nor was there seniority protection. Seniority
remained an important issue; in fact job security for long-term employees
had been one of the key organizing issues during the union's formative
period. Local 206 became one of just two UE locals in the country to attend
the 1938 national convention with a signed labor agreement.
By 1940 grievance and arbitration procedures were in place,
seniority rights were spelled out, six paid holidays and a vacation schedule
were established. Local 206 bargainers gained language stipulating that
layoffs and recalls were to follow plant-wide seniority. A job classification
book became part of the contract in 1941.43 Steady wage gains were made
as well, with eight and 10 cent per hour increases in 1938 and 1939. In five
years base rates were raised from a range of 20 cents to 50 cents an hour to a
43 LB, September, 1963.
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new range of 60 cents to $1.21. By comparison, only after work stoppages
and sit-downs throughout the early months of 1941 did the UAW and
Ford settle on a 10 cent increase, the first for Ford workers in three years
.
44
The Local 206 agreement fit into an emerging pattern in
metalworking. In a study of collective bargaining carried out in 1941
economist Sumner Slichter determined that while 290 of 400 contracts
negotiated between 1933 and 1939 contained some seniority provisions,
fully 87 percent of metal trades agreements contained such language.
With the Springfield Westinghouse local pushing for this protection in
their agreement, it is likely that this influenced Local 206 negotiators to
make a concerted effort to win such protections for their members as
well .45
Bosch plant-wide seniority language was significant because in such
a large, sprawling facility, with close to 50 production departments and
several hundred job classifications, administering the system became a
bureaucratic nightmare. Seniority clauses in other contracts were usually
limited to specific departments, making it easier for management to layoff
workers. Plant wide seniority like Bosch workers had, gave high seniority
workers from one department the right to "bump" workers off a job in
another department. A chain reaction of "bumps" across the plant often
resulted, causing serious production disruptions. Certain occupations
44 Nelson Lichtenstein, Labor's War at Home: The CIO and World War II, p. 46 - 47. U.S.
Steel, General Motors, General Electric and other corporations similarly increased wages as
well.
45 Sumner Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management (Washington, D.C., 1941) p.
105-107. For discussions of the issue of seniority as an aspect of union formation see
Freidlander, The Emergence of a UAW Local, 1936-1939 , p. 72-74; Howell Harris, The
Right to Manage (Wisconsin, 1982) p. 64-65; Schatz, The Electrical Workers , ch. 5, p. 105-
136.
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"requiring ability, as may be agreed upon jointly by Management and the
Committee of Local 206, as necessary to the efficient operation of the
plant" could be exempted from seniority rules. A clause was also put in
place calling on the company and union to explore the option of going to a
32-hour work week if layoffs would drop the workforce below 2,000. The
plant-wide language and the "bumping" procedures it sanctioned would
be a sticking point in union-management relations for the rest of the
union's history.46
The Bosch contract was more elaborate than many others in the late
1930s and early 1940s. David Brody characterizes most agreements as "thin
affairs, largely codifying existing conditions and limited to wages, hours,
vacations, and weakly drawn grievance and seniority provisions." Only
after the war was such language strengthened, as new provisions were
added to contracts. By comparison, in the 1940 Bosch agreement all
personnel moves were to be based on plant-wide seniority. Seniority was
accumulated from date of hire, providing there were no breaks in service
for voluntary quits, discharge, or failure to report to work.47
Early agreements contained strong maintenance of membership
language requiring that employees "will be required as a condition of
employment with the Company to maintain their membership in good
standing during the life of this Agreement." This was something the
UAW only gained with General Motors in 1950. A check off system was
also established, with dues automatically deducted monthly from each
46 Local 206 Contract, 1942, p. 30. In later years management aggressively sought to limit
this language through negotiations and in arbitration cases, arguing that a layoff of 25
workers would result in at least 100 moves across the factory as each laid off worker
exercised his or her rights to bump into other jobs using their seniority. The domino affect
this caused could result in a layoff taking several weeks to complete.
47 David Brody, Workers in Industrial America (New York, 1980) p. 178. Local 206
Contract, 1942, p. 30.
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worker's pay and turned over to Local 206's treasurer. The maintenance
of membership and dues deduction clauses simplified the administrative
tasks that confronted the local. By 1941 the contract required the company
to pay for the negotiating committee's lost time when the company
requested meetings. Grievance committee members were to be paid
during weekly meetingsas well. In 1941 the local gained the right to
represent all office workers in the plant excluding engineers and
supervisors.
On the eve of World War II, then, Local 206 had achieved
legitimacy. With the exception of the 59 minute sit-down this was done at
the bargaining table. Maintenance of membership language, company
dues check-off, well-defined grievance and arbitration language and
seniority measures elaborating the ways management could move
workers in and out of the plant provided workers with parameters in
dealing with management. The contract greatly reduced the arbitrary
authority of foremen that sparked worker organizing in the plant in
1936.48
Conclusion: The Union Faces an Uncertain Future
Examining trade union activity during and immediately after
World War II, Nelson Lichtenstein contends that a "system of interclass
accommodation" developed immediately following the war. Union
power was essentially political power, and it was put to effective use on
the shop floor during the 1930s and early 1940s. In auto plants workers
operating grinding machines, milling machines, lathes and performing
48 Local 206 Contract, 1942, p. 26 33.
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intricate assemblies were able to maintain a level of control over the pace
and content of their work, unlike workers regulated by the flow of moving
assembly lines. Labor agreements provided workers with protection from
unilateral reprisals by management when they challenged management
authority on the factory floor. Quickie work stoppages and departmental
slowdowns escalated among workers. By 1944 one of every two workers in
the auto industry was taking part in some sort of work stoppage. In 1944 a
GM vice-president reported that most GM strikes were "caused by the
refusal of workers to meet production standards."49
Such overt activities never assumed prominence in Springfield.
Local 202 at Westinghouse had lengthy strikes as part of national labor
negotiations. However Bosch, Van Norman, Chapman Valve, and other
significant metalworking plants were quiet during and immediately after
the war. The fight over rates and production standards took on greater
urgency in the mid-1950s. Springfield metalworkers may actually have
maintained more control over their work than Lichtenstein's
autoworkers, at least until then.
As the previous chapters show, the management team that
consolidated its authority in the Bosch plant under the direction of
Charles Perelle sought to gain a measure of control on the factory floor at
two levels, ideologically with the union and at the point of production by
reconfiguring the factory floor. A popular labor relations manager was
fired and the hated head of time study took this position. The long-time
49 Quoted in Lichtenstein, "Conflict Over Workers' Control: The Automobile Industry in
World War II," in Michael Frisch and Daniel Walkowitz, eds., Working Class America
(Urbana, 1983) p. 295. The workforce Lichtenstein describes as being the most actively
involved in shop floor job actions is quite similar to the one found in the Bosch plant.
During the 1940s and early 1950s close to 50 percent of the workforce set up and operated
manual machines and could significantly control output by controlling their own pace.
Information from Local 206 seniority and occupations lists, UMass Archives.
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production manager was released along with several production
supervisors. Because of their high skill levels, and the intricate and close
tolerance work performed, Bosch workers had not yet had their roll on the
shop floor challenged, but they soon would. For example, before and
during World War II the union had a vibrant union-management council
in place to discuss production-related issues with management. By the
mid-1950s the union fought, albeit unsuccessfully, to keep this council
going, in vigorous opposition to management's unilateral decision to
eliminate it.50
Labor historian David Brody contends that significant shop floor
battles were continually being fought as part of a never-ending jockeying
for in-plant control. During the war managers were concerned that
unions were encroaching on their right to run the shop. Labor
agreements reflected local leadership's commitment to preserving job
security for their membership. A give-and-take ensued, and resultant
contracts reflected labor relaxing its concern for shop floor and job control
language in exchange for seniority protection and cost of living and wage
increases tied to productivity boosts. Income security prevailed over job
security.
5U During and immediately following the war the CIO's Philip Murray and the UAW's
Walter Reuther attempted to define a role for labor in corporate decision-making, based in
part on the shop floor militancy Lichtenstein describes. Murray's Industry Council Plan
sought a voice for labor in corporate production, investment, and employment decisions.
Lichtenstein, "Conflict Over Workers Control," p. 301. By the mid 1950s the Local 206 labor
agreement contains the following language: "The Company reserves and retains complete
authority to manage its business and to make all decisions relative thereto, including, but
not limited to, the right to schedule the work and working forces, discipline or discharge
employees for just cause, promulgate reasonable shop rules, and other inherent management
rights not herein specified."
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At the local level workers still tried to exercise some control over
their work. Brody's assertions are supported by Gary Gerstle's study of
textile union activity in Woonsocket, Rhode Island. Analyzing contract
language he states that "In mill after mill, unionists sought to replace the
managerial unilaterialism that had characterized shop floor governance
with management-labor mutualism.... Discharges, qualifications for
promotion, piece rates and bonuses, work loads and working conditions
all demanded the mutual agreement of employers and employees.... To
Independent Textile Union members in 1941, industrial democracy had
come to mean equal voices for management and labor on every issue
relating to life on the shop floor." However the 'control' gains of the
early 1940s did not last long. Management rights clauses were inserted
into most contracts and the spirit of mutuality was in retreat.51
Interpretations put forward by Lichtenstein and Brody describe a
pattern of union activity emerging after World War II in which firm-
centered collective bargaining and the policing of contract language are the
focal points. In this model, income-security became more important to
union leaders than employment-security. However, it appears that Brody
would place more stock in the persistent shop floor 'dances' - the
soldiering of completed work so as to make sure piece-rates were tilted in
the worker's favor, the stretching out of machine tool set ups to play
havoc with production schedules and insure overtime for one's
department, the zealous guarding of contract language that protected
51 Brody, Workers in Industrial America, p. 188 - 195; Gary Gerstle, Working-Class
Americanism: The Politics of labor in a Textile City, 1914 - 1960 (New Yoek, 1989) p. 212,
314-316. A typical clause read: "The Union recognizes that the Management of the plant
and direction of the personnel, subject to the provisions of this agreement, shall be vested
exclusively in the employer." Compare this to the management rights clause in the Local
206 agreement.
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seniority rights for new jobs and against layoffs - as being symptomatic of
rank and file interest in the maintenance of a semblance of job control. A
close review of Local 206 grievances and arbitration cases during the 1950s
and 1960s is presented in chapter 7 to determine if this was indeed the case
in the Bosch.
After the war, Bosch workers were confronted with three disruptive
issues: employment levels fluctuated wildly causing hundreds of workers
to be laid off and recalled repeatedly from 1945 - 1960; the UE was openly
challenged for leadership in the plant by the upstart International Union
of Electrical Workers; and Bosch became part of a larger corporation with
factories spread out across the country and Europe. Rather than eschew
the strike weapon, the local responded to these changes by becoming more
assertive than ever before at the end of the 1950s and through the 1960s.
These issues, along with the union's response to management's drive for
shop floor control in Springfield, and overseas expansion will be discussed
in the next two chapters.52
52 This appears to be a fairly high level of strike activity for the years in question and is
similar to what Geiger found in his study of Madison's battery workers. See his concluding
chapter in Madison's Battery Workers, 1934 - 1952.
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CHAPTER 6
THE UNION AND CORPORATE CONSOLIDATION I:
UNION SPLITS AND RUNAWAY JOBS
Introduction
In the years immediately following World War II Connecticut
River Valley metalworkers were enmeshed in a high stakes fight for
survival. However, there is scant evidence that their unions attempted to
take a common stand to preserve their livelihoods. New corporate
ownership took charge of factories that had been locally owned for
generations as Springfield's metalworking industry was integrated into
the rapidly changing national and international economic landscape.
Bosch workers witnessed the shift of what they believed to be their
machines and work to newer US and foreign plants. They also grappled
with the impact the purchase of new machine tools had on skills and
seniority protection. As we have seen, during this period management
repeatedly compared Bosch hourly wages to costs in Europe, South
America, and the rapidly industrializing and mostly non-union southern
United States. Several joint production ventures were established
overseas, and a production plant was built in Mississippi to perform work
usually done in Springfield.
At Bosch, union leaders attempted to assert themselves to maintain
the prestige earned during the war production boom. Through the
monthly Bulletin members were told of the impact of corporate decisions.
They were told that new technologies and shop reorganization plans
would lead to workers running several machine tools simultaneously.
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Articles warned that this would play havoc with long-standing job
classification and seniority language as well as alter the way piece work
rates were set. Militant rhetoric was also directed against management for
expanding in Mississippi, and for a brief period calls were made to
establish a community-based coalition to fight the shift of manufacturing
jobs out of Springfield. However, by the late 1950s, the union campaign,
weak though it was, had collapsed. Erratic employment swings continued.
Union membership remained unstable, making it difficult to establish a
consistent, unified response to the company (Figure 6. 1- Local 206
membership).
3000 n
2750 -
Local 206 Membership September 1946 - January 1968
Figure 6.1: Local 206 membership 1946 - 1968
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Compounding these problems, the legacy of the acrimonious in-
plant battle that resulted in the IUE wresting control of Local 206 from the
UE made in-plant unity all but impossible. Several founding officers and
long-time union stewards of UE Local 206 withdrew from active
participation in the union. Just as ownership and decision-making
authority over the Bosch shifted to New York, workers were engaged in a
power struggle, and thus missed the opportunity to address the sale of the
plant and articulate their own vision of the factory's post - World War II
future.
Finally, the union's leadership often took contradictory positions
toward management during the 1950s, leaving the rank and file confused
as to the position they should take toward supervision. For example, in
April, 1959 Charles Perelle was praised for putting "AB in a position to
compete, cementing most jobs here in Springfield." Seven months later
he was accused of viewing workers in the plant as basic units of
production instead of people. Lacking a consistent approach to the
problems facing workers, union leaders reacted to each new crisis as it
occurred; all the while membership dropped, and work left the city for
good. Through it all, no comprehensive strategy was ever articulated to
deal with these issues. 1
' LB, April, 1959, p. 1. In the same article Perelle is praised for bringing in his management
team. The article concludes on an optimistic note. "We (the workers) have proven our
worth - considerations always follow recognition." LB, November, 1959, p. 1; LB, May,
1956, p. 3. In 1956 one Bulletin writer likened supervisors to "new-born reptiles ready to
strike at the opportune moment," LB, May, 1956, p. 3.
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United Electrical Workers Under Attack: 1948 - 1952
Introduction
In February, 1951 the second issue of the IUE-CIO Bulletin carried an
editorial titled "Coincidents - Communists - And Comments." It
reiterated events leading up to the June, 1950 representation vote when
the International Union of Electrical Workers won a clear cut majority
and succeeded the United Electrical Workers as bargaining agent for
workers in the plant. Once again charges of Communist party
membership were leveled at several UE national officers and organizers.
The editorial writer called on these national officers to "name us one
single instance in which the UE line has departed from the line of the
Communist party and Soviet Russia over the past ten years." Absent from
what the article called "its last full scale attack on the UE" was any
discussion of trade union policies or disagreements the Bosch-IUE local
had with the performance of the UE from 1936 - 1950 in the plant. By the
local's thirtieth anniversary celebration its history had been completely
rewritten. No mention was made at all of the UE as organizer of most of
the large metalworking firms in Western Massachusetts. Instead, those
members who led the fight to remove UE from the Bosch were canonized
as the pioneers of the Bosch union. 2
At its 1949 convention the Congress of Industrial Organizations
expelled the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers. In 1950
several more unions were expelled. The UE expulsion was anticlimactic
2 LB, February, 1951, p. 3.
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since it had already resigned from the CIO prior to the 1949 national
meeting. It is not the intent here to analyze what transpired at the
national level. The focus is on Springfield, home to several UE
metalworking locals, and how the UE - IUE conflict affected Local 206's
presence in the plant.
Chapman Valve, Van Norman, Westinghouse, and Bosch were
organized from the mid- to late 1930s and remained part of the UE for
roughly 10 years, as did many other plants in the Connecticut River Valley
between Bridgeport, Connecticut and northern Vermont. In just eight
weeks during November and December 1949 Springfield UE members
backed their Executive Board recommendations and voted to leave the UE
and for the CIO - backed International Union of Electrical Workers; only in
the Bosch plant was there organized opposition to this move.3
The National Scene
From its founding in 1936 UE was a divided union. According to
historian Ronald Filippelli three distinct groups joined together to form
the UE between 1936 and 1937. One group was headed by James Carey, in
his role as leader of the Philadelphia-based Radio and Allied Trades
National Labor Council. A second was led by James Matles, who brought
in locals affiliated with the Machine Tool and Foundry Workers along
^ There are several histories of the United Electrical Workers and studies of anti-
communism in the labor movement that contain detailed discussions and analysis of the UE
- IUE split including: Michael Bonislawski, The Ant-Communist Movement and Industrial
Unionism: IUE vs. UE (Master of Arts Thesis, 1992); Ronald Filippelli, The United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 1933 - 1949: The Struggle for Control
(diss., 1970); Martin Halpern, UAW Politics in the Cold War Era (Albany, 1988); Stephen
Meyer, Stalin Over Wisconsin: The Making and Unmaking of Militant Unionism, 1900 -
1950 ( New Brunswick, 1992); Steve Rosswurm, ed., The ClO's Left-Led Unions (New
Brunswick, 1992); Ronald Schatz, The Electrical Workers (Urbana, 1983).
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with 14 International Association of Machinist lodges. The third group,
consisted of workers from several General Electric facilities, including
plants in Lynn, Massachusetts and Schenectady, New York, was closely
identified with Julius Emspak.
Divisions manifested themselves at the union's Buffalo, New York
founding convention in March, 1936. Delegates voted 36 - 10 against a
motion to support a third national political party. Carey led the
opposition along with Springfield Westinghouse local president Matthew
Campbell. The GE locals, loyal to Emspak, supported the third party
concept. At the same meeting Carey was elected president and Emspak,
Secretary-Treasurer of the UE.
Matles and the machinist locals did not join the UE until 1937.
When they did, Matles became director of organizing and the balance of
power in the union shifted from Carey. Even while president, Carey was
kept out of the successful 1937 - 1938 negotiations for a General Electric
national contract. Carey's fall from power in the UE culminated in his
defeat for the presidency by Al Fitzgerald of the Lynn, Massachusetts GE in
1941. However, Carey had been elected Secretary-Treasurer of the CIO in
1938. From this highly visible national position he maintained support in
many of the radio plants he had brought into the UE, and by early 1948
Carey and his allies were able to turn several UE locals against the national
leadership.4
There were other indications of what was to come after World War
II. During the 1940 UE convention, Emspak and Matles joined together
against Carey in opposing conscription. At the March, 1941 national
Executive Board meeting Carey again opposed Emspak and Matles.
4 Filippelli, The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, p. 53
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Championing the cause of local autonomy, Carey and his long-time
Philadelphia ally, Harry Block, attempted to gain passage of a resolution
allowing locals to bar members from holding office based on their political
affiliation. The effort failed.5
Not long after this Executive Board defeat Carey allied himself with
the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU). Established in 1937
by several New York priests, labor organizers, and social reformers, ACTU
had chapters in at least two cities, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and
Bridgeport, Connecticut, that were UE strongholds. ACTU concerned itself
with the dangers it felt Communists in the labor movement posed to
Catholic workers. It was also putatively anti-fascist. ACTU focused
mainly on UE because, according to historian Ronald Schatz, half UE's
members were Catholic. 6
Internal and external pressure on the UE's top leadership began in
earnest in the summer and fall of 1946 when Block organized UE
Members for Democratic Action (UEMDA). According to Block, local
unionists who resisted what he termed Communist dictation, were
relegated to second-class membership in their locals. UEMDA intended to
change this. Several Congressional subcommittees also began to
investigate the UE at this time.7
5 Block was a founder of the Philadelphia Philco radio local in 1933, attended the UE's
founding convention, and was president of the Philadelphia district of UE. Block and
Carey were joined by Matthew Campbell in this unsuccessful effort. Campbell's vote here
is consistent with the position he took to bar Communist party members and supporters from
running for office on the United Labor Party ticket during Springfield city elections.
6 Schatz, The Electrical Workers, p. 181.
7 Filippelli, esp. p. 68 - 88, 201. From 1936 - 1940 Carey could usually count on Campbell for
support in his attacks on the political affiliation of UE officers, efforts by UE to develop a
labor party, and statements against early entry into the war. Campbell's death in June,
1941 deprived Carey of a consistent Executive Board vote. Al Fitzgerald, from GE. Local
201 in Lynn took Campbell's seat on the Board and soon defeated Carey for the UE
presidency. By 1948 three key issues divided CIO unions: the Henry Wallace presidential
campaign, membership in what was argued was the Communist-dominated World
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But in spite of the attacks and investigations UE continued to
receive financial and moral support for its organizing efforts. The
National Citizens Emergency Relief Committee conducted extensive
fundraising efforts to support striking General Electric and Westinghouse
workers. Members of the committee included Eleanor Roosevelt, former
New York City mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, Florida Senator Claude Pepper,
actor Melvyn Douglas, musical conductor Leonard Bernstein, and band
leader Artie Shaw. Locally, the Springfield City Council voted 21 - 3 to
support local Westinghouse workers, out of work in a national strike.
Labor unions and civic groups collected over $2,000 during a fund raiser
for the strikers. Students from area colleges, including Smith, Mt.
Holyoke, and American International, served as ushers at the event. In
Massachusetts the UE played an active role on the labor front, with union
staffers leading the fight in the legislature for passage of a law
guaranteeing unemployment payments for strikers out of work over four
weeks.8
While Carey and Block plotted against the union's national
leadership, UE remained successful organizing new locals and defeating
take-over attempts from other unions, including the United Auto
Workers (UAW), the United Steel Workers (USW), and the International
Association of Machinists (IAM). In Dayton, Ohio by a 275 - 23 vote
machinists decided to leave the IAM because of dissatisfaction with their
contract, and affiliated with UE; and in Henderson, Kentucky the UE
federation of trade Unions, and support for the Marshall Plan. See F.S. O'Brien, "The
'Communist Dominated' Unions in the United States Since 1950," Labor History, 9 (Spring,
1968) esp. p. 185 - 186. Block's role in establishing the UEMDA is discussed in Schatz, The
Electrical Workers, p. 180 - 181.
8 UEN, February 18, 1946, p. 7; February 26, 1946, p.8; March 16, 1946, p. 6.
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defeated an A.F.L. Federal Union 121 - 32 at a GE appliance plant in the
face of A.F.L. charges that the UE was un-American and communist.9
Early in 1947 the Saturday Evening Post ran a series of articles by
conservative columnists Joseph and Stuart Alsop. In "Will the CIO Shake
the Communists Loose?" Post readers learned that UE's leaders were
directed from the Kremlin. According to the Alsop brothers, Carey was
fooled by Emspak and Matles because both were highly effective
organizers. The death of Matthew Campbell in an auto accident weakened
Carey's position in the UE and it then shifted to outright Communist
party control. The article described UE union meetings as "not affairs of
joy and gladness. They are usually held in grim and sleazy halls... . The
rank and file stay away. But a communist will come to a union meeting if
he has to crawl to it from is death bed... ."10
The Post article was not favorable to Carey or the CIO, either. While
attacking the UE a broader anti-union message was being conveyed. The
authors wrote: "The very thought of the CIO causes many respectable
persons to sweat with horror." As for Carey, they described him at the
1947 CIO convention "sitting beside Murray (United Steel Workers and
CIO presidents) energetically smoking a cigar too large for him," and as a
"small, dark young man boiling with nervous energy, chieftain of the
anti-communists, and the best kind of fighting Irishman." 11
9 LIEN, May 25, 1946, p. 7; October 5, 1946, p. 4; February 8, 1947, p. 3.
*0 Joseph and Stuart Alsop, "Will the CIO Shake the Communists Loose?" Saturday
Evening Post, February 22 and March 1, 1947. The authors were certainly wrong about the
cause of Campbell's death which was from a sudden heart attack, not an automobile
accident.
11 Alsop, "Will the CIO Shake the Communists Loose?" Saturday Evening Post, March 1,
1947, p. 27.
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UE_Maintains Support. Attacks like the one in the Post escalated,
but UE continued to achieve significant organizing success. In February,
1947 UE took control from the International Brotherhood of Electrical
'
Workers (IBEW) of a large General Instruments plant in New Jersey after
workers invited the UE in and expressed dissatisfaction with their existing
contract. During the General Instruments campaign, according to the UE
News, "The use of an attack on the UE written by James Carey, assistance
by the employer, and appeals to racial and religious prejudices had failed
to overcome one fact - wages and conditions were far below those in
nearby UE plants." UE's opponents argued that if UE won the plant
would be desegregated. Organizers responded that this was indeed the
case, and actively sought support in African-American neighborhoods.
Henderson Simons, a black World War II veteran told UE News that all
200 African-American workers in the plant voted for the UE: The final
tally was 923 - 356. 1 2 In near-by Holyoke, in November 1946 the UE
defeated the IBEW 290 - 15 and gained the right to represent workers at the
Holyoke General Electric plant in spite of what the local papers referred to
as a campaign of "red baiting and racial slanders."*3
During an organizing campaign at a Lowell, Massachusetts, GE
plant the company charged that the union was a front for "the evil power"
and that union leaders were "dishonest, unpatriotic, and ungodly".
However, UE still won the election, defeating the International Ladies
Garment Worker Union 202 - 94.14 ^ me face of similar attacks during an
organizing drive at an RCA plant in Pulaski, Virginia local merchants
took out a full page newspaper advertisement in support of the UE. In the
12 UEN, March 1, 1947, p. 1.
13 UEN, November 9, 1946, p. 4.
14 UEN, August 2, 1947, p. 7.
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ad merchants urged workers to vote UE based on the union's record of
achievement, its dedication to solving members problems, and its ability
to "support its members in their effort to win the things that they are
entitled to as Americans." UE won 739 - 3.15
In summary, between 1946 and September, 1947, UE was involved
in 571 representation elections - at new shops or in shops where they were
being challenged by another union - and won 86 percent. It is apparent
that large numbers of rank and file workers believed that the UE was a
legitimate union and that it offered a powerful voice in their efforts to
gain better pay and working conditions.^
The Rise of the International Union Qf Electric! WnrU.c
in Springfield- 1947 - 195n
In October, 1947 the Springfield Union published an open letter
from Anthony Cimino, former president of Westinghouse UE Local 202,
to Ralph Forsstrom, president of Bosch UE Local 206. The letter reiterated
charges made in the Saturday Evening Post and elsewhere, that many UE
national and district officers were members of the Communist party.
Cimino, a 15-year assembler at Westinghouse, urged UE members to join a
local chapter of UE Members for Democratic Action and become involved
in the fight to return UE to sound American trade union principles. 17
Forsstrom, a skilled toolmaker, had been elected president in 1945.
He was singled out for this attack because of his public defense of the
15 UEN, August 9, 1947, p.l.
16 Election figures are in UEN, September 27, 1947, p.8. A total of 112, 745 workers were
employed in plants covered by these elections. UE won the right to represent 73 percent of
these workers.
17 SMU, October 29, 1947.
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union against red-baiting from UEMDA members. In a 1946 letter to Jim
Matles, Forsstrom requested information on the role Harry Block and
others were playing in attacking UE. He informed Matles that:
I intend to take the floor at our membership meeting next
month in support of the National officers and in opposition to
Red-baiting, but I know I will get a lot of opposition from some
of the other officers of our local, so that any information you
can send me will be greatly appreciated as long as it is strictly
the truth and can be substantiated. I have a reputation for
being both truthful and sincere and I intend living up to this
reputation. 18
On the same day Forsstrom wrote UE president Albert Fitzgerald to
express regret that he had voted against the re-election of Matles and
Emspak at the national convention. "My conscience is bothering me a
little," he wrote, "even though we were instructed to vote as a unit and
the majority of our delegates were in favor of voting for Block's running
mates." This indicates the Local 206 Executive Board - which instructed
delegates on how to vote at conventions - was divided on the communist
issue. It also demonstrates that Forsstrom was neither Communist-
controlled or a Communist Party member as Cimino and others
contended. In the note Forsstrom's democratic proclivities appear as he
let Fitzgerald know "my conscience does not bother me a bit for voting
18 Ralph Forsstrom to James Matles, September 22, 1946 (UE Archives District-Local
Series, ff 247x). The 1946 Milwaukee convention marked the first time an open electoral
challenge to UE national leadership took place. By eight-to-one majorities each attempt
failed. Local 206 was now identified by its votes at this convention as in the Carey-Block
camp (Schatz, The Electrical Workers, p. 184).
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against you because of the unfair manner in which you conducted the
meetings at the Convention... ."19
Fighting inside the UE continued through the rest of 1947. In
Bridgeport, Connecticut the local leadership had testified before the House
Un-American Affairs Committee that UE was Communist-dominated. At
the Bridgeport GE plant everyone who testified was voted out of office,
including all members of UEMDA. The UE New England District 2
Council passed a resolution condemning the UEMDA as a dual-union
movement, and demanding that it dissolve.20 Local 206 members
continued to support Forsstrom. For example, at a May meeting union
members rejected a company contract offer endorsed by the negotiating
committee by a four to one margin and voted to dismiss the entire
committee and business agent. Forsstrom was easily elected to the new
negotiating committee. 21
The September 1947 Convention and the Ciminn Letter But in
September the event that precipitated Cimino's open letter occurred: At
the UE national convention in New York City Forsstrom, unlike in 1946,
defied the local's directive and voted for the national officer slate of
candidates, including Matles, Emspak, and Fitzgerald. Two other Local
206 delegates, James Manning and William Slattery, cast their votes as
instructed in opposition to the national UE officers. Manning, an Ail-
American football player and graduate of Jesuit-run Fordham University
in New York City, continued to oppose UE national leaders and policies
19 Ralph Forsstrom to Albert Fitzgerald, September 22, 1946 (UE Archives District-Local
Series, ff 247x).
20 UEN, December 20, 1947; UE District Council Minutes, October 1947 (UE Archives, ff 6).
21 Al Smith to James Matles, May 20, 1947 (UE Archives, District-Local Series, ff 253).
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after the convention. While there is no evidence linking Manning to the
Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, possibly he was exposed to the.
outlook on trade union issues and attitudes toward UE while enrolled at
Fordham, since New York was a stronghold of ACTU activity.
In its convention coverage the Daily News informed readers that no
Springfield locals voted for Fitzgerald, Matles, and Emspak. Cimino's
letter followed, and by early 1948 Manning and Slattery were
spokespersons for a growing opposition group inside Local 206. They were
supported by the Greater Springfield UEMDA chapter, which regularly
leafleted the Bosch telling workers that if "Communism is an issue in any
of your unions throw it to hell out and throw the advocates out along
with it."22
The UE Comes Apart in Springfield- November - December 1949
Ralph Forsstrom became the focus of UEMDA attention. In spite of
this, he was re-elected president of the local in November, 1948, garnering
71 percent of the vote against UEMDA candidate William Slattery. As
with his earlier election to the revamped negotiating committee, it
appears the rank and file preferred officers who projected themselves as
effective unionists. The national political struggle was still secondary. 23
This was the case in most of the country as well. In December, 1948 alone
11 SDN, September 9, 1947. The throw them out statement was first made by Philip
Murray, president of the Steelworkers. The News reported that "A number of delegates
from the Springfield area have expressed their growing distrust of the left-wing elements
in the UE union." Leaflet quote in SDN, article titled "Bosch Workers Urged to Battle
Reds in UE," September 18, 1948. UEMDA had representatives from UE unions at Monsanto,
Package Machinery, Van Norman, Chapman Valve, Bosch, and Westinghouse.
23 UEN, November 27, 1948, p. 10.
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UE defeated three attempts by the UAW to raid its locals, including a 3,000
worker refrigerator plant in Evansville, Indiana.24
At the start of 1949 UE national leaders attempted to shift the focus
from the union by mounting an all-out campaign against high
unemployment and falling worker incomes. The national Executive
Board passed a resolution castigating big business and Congress for the fact
that five million Americans were jobless. They also went after those they
termed half-hearted labor leaders who were running away from the fight
against unemployment. However, these efforts failed and at the
September, 1949 national convention James Carey emerged with three
times more delegate votes than in 1948. Carey now claimed that locals
loyal to him represented 150,000 out of approximately 475,000 UE
members.
At the beginning of November, prior to the start of the national CIO
convention which officially expelled them, the UE resigned from the CIO.
The Westinghouse, Chapman Valve, Van Norman, Monsanto, and Bosch
locals issued a joint press release stating that they intended to remain in
the CIO. "We're staying in the CIO," read the release, "we don't know yet
how this is to be done, but we'll find a way. Between the UE and the CIO
the choice is clear - it's CIO every time." On November 2nd Herman
Greenberg, president of the Western Massachusetts CIO Council,
announced that a ten-person national board had been appointed to set up
a new labor organization to represent any workers desirous of leaving the
UE. Anthony Cimino was named Springfield-area representative to the
board. The board's first action was to grant a CIO charter to the
International Union of Electrical Workers and name James Carey
24 UEN, December 18, 1948, p. 5; December 25, 1948, p. 3; January 22, 1949, p. 1
.
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president of the new union. On November 4 Carey sent telegrams to 1,500
manufacturing plants urging management not to have any further
dealing with the UE and advising them that fUE now represented their
employees. 25
Also on November 4, regularly scheduled elections for Local 206
officers were held. In the main contest Forsstrom faced Ralph Chicketti in
a race for business agent. Chicketti, a union steward and stock handler,
had thirty years' seniority in the plant. By a 690 - 670 vote Chicketti
narrowly defeated Forsstrom, while Frank Broderick, another anti-UE
leader, was elected president. On November 5th the Daily News headline
read "Bosch UE Defeats Forsstrom: Leftists Lose Last Hope of Major
Influence Here."26
In rapid succession area plants exited UE and affiliated with the IUE.
Van Norman led the way on November 4, followed by Westinghouse and
Chapman Valve three days later, and Monsanto on November 8. At a
Sunday, November 20 mass membership meeting Pittsfield GE workers
voted overwhelmingly to join the IUE. There, before the vote workers
listened to a sermon by Father Marshall of St. Mary's Roman Catholic
Church advising them that they had a choice between "Washington and
Moscow and ultimately Christ and Stalin."27
The Bosch remained split three more weeks. Management refused
to recognize UE, held dues collected in escrow, and refused to negotiate a
25 SDN, November 1, 1949, p. 1, p. 4; November 2, 1949, p. 12; Novembers, 1949, p. 1.
Cimino had attended the CIO convention that expelled UE as a delegate from a
Pennsylvania local of the United Theatrical Employees Union. SDN, November 4, 1949, p.
8. Chicketti had 30 years seniority in the plant.
26 SDN, November 5, 1949, p. 1. In a related story Herman Greenberg praised Bosch
workers for defeating Forsstrom.
27 SDN, November 21, 1949, p. 32.
172
new contract. On November 9 the stewards council, chaired by Forsstrom
and comprised entirely of union stewards, affirmed its support for the UE
and agreed to send a telegram to Carey demanding that "he keep his nose
out of our business and stop interfering with our current contract
negotiations." But the Executive Board, composed of top officers and just a
handful of stewards, passed its own motion calling for a swift resolution to
the conflict.
Finally, at the November 19 membership meeting a motion carried
ordering all local officers to withdraw immediately from the UE and sign
IUE membership cards. A second motion passed directing Broderick and
Chicketti to attend an organizing meeting of the IUE to be held in
Philadelphia at the end of November, with all expenses paid by Local 206.
Confident that they had shop floor support, Broderick, Chicketti, and
Manning called a special executive board meeting for November 25 and
suspended Forsstrom, second shift Vice-president Theodore Gagnon,
Trustee Donald Bergeron and three negotiating committee members from
office for failing to comply with the wishes of the membership to
disaffiliate from UE and sign IUE membership cards. These six, along with
25 other members had signed an open letter refusing to join the IUE at the
November 19th membership meeting. By November 30, 1,200 workers
had signed IUE membership cards. 28
Through the first five months of 1950 attention focused on the
National Labor Relations Board election to be held June 2 to decide the
issue of representation in the plant. Anthony Cimino, now an IUE
international representative, helped IUE supporters throughout the
28 Executive Board minutes, November 14, 1949; General membership meeting minutes,
November 19, 1949; Special Executive Board meeting minutes, November 25, 1949 (Local 206
files).
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campaign, He was assisted by Herman Greenberg who planned a giant
rally the night before the election. Workers voted 964 - 724 to end their
affiliation With the United Electrical Workers. An [UE supporter quoted
in the local papers remarked "The fight to clean the Communists out of
our union started here in Springfield. It is fitting that every major plant
in this area has seen lit to stay with the C IO and reject decisively
com munisin." 24
Skill Counts: Who Su pported the Ut- and thp II ||.?
The UE made one attempt to reestablish itself in the Bosch plant. In
1952 Forsstrom led a brief but intense campaign to represent workers in
the skilled trades, including the maintenance department, experimental
machine shop, and all tool and die and gage makers. I lowever, under the
supervision of the Boston office of the NI.KB, workers voted 127 - 78 to
remain in the [UE.30
A close analysis of individuals associated with the UH and I L J I : from
1947 - 1950 indicates that Forsstrom made the right decision in trying to
win back those departments. It is possible to identify 4 I workers and their
occupations, 10 at Westinghouse and 3] from Bosch, who declared lor or
against the UE. Looking first at Bosch, the occupations of 21 who voted to
remain in the UE were determined. Highteen held skilled positions in the
plant: Of these, five were toolmakers and lour were all-around
machinists. On the other side, among the ten [UE supporters, there was
^ SMI I, | unfi 3, 1950/ p. I . I he IUI! International loaned the Springfield local close lo
$10/000 to finance the campaign (Local 206 files, c lorrespondence Series 1 1).
30 SDN, Augusl :><), 22, 1958,
174
one set up man, two machine operators, an assembler, and six stock
chasers and store room clerks.
At Westinghouse 14 workers signed a public statement opposing
the IUE and for a brief period tried to reorganize a UE local in the plant.
Occupations were determined for seven from this group. Five of the
seven were skilled tradesmen and machinists and two were assemblers. A
key leader of the stay-in group was maintenance mechanic Murdo
Campbell, brother of deceased UE stalwart Matthew Campbell. The two
most influential IUE leaders in the plant were assemblers 31
Historian Ronald Schatz found a similar pattern in an examination
of the occupations of UE and IUE supporters in East Pittsburgh
Westinghouse UE Local 601. Just as with early Bosch organizing, the main
tool room had been a center of early union organizing. Many remained
loyal to UE, while the nucleus of IUE support came from younger,
unskilled and semiskilled workers. Schatz writes: 'Although exceptions
can be noted, the UE generally captured majorities in those sections of the
bargaining unit in which a high proportion of the workers were either
skilled, well paid, or both. The IUE won those sections of the unit in
which the proportion of skilled or well-paid work was lower."32
In April, 1950, prior to the failed certification elections at
Westinghouse and Bosch, UE News printed a series of interviews with
Westinghouse workers. Titled "Old-timers Fight for UE at Springfield
Westinghouse" the article provides further evidence of UE's support. A
toolmaker commented that the strongest pro-UE department in the plant
* For Westinghouse see SDN, November 18, 1949, p. 1 . The fourteen signed non-communist
affidavits to conform to Taft-Hartley guidelines, established themselves as UE local 202
and petitioned the NLRB for what ended up being an ill-fated certification election.
32 Schatz, The Electrical Workers, esp. chapter 8, quote on p. 203.
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was the tool room. Oscar Nilsson, a machinist and one of the first UE
orgaruzers in the plant added "I certainly don't fall for mis communist-
baiting. I think that's a political move of guys to get votes and get jobs
for themselves."33
In sum, the Bosch and Westinghouse numbers reveal the
following: 23 of 28 UE supporters held skilled positions while only one of
12 IUE supporters held a similar job. UE supporters included: machinists
James Cornell, Theodore Gagnon and Ray Gosslin; toolmakers Ed
Durgin, Ralph Forsstrom, Louis Urban, and Emil Claus; and machine
mechanics Gustav Langheld, Murdo Campbell, and James O'Neill. It was
also possible to identify the occupations of 12 Local 206 officers who held
positions in the union between 1940 and 1944. Here again the findings
reveal that a majority of individuals held skilled positions. In the group
of ten were diemaker Leo Goulet, tool grinder Wallace Kennedy, two all-
around machinists Leonard Hayward and John O'Connell, and tool
designer Robert Shields.
After the split union leadership came from a different source.
Three men dominated Local 206 for the next ten years: James Parker, a
stock clerk served as president from 1952 - 1958; Jim Manning, now a
work expediter, was business agent from 1952 - 1958; and Ralph Chicketti
another work expediter, served as president from 1950 - 1951 and was on
UEN, April 2, 1950, p. 4. It is unclear if there was an ethnic aspect to who wanted to
stay affiliated with the UE. In a recent conversations with a long-time UE staff person,
David Cohen, he indicated that the shops that remained UE, especially in Greenfield,'
Massachusetts and Springfield, Vermont were comprised mainly of workers with old New
England Yankee backgrounds who rejected outsiders from various anti-UE organizations
telling them who to support.
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various negotiating committees. No skilled machinists or tool and die
makers were elected to top office in the local through the 1960s .34
The Impact of the Split on Or^niypH T ah™
It appears that skilled workers now focused their attention mainly
on improving wages. Since the majority of workers were paid on an
incentive basis tool room and other trades people often made less money
per hour because they were paid a straight hourly salary. This group
became active during contract negotiations and usually managed to elect at
least one skilled trades member to negotiating committees. Content in the
belief that their high level of skill assured them employment, if not at
Bosch, somewhere else in the valley, the group became disengaged from
the affairs of the local. They paid little attention to the negotiating battles
and daily shop floor fights piece workers had with management over such
issues as rate changes, the introduction of new incentive systems, and
management's desire to replace workers with new machines. The social
base of the local during the 1930s and 1940s, fell silent during the 1950s and
1960s. That no tool and die makers, machinists, and mechanics held high
office after 1950 is noteworthy, indeed. Angered, embittered, embarrassed,
barred from running for office for their loyalty to UE, many quit the union
movement at a time when their energy and organizing skills were much
needed. Most were like what labor journalist Len De Caux termed the in-
Names were gathered mainly from meeting minutes and newspaper articles.
Occupations were determined primarily using city directories and union newspapers.
Employment records for the period could not be found. IUE officers were determined from
election files in Local 206 archives, UMass-Amherst.
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between progressives in the labor movement, who now wondered how
much good they had done.35
The UE had aggressively organized the rapidly growing electrical
industry starting in the late 1930s and established national agreements
with two of the largest corporations in the country, General Electric and
Westinghouse. In the early 1940s close to 80 percent of the workers in the
industry belonged to UE. However, as a consequence of intensive raiding
by CIO unions like the UAW and the internecine battle with IUE, UE
membership dropped to 71,000 in 1957 from almost 500,000 at the end of
World War II. Most importantly, as Schatz points out:
Freed from the constraint of a powerful nationwide union,
top General Electric and Westinghouse executives set about
redesigning jobs, manufacturing facilities, and the internal
structure of management itself. The net effect of these
changes, which began immediately after World War II and
extended into the mid 1960s, was to radically change the
world of the workers and in the process undermine the
conditions which had given birth to nationwide unionism in
the first place.36
Nationally, the IUE grew quickly, winning several more
representation elections between 1950 and 1954. But the electrical
industry, particular the consumer goods segment, grew more rapidly, with
While it is beyond the scope of this research it would be interesting to determine if any
UE skilled workers left the large plants in the early 1950s to start smaller firms of their
own. There is evidence that in parts of Europe, and particularly northern Italy, numbers of
plants were established by workers expelled from large firms for their Communist political
views during this same period. In Labor Radical Len De Caux reports on visits with
several labor organizers and officers affected by the attacks on alleged communists in the
labor movement. Besides eliminating communists, De Caux contends, the move also
eliminated "most earlier labor idealism." See Len De Caux, Labor Radical (Boston, 1970) p.
504 - 506.
36 Schatz, The Electrical Workers, p. 232 - 233.
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most new plants built outs.de the Northeast, IUE's base of support. GE's
Unionization rate dropped to 80 percent in 1960 from 95 percent in 1950.
By the early 1960s GE workers were m a dozen unions instead of just one
as they had been through the late 1930s and 1940s. Coordinated bargaining
With GE became very difficult 37 Some highly skilled work remained in
the Northeast, like the production of GE's massive electrical transformers
in Pittsficld, and its airplane engines in Lynn, Massachusetts. However,
consumer products plants were built in the South and Southwest and by
the early L9608 newer factories were placed in Europe and elsewhere
around the globe to take advantage of lower wages. How did this
production shift affect IUE membership in New England? In 1955 IUE
represented workers in 59 factories in southern New Hampshire, northern
Connecticut, and Massachusetts: By 1985, 65 percent of these plants were
closed.™
Local 206 and the Mississippi P\?n \
Introduction
In the essay "American Workers and the New Deal Formula" labor
historian David Montgomery describes four sources of employer control
over labor: Ideological control of the education system; the coercive
authority of the government; company ownership of the means of
^w Srh.ii/, The Electrical Workers, p, 226. ny L963, in terms ol membership numbers UE
only represented 10,000 GE workers. Other unions with ,i sizable presence in c,E wen- mi:
68,000; 1AM - 9,000; UAW • 5,500
™ The list ol plants was found in IUE 206 files, UM.iss, Amherst Libor Archives. Closings
were determined usin^ city directories .it three year Intervals from 1970 1985, it is
possible th.it ,i handful may have changed ownership and/or name and still he open Out
this does little to minimize the fad that so many plants Hosed.
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production; and the firm's drive for profits and control of markets. The
later two were effectively utilized when Bosch management announced
plans to build a manufacturing plant in Mississippi in 1953, and repeatedly
used thereafter as joint production ventures were established in England,
Holland, Italy, and South America. This unchallenged ownership made it
possible for the corporation to determine where production could be
carried out in the most cost effective way: If production in Springfield
could be done cheaper elsewhere, so be it.39
To support his contention Montgomery cites the work of labor
economist Sumner Slichter who in 1940 observed that "in the absence of
great outbursts of union enthusiasm the pressure of business competition
will always make the unionized sector of any industry tend to shrink."
Montgomery refers to the case of northern textile workers, who made
significant gains in wages and working conditions in the aftermath of
World War I only to see their factories close down and industry move
south. A similar fate awaited Springfield metalworkers in the mid
1950s.40
Mississippi Moving
In constructing the Mississippi plant "ABA is essentially following
the trend of other manufacturers in the highly competitive automotive
component business who have found the operation of branch plants to be
advantageous," company president Donald Hess told workers. The
Springfield plant had recently lost high volume production work for Ford
39 Essay in David Montgomery, Workers Control in America (New York, 1979) ch. 7.
40 Sumner Slichter quoted in David Montgomery, Workers Control, p. 157.
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to Southern competitors and Hess had no intention of losing again.
Following the recent split in Local 206, Hess had little reason to fear the
"great outburst of union enthusiasm" Slichter wrote about would be
forthcoming. 41
There was a public response to the Mississippi announcement in
the union's monthly paper. A Bulletin editorial cautioned members not
to be fooled by the reasons Hess gave for the Mississippi start-up.
According to union business agent Jim Manning it had little to do with
loss of work to competitors with Southern plants or the need to reduce
costs to meet increased competition. "They are attempting to get away
from paid holidays; three week vacations; cost of living increases;
pensions; paid insurance; seniority." Union president Parker added that
he doubted the company's strategy would work: "So if they think, by
moving to Mississippi, they will get away from Organized Labor, they are
making a sad mistake." Parker added, "When they open the gates of their
new plant in Columbus, they will find themselves surrounded by IUE-CIO
Organizers." Parker also informed members that the ARMA Corporation
owed its Long Island workers over a million dollars in retroactive pay
dating back to July, 1952 and asked: "Now the same Corporation is
building a new plant in Mississippi - when they do not have enough
money to pay the employees they have now. I wonder what will happen
next?"42
A Bulletin writer asked "Is Bosch doomed in Springfield?" and
proceeded to answer his own question, warning that it would be difficult
for workers to win the fight: "The working class may succeed in
41 Hess letter quoted in SMU, April 15, 1953.
42 LB, April, 1953, p. 1.
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postponing its final breakdown; they cannot avert it whichever way they
turn, whatever remedy they resort to, they cannot overcome the fatal
contradictions that gnaw ceaselessly at the workers' vitals...." He
concluded, "The moving to Mississippi plan is one of the desperate
schemes to which the stockholders have turned to increase their
dividends. "43
In fact, the IUE did organize the Mississippi factory by the late fall
1954, but this did not stop the expansion of the plant later in the year and
the reallocation of even more Springfield work to the facility. Local 206
provided organizers with information on wages, benefits, and seniority
language that were used in a series of newspaper advertisements aimed at
workers in the new plant, and president Jim Parker went to Columbus to
work on the organizing drive for several weeks. In an open letter
distributed to Mississippi Bosch workers, the union observed "We are in
no small way interested in the forming of a union at the AB plant in
Columbus, Mississippi." The letter highlighted the workers' strong wage
and benefit package that derived from a strong union. Local 206 went on
that the contract secured better labor relations because "we believe, and the
company believes, in good honest, fair negotiations."44
^ LB, April, 1953, p. 2.
44
"Dear Friends Letter", October 19, 1954 in Local 206 Labor Archives, Correspondence
File, Series 2. It is surprising that this tone would be used toward management when the
union had been accusing them of behavior comparable to what happened at Pearl Harbor
for building a plant in Mississippi. Such thinking shows how labor lacked a strategic-
approach to the rapid pace of events swirling around them and how labor felt it needed to
appear very reasonable to succeed. In fact relations were anything but excellent. For
example, in a June, 1954 letter to IUE field organizer Emmett Curley, President Parker
apologized for not corresponding sooner and explained "We have been going through some
big layoffs...
. We now have over 600 people laid off since the middle of April" (Local 206
Archives, Correspondence file).
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The Carey Plan. As part of their organizing campaign IUE
distributed a news article to Mississippi workers taken from a speech made
by President James Carey. "The Southern Story" outlined the
international's position on Southern industrial development. Using
twisted logic, Carey stated in part: "But there is a considerable difference
between an expansion of production; part of which is to take place in non-
industrial areas, which we favor, and simply changing existing production
from one area to another." Carey assumed that a corporation only made
decisions to build new plants when it had excess work orders for existing
facilities. Such a decision was also predicated on at least stable, but by
implication growing markets. Once a new factory was built a company
was going to use it, even if it meant shifting work from an older plant
when orders slacked off. This position encapsulates the overall weakness
of labor's national efforts to understand and develop strategies to deal
effectively with the changes underway in the global economy. One small
local in Springfield could do very little alone, while at the national level
Carey in this case, made this confused statement about production
expansion the center-piece of his union's effort to fight runaway shops in
the electrical industry.
Carey argued as well that corporations stood to make huge savings
on such things as pensions and vacation benefits if they closed factories
with high seniority workers. "We have demonstrated, for example, that
by wiping out a plant of 1,000 people with ten years of service and starting
up an entirely new plant where people have no service, General Electric
would be able to save a million dollars..." Finally, he cited several
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instances of electrical, radio, and machine industry runaway shops from
the New England and Middle Atlantic states to support his arguments .45
Carey also outlined the IUE's five-part program for combating
factory closings. First, federal tax abatement and other programs designed
to make it financially beneficial to move should be eliminated, including
Taft-Hartley provisions allowing firms to pay sub-minimum wages during
start-ups. Second, workers laid off as a result of a closing should be given
hiring preference at new facilities. Third, all seniority and service credits
should be retained by workers when they relocate to the new plant.
Fourth, severance equal to one week's pay for each year worked should be
paid to all laid off employees by the company. Finally, unemployment
compensation should be increased and benefit periods lengthened
through the establishment of an Employment Security Fund.46
Labor Falters on Runaways
Carey's program is indicative of arguments David Brody made in
Workers in Industrial America. Discussing UAW behavior during the
early 1950s Brody states: "When it took up the problem of unstable
employment in the auto industry, the UAW had two choices: Either to
deal with the causes, or to protect its members from the consequences."
For the UAW, by the mid 1950s, supplemental employment benefits and a
result-based approach prevailed; Carey's five points similarly focus
45 Special Bulletin: The Southern Story, in Local 206 Labor Archives. In the examples
plants were abandoned in Trenton and Belleville, New Jersey; White Plains, New York;
Bridgeport, Connecticut; Pittsfield, Massachusetts; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and
production started in Louisville, Kentucky; Tyler and Paris, Texas; Rome, Georgia;
Ashville, North Carolina; and Reform, Alabama. The Special Bulletin was also
distributed in Springfield by the Western Massachusetts CIO Council.
46 Special Bulletin.
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primarily on income security.47 There was no call for stepped up
Southern organizing or a discussion of capital mobility and its possible
prevention. Absent, as well, was any recognition at all of the rise of global
competition. In the early 1960s this limited perspective resulted in the
union joining with management in a company-financed 'Buy-America
campaign' even as the corporation laid off hundreds of workers and
expanded its production base in Europe and South America. Carey's
program conceded any interest at all in developing a comprehensive
strategy to deal with the structural changes in the electrical industry. By
looking inward, the program also failed to galvanize the community in an
effort to stem job erosion.48
Brody also cites a 1960 study in which economist Sumner Slichter
contended that the choice unions made to be more concerned with
income security is indicative of the general conservatism of the American
labor movement. Such a policy, Slichter argued, avoided "the necessity of
bargaining over such essential management decisions as production
schedules, capital improvement plans, and plant location and left
management
... its freedom to make these decisions".49 This had not been
labor's position right after World War II. Consider, for example,
observations made in 1945 by an aide to UAW leader Walter Reuther
regarding the 1945 General Motors strike. The UAW viewed the strike as:
4^ David Brody, Workers in Industrial America, p. 194.
48 UE, by comparison, tried to develop strategies that would address the needs of laid off
workers as well as look at the industry. It called repeatedly for a strategy to organize the
South and end discrimination. UE recognized as early as 1946 that corporations were
beginning to decentralize production and attempted to devise responses to this as shops
became scattered and decreased in size. They also sought to develop community-labor
coalitions wherever possible to fight plant closings For two examples of this see UEN,
September 14, 1946, p. 7 and District Council No. 2, Unemployment in Massachusetts (Fall,
1949); UE National Office Records, District 2, ff 103, University of Pittsburgh.
49 Slichter, quoted in Brody, Workers in Industrial America, p. 194 - 195. See chapter 3 for
a discussion of UE strategies immediately after World War II as an example of this.
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... the first act of a new and significant era in American
unionism, an era in which labor might break away from the
bonds of business unionism, to wage an economic struggle
planned to advance the welfare of the community as a whole,
and to lay the foundations for new economic mechanisms
designed to win security without sacrificing liberty.50
In a 1951 Bulletin article at least some workers in Local 206 still
believed labor needed more.
In Europe unions have been guaranteed the right of co-
determination, which implies union participation in
corporate financing, pricing, supply, and all other functions
of management. This theory has been covered in some of
Walter Reuther's writings and we hope in some future issues
to bring you a report on this tremendous advance in union
responsibility.51
In 1953 and early 1954 the Bulletin carried several more articles
about the Mississippi plant. Union officials predicted the Mississippi
move would lead to higher unemployment in the Springfield-area and
decrease the demand for labor and the price paid for it. A call was also
issued for union members to get involved: "This one time all of you must
get into the battle, for though the North won the Civil War, the Union
Army better organize and really win this one." Politicians were criticized:
"Because of the juicy advantages offered by the South for exploitation of
non-union workers by manufacturers, with little or no opposition by
some senators and congressmen from New England, we're heading for a
50 Quoted in Brody, Workers in Industrial America, p. 176.
51 LB, February, 1951, p. 2.
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rough time." A growing concern was now becoming a "Going - Going -
Gone Concern."52 A front-page cartoon in the April, 1954 issue depicted
the Mississippi plant submerged in mud with ducks floating around it.
Two managers, covered with the mud themselves, were talking and one
said "Well the Labor's Cheaper anyway." An editorial accompanying the
cartoon warned that the corporation had 47 additional acres on which to
build in Mississippi and questioned "How can anyone at the American
Bosch feel reassured that his work is not moving, but will stay?"53
The April issue also reported a disappointing trip Local 206 officers
made to Washington, D.C. The Massachusetts Congressional delegation
ignored Parker 's call to eliminate provisions in the Taft-Hartley law that
allowed manufacturers bringing new industry to a community to petition
the federal government for a six-month waiver on minimum wages laws.
They also refused to consider sanctions against the corporation, including
the curtailment of lucrative defense contracts.54
The issue of defense contracts, which arose several more times
through the 1960s, illustrates how the absence of a coherent strategy to
fight work relocations could hurt labor. For example, while Parker sought
to use the contracts as a way to penalize Bosch for moving, just four years
later the Springfield Westinghouse local sought, and obtained a pledge
from Massachusetts Senator John Kennedy and Springfield Congressman
Edward Boland that they would pursue large defense contracts for the
plant to keep employment up in the city.55
5^ LB, April, 1953. Usage of the phrase "This one time" implies that the union rank and
file had not been actively engaged in the affairs of the local. There is a sense of urgency
here that workers need to, at the very least, come to the defense of their livelihoods.
53 LB, April, 1954, p. 1.
54 LB, April, 1954, October, November, 1954.
55 SDN, February 28, 1959, p. 1. Kennedy and Boland did not deliver on their promise as
the plant fell to 200 workers in 1970 from 4,000 in 1958 (Joan Reilly, History of
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Finally, Local 206 officers called for the establishment of a non-
partisan movement to fight runaway shops and safeguard Springfield's
skilled jobs. 'The storekeeper, grocer, milkman and all other businesses
will suffer from this move by industry out of the area unless something is
done and done soon," an union editorial warned. However, there is
absolutely no evidence that this call, the criticism of political officials, and
the challenge to union members ever amounted to more than a rhetorical
effort or that workers were willing to fight to preserve jobs.
In fact, events at Westinghouse indicate the opposite may have
been the case, and that the rank-and-file chose to ignore the situation
entirely. At Westinghouse, while rumors circulated that thousands of
jobs were to be lost, Local 202 members defeated William Lieberman in his
1958 presidential reelection bid. Lieberman had been outspoken in
challenging Westinghouse to declare its Springfield plans and successfully
pushed for the Massachusetts AFL-CIO to call for a boycott of
Westinghouse products. From local newspaper accounts it appears
Lieberman was defeated because many workers believed his stridency on
the issue was alienating the company. After his defeat the boycott was not
implemented.56
Westinghouse Electric Company in Springfield 1915 - 1970: The Demise of a Giant
(unpublished paper, 1986) Pioneer Valley Historical Society Westinghouse Business file.
It was obviously a lot easier for Kennedy and Boland to tell workers they would try to put
more contracts in the city than tell a Fortune 500 corporation that they were going to be cut
off from defense work, especially in the absence of any laws or regulations that tied the
contracts to specific geographic regions. Local 206 tried again in the mid-1980s to get
Congress to curtail contracts to the new plant owner United Technologies. The corporation
had a several hundred million dollar defense order backlog and was in the process of
closing the Springfield plant ostensibly because there was a lack of work for the facility.
56 SDN, February 28, 1959, p. 1.
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Conclusion: A Weak Economy Getting Wnr^
By May, 1954 Bosch union leaders conceded there was little that
could be done to stop the relocation of work to Mississippi. An editorial
titled "Reward for Faithful Service" accompanied a cartoon showing a
worker being kicked out the door of the factory. It read in part:
More lay-offs can be expected when the moving starts rolling
in high speed. There are many employees who will be
affected directly and indirectly. Some of these employees that
will be affected by these lay-offs have been with the company
between ten to twenty-five years, and some even longer. It
will be hard for some of us to stand by and watch our living
move from under our noses, and what hurts most is that we
can't do anything to stop this flow of work from going out
the door.57
Weaknesses in the regional economy were difficult to ignore.
Three area plant closings are symptomatic of the problems workers and
unions faced. In July, 1954 the Springfield Thread Works, a 52 year-old
family business closed its doors. Of its 70 employees, ten had worked at
the plant over 40 years. In the Summer of 1958 the H.L. Handy. Co.
announced plans to leave the area, laying off 500 workers. This meat and
provisions firm, founded in Springfield in 1883 by Herbert Handy, was
now part of Swift and Company. Swift stated the closing was a part of "the
company's program to close uneconomical units, improve others,
consolidate operations where possible into the most modern facilities."
The Fleming Foundry, a three generation family-owned business
57 LB, May, 1954, p. 4.
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announced it was ceasing operations in March, 1959 leaving 50 workers
unemployed. Foundries, the starting point for much of basic industry,
were feeling the effects of the declining US machine tool industry.
Fleming was also losing work because many industries were switching
from the purchase of gray iron castings, its sole product, to new materials.
The closing of these three well-established firms, with deep roots in the
area, along with several others, might have prompted much public
concern, but it did not.58
In 1956 Future Springfield, Inc., a local business and industry group,
prepared an economic blueprint for the city. Its research established that
there were 12 manufacturers that employed over 1,000 people in the city.
In just ten years, as a consequence of work relocations and closing, the
number dropped to eight; by 1976 there were only five. If the group had
updated its report in 1986 they would have been distressed to learn only
two of their original twelve companies were still engaged in
manufacturing.59 Labor's response to threats like the one posed by the
Mississippi plant and such manufacturing job loss remained ineffectual in
Springfield and other older Northeast manufacturing cities like
Bridgeport, Connecticut and Trenton, New Jersey.
At the national level unions remained indifferent to the problem
and failed to mount even an educational campaign about the changing
global economy and its potential impact on jobs and communities. The
58 SMU, July 24, 1954, p. 10; SDN, August 21, 1958, p. 1; SMU, March 5, 1959, p. 13.
59 Future Springfield, Inc. Report (1956) found in Pioneer Valley Historical Society
Business Collection series. The 12 are American Bosch, Chapman Valve, Gilbert and
Barker, Package Machinery, F.W. Sickles, Springfield Armory, J. Stevens Arms, U.S.
Rubber, Van Norman Machine, Westinghouse, Monsanto Chemical, and Spaulding. Only
the last two are still in operation. Forrant, Plant Closings (1987).
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American Federation of Labor strategy focused mainly on ending tax and
bond subsidies for runaway companies, along with calls for Congressional
investigations on runaway shops.
With the exception of the Mississippi plant, the ARMA Corporation
expanded mainly in Europe and South America through the 1950s and
1960s, rendering much of the AFL position meaningless. Reuther's late
1940s argument that labor needed a place at the table when investment
and plant expansion decisions were made was more apposite, but had no
champion in national AFL-CIO circles. Without a national labor strategy,
Bosch workers resorted to what they knew best. They argued with the
company to make the product better and stated repeatedly that their skills
were enough to keep work in the plant and make it competitive.
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CHAPTER 7
THE UNION AND CORPORATE CONSOLIDATION IT
GRIEVANCES, LABOR CLASSIFICATIONS AND STRIKES
Introduction
Chapter 6 discussed the two most important external events
affecting union activity in the plant, the acrimonious struggle between the
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers and the International
Union of Electrical Workers for control of Local 206, and the corporation's
decision to build a plant in Mississippi. In this chapter three internal
issues are discussed: the operation and uses of the grievance procedure,
the job classification and rating system and how it affected workers in the
plant, and the Fall 1958 solidarity walk-out in support of the Bosch
engineer's union.
The union had a difficult time regaining momentum in the shop
after the UE-IUE split. The most notable manifestation was a failure to
achieve needed quorums for monthly membership meetings. ARMA
benefited from this as they sought to make changes in the plant. The lack
of internal cohesion made it difficult for the local to deal effectively with
the issues of job loss, work relocation to Mississippi, and global expansion.
With workers in most large metalworking plants facing the threat of
outright closure or large layoffs, the Springfield trade union movement
failed to pull together, as Bosch unionists and others failed to develop a
shop and community-wide program to defend jobs. The region's Central
Labor Councils remained silent as well. The union however, did become
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contentious in the shop whenever work increased and members returned
from lay-off. Then, it attempted to use what temporary bargaining
leverage it had to achieve wage and benefit improvements and resolve
outstanding issues on the shop floor.
The Grievance ProrpHnrp
Introduction
Workers in the Bosch, like their counterparts in other large
manufacturing plants across the country, chafed under the arbitrary
authority of foremen through the 1920s and early 1930s. They especially
resented management's unilateral right to determine who worked and
who did not. From the outset, unionists determined to solve this problem
by establishing dispute resolution mechanisms the company would have
to observe. There is reason to believe that this issue was as important as
wage considerations were to Bosch workers who led the 1936 organizing
campaign. 1 A 1940 UAW pamphlet, cited by Stephen Meyer in his history
of Allis-Chalmers and the UAW, supports this view. Before unionization
shop supervisors "were little tin gods in their own departments. They
were accustomed to having orders accepted with no questions asked. They
1 Early union activist Ralph Chicketti's remembrances discussed earlier bear this out.
Lining up for work early each morning and relying on the good will of supervisors to have a
job and be assigned decent work had to rankle particularly the more highly skilled workers
in the plant. The affront contributed to this group playing a leading role in union
organization in the late 1930s. In 1973 the grievance procedure still performed the function
of regulating behavior between a foreman and worker. In one incident a 30-year gage maker
was accused by his supervisor of not working the first half hour of his shift. Upset, he left
the shop and was suspended. At the first step hearing the steward got the suspension
rescinded. At the next step union and management got the worker and supervisor to shake
hands and the issue was resolved (Series III, Local 206 grievance files, UMass Labor
Archives).
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expected workers to enter into servile competition for their favors." After
unionization, the pamphlet continues, "The foreman finds the whole
world turned upside down. His small-time dictatorship has been
overthrown, and he must be adjusted to a democratic system of shop
government." 2
Ronald Schatz found much the same in interviews he conducted
with UE members at the East Pittsburgh Westinghouse plant. Machine
operator Art McCollough commented: "The company had the
goddamned thing so unequal you know, that a foreman's favorite would
be making a hell of a lot more money than somebody else and this other
guy might be doing more... ." Operator William Winn agreed: "People
bring in farm baskets and get good jobs and privileges - and you can't do
nothing about it. What could you do?"3
Bosch Grievance Procedure
In the first Bosch contracts, procedures to settle disputes were
delineated, but what constituted a contract violation was not clearly
defined. For example, the first line of the 1941 contract's section on the
grievance procedure begins, "in the event of a grievance" and outlines the
procedures. While no early grievances were preserved it is likely that in
the late 1930s and early 1940s the union and company spent considerable
time debating whether an issue the union raised did in fact constitute a
grievance. In 1941 a steward system was established and problems were to
be resolved at the department level between the worker, foreman, and
2 UAW 1940 pamphlet quoted in Stephen Meyer, Stalin Over Wisconsin: The Making and
Unmaking of Militant Unionism, 1900 - 1950 (New Brunswick, 1992) p. 109.
3 Ronald Schatz, American Electrical Workers (diss., 1977) p. 68.
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union steward whenever possible. If a dispute could not be settled at this
level, a four-person grievance committee would meet with management
to solve the problem, with the company paying the wages of all in
attendance.
Time limits were also in effect to insure speedy dispute resolution.
At the first stage the foreman, steward, and grievant were to meet in the
department to solve the problem. Failing resolution, the issue would next
be placed before the personnel department by the union business agent
within one working day. A formal investigation would take place in the
next two days by the grievance committee if the business agent and
personnel department could not satisfactorily resolve the problem. After a
formal hearing, to be held within one week, the company had an
additional week to answer the complaint. If a settlement was still out of
reach, the parties agreed to submit the dispute to a three-member
arbitration board for final resolution. The union agreed in the arbitration
clause that it "will not cause or permit its members to take part in any sit-
down, stay-in, slow-down, or stoppage within the period of this
Agreement." Management, in turn, agreed not to "lock out any
employee." The 1958 walk-out in support of another striking local in the
plant discussed in the next section tested this clause.4
By the end of World War II this system upset corporate labor
relations officials across the country. Skillful unions, they argued, used
the vagueness of the system, to gain an unfair advantage for labor and
infringe on a company's right to manage the enterprise. Historian Sidney
Lens pointed out in 1948 that in fact each side used the grievance
procedure to "consolidate its base," and "to plan and prepare for bigger
4 Local 206 Contract, 1941.
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conflicts at the termination of the contract or wage reopening period."
During the war production boom, union stewards did diminish the
arbitrary power of foremen but in the late 1940s and early 1950s
management was determined to take back the power it believed it had lost,
Limiting labor's abilities to use grievance machinery effectively was one
aspect of this.5
An Historical Overview. Milton Derber visited several unionized
electrical, glass, and rubber factories in 1939 and 1940 and prepared a series
of case studies under the direction of University of Wisconsin labor
historian Selig Perlman. Derber determined that while labor generally
agreed that management had the right to direct production they also did
everything possible to restrict this right. During interviews with
managers, union officials, and rank and file workers he found that after
the issue of wages the most important question was how work was
allocated. Workers were attempting to eliminate the ability of foremen to
arbitrarily give the best piece work jobs to friends, relatives, and non-
union machine operators. Conflict also ensued over the issue of foremen
operating equipment and performing other work unionists felt belonged
to them. The union and company also argued frequently over the
establishment of a proper role for the union in verifying the fairness of
piece work rates. Derber indicated that unions were learning how to
5 Sidney Lens, "The Meaning of the Grievance Procedure", Harvard Business Review, Vol.
26 (1948) p. 721. By 1971 the Bosch contract defined a grievance as "a claim by an employee
or the Union, that an action or non-action by the Company violated a specific provision or
provisions of this Agreement." In the late 1970s the company tried to get time limits for
filing grievances in the contract but failed. It succeeded in 1983 when the negotiating
committee was fearful the plant was going to close.
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utilize the grievance procedure to prevent management encroachment on
early contract gains.
Derber noted, as well, that in the plants he visited top management
"has become slightly less antagonistic" to labor. When the union allowed
for "exceptions and not too rigid a system," in turn, "The petty tyrannies of
minor supervisors have been eliminated and production efficiency has to
that extent increased."6 Derber's examination of the history of
unionization in the electrical industry revealed that there was "relatively
wide and peaceful adoption of collective bargaining." This stemmed from
two things: First, employers realized that the fight would be costly and
futile; second, the union organizers were extremely skilled and
resourceful. 7
In Springfield, the Westinghouse union and plant manager had
regularly scheduled meetings to discuss outstanding problems. In 1934 the
company had also established what it called shop regulation committees,
to work on such issues as plant housekeeping and maintenance. The
union selected two workers from each department in the plant to serve on
these committees. During this period grievances were largely resolved on
the shop floor or in regularly scheduled meetings between the Industrial
Relations director and the union's business agent and president.
According to Derber, the union wanted to demonstrate to management
and the public that "a responsible labor organization could make
constructive contributions to the welfare of the plant," and this was the
° Milton Derber, The New Unionism and Collective Bargaining (1940) p. 26. Derber cites
an industrial relations director who commented that his job was "to keep the peace without
selling the plant," p. 46.
7 Derber based his observations on interviews with managers and union officers at the
Schenectady Works of General Electric, the East Pittsburgh and Springfield Westinghouse
plants, and a Philco and an RCA plant in Philadelphia. Derber most likely talked to
Matthew Campbell while in Springfield.
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case.* Westinghouse managers estimated that 12 percent of productive
labor was lost to waste and defective work in 1937. This had dropped to 6.1
percent by 1939. Derber added:
However, even if its economic value were slight, the 'scraps'
campaign would be worthwhile, for it has a notable influence
on labor relations. Through the joint departmental and
inter-departmental committee meetings it has given the
workers and supervisory officials a clearer appreciation of
each other's problems and has destroyed many of the bases of
misunderstanding and antagonism.9
Stephen Meyer, in his recent book on Allis-Chalmers and the
UAW, examined hundreds of grievances for the period 1937 - 1940.
Meyers notes two important categories of grievances, those that presented
"a significant challenge to the shop floor authority of straw bosses,
foremen, and supervisors," and those that "touched on the complicated
question of new production technologies." 10 He found that 48 percent of
2,500 indexed grievances filed between 1937 and 1940 involved wages, and
that most of these protested unfair piece rates and requested the union be
present for new studies or demanded access to management studies.
Meyer contends that grievance activity "constituted a means for
resisting new technologies and new production methods" and sprang
from a sense of "equity and fairness." The grievances were also the only
contractual vehicle workers had to stave-off speed-up. From the machine
operator's perspective, an unfair rate connoted an attempt by management
to gain more pieces per hour for the same, or less pay. As automatic
8 Derber, p. 93 - 99.
9 Derber, p. 100.
10 Meyer, Stalin Over Wisconsin, esp. p. 111-117.
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machinery was introduced these rate grievances also gave workers an
opportunity to protest both the technology and the rates on the jobs the
equipment performed. Examples from Bosch grievance files help to make
this clear. 11
Tob Structures and Labor Classifications
The System
By the late 1940s every Bosch worker had a labor grade and detailed
job description that defined what he or she did in the plant. In tandem
with the seniority system that governed layoffs and recalls, these
regulated the movement of workers in and out of the factory. At the same
time they significantly limit management's flexibility in the areas of job
assignment and staffing.
The entire system evolved during World War II with the
incorporation of the first job classification book in the contract. Along
with the piece work incentive structure, the seniority-classification system
was a principal source of friction in the plant until the day the doors were
locked. Each worker had a detailed job description and labor grade that
defined their occupation in the plant and encompassed their classification.
In addition, the parties agreed to "establish straight plant-wide seniority"
using these occupations; layoff procedures were also based on them. As
will be discussed below, unionists refused to perform functions they
believed strayed from their classification and argued for a higher rate of
pay if directly ordered to do so. When ordered, a grievance was filed,
11 Meyer, p. 113.
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was
which in turn, slowed production at the precise moment when it
important to get the job assignment done. Workers also zealously
guarded what they felt to be the work in their classification and grieved
whenever they believed somebody else was performing it. In addition
union stewards kept an eye out for instances where a worker was ordered
to perform tasks ordinarily done by a worker who may have been laid off.
During every contract negotiation period from the late-1960s through the
1980s management tried to rid the plant of this system, contending that it
placed severe restraints on their ability to produce cost effectively.
However, union negotiators spurred on by high seniority workers, dug
their heels in and defended what they viewed as their only modicum of
job protection. 12
Each worker had a detailed job description with a labor grade and
occupation code attached to it. The lower the labor grade number, the
higher the base rate payment. There were six grades for production
workers running from labor grade 4 - 9. A grinding machine operator's
job description read as follows: "Grind to very close tolerances and fine
finishes. Finish grind plunger outer diameter, and plunger helix, also
rough, semi-finish and finish grind camshaft lobes. Set up complicated
jobs. Dress Wheels." This occupation carried with it a Job Grade 4 and
Occupational Code 307A. There were two other descriptions for grinding
machine operators with subtle distinctions and different job grades and
occupational codes. A Job Grade 5 grinder "did repetitive grinding to close
tolerance and finish" and "performed production setups", while a Job
12 SMU, December 10, 1958; April 8, 1959; July 29, 1960; March 15, 1962.
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Grade 6 grinder performed "repetitive grinding to average tolerance and
finish" and did "production setups."^
Turret Lathe operators had three job descriptions, occupational
codes and job grades. Distinctions centered on setup responsibilities and
tolerances. The top operator was required to perform complicated setups
and work to close tolerances; the middle range, simple setups and close
tolerances; and the lowest performed no setups at all and worked to
average tolerances. 14
Floor inspectors moved throughout the factory checking on the
quality of parts being produced. They had three job descriptions. An
Inspector Class 1, Job Grade 4 performed final inspection work on
complicated and expensive products, needed to exercise a high degree of
responsibility and required very little supervision. An inspector Class 2,
Job Grade 5 worked on complicated parts and assemblies, had to have
knowledge of blueprints and used minimal judgment. An Inspector Class
3, Job Grade 6 worked on simple parts and assemblies. Traditionally an
inspector in job grade 4 could 'work down' and perform less complicated
work, while the obverse would prompt an immediate protest. This was
done to prevent the company from eliminating more well-paid inspectors
by assigning their work to Job Grade 6 inspectors. 15
L * IUE Local 206 Red Book of Job Classifications, p. 20, 21.
14 Red Book of Job Classifications, p. 20, 21. There were over 150 descriptions and
occupational codes in place by the completion of 1958 contract negotiations.
15 Red Book, p. 12. While piece workers had to contend with the rate issue, inspectors,
stock handlers, set-up men, and other of what were termed day workers, always had to be
aware of company efforts to assign higher labor grade work to lesser classified people.
Since it was difficult for the company to establish time standards for the work these
individuals performed, the next best thing was to pay as little as possible to get it done.
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The AATM Rating Manual. Bosch labor grades were established
using a complex job rating system established by the American Association
of Industrial Management (AAIM). AAIM utilized a point-based system,
that made it possible to "determine the differentials between jobs in terms
of their relative requirements, and provides the factual basis for obtaining
such differentials." According to AAIM such ratings yielded the benefit to
a company of "establishing and maintaining the equitable wage
relationship between jobs, which is fundamental to good industrial
relations and sound wage administration."
AAIM attached point values to the application of such things as
skill, effort, and responsibility, totaled the points, and through
predetermined point ranges, arrived at a job grade for the hundreds of
occupations in the plant. For example, the Job Grade 4 Grinder in the
example above had a point total in the 294-315 range while the Job Grade 5
Grinder was in the 272-293 range. In each broad category to be reviewed
there were specific factors to be rated. For example, in the category skill the
factors were education, experience, initiative, and ingenuity. Finally
within each of the factors there were five degrees of proficiency. Such a
complex and subjective system was bound to cause disagreement between
workers and supervisors.
Within the overall system experience could gain the most points,
followed by education and initiative. Points were based solely on what
was needed to do the job. Thus, a drill press operator who might have
graduated from a machinist apprentice program and could interpret
complicated blueprints gained the same points for education as a co-
worker who had never finished high school. He or she received points
based only on what it took to become a good drill press operator. Workers
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wore never paid for knowledge or overall ability, but for the precise
functions they were expected to perform. The system was inflexible in this
regard. 16
Here, as with the job descriptions, the finest of distinctions existed
between the degrees in a factor being reviewed. Under experience, the
operative words were the "minimum length of time it would take a
normal qualified person working under normal supervision to attain
quality and quantity performance standards." The faster a job could be
learned the lower the point value attached to it. Under initiative and
ingenuity "the independent action, use of judgment, the making of
decisions and the amount of resourcefulness and planning the job
requires" were rated. The difference between the top two degrees were
"requires the use of considerable judgment" and "requires the use of
outstanding judgment". Mental or visual demand evaluated the "degree
of mental and /or visual fatigue sustained through the application of mind
and eye in performing job duties. "Concentrated" attention and "intense
and exacting" attention made the difference between the top two degrees
in this category. 17
AAIM and Quality. The AAIM system placed almost no emphasis
on the issue of quality work. Quality was mentioned in just the Effort
category in the manual. It measured "the responsibility for preventing
loss which may result from negligent inspection or testing. " It carried a
maximum point value of 25, the lowest a factor could receive in the entire
16 Bosch job Rating Manual p. 3.
17 Bosch job Rating Manual, p. 4, 6, 9.
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system. The greater the dollar-value loss caused by bad work, the high
the points achieved. 18
Each time a new machine tool was placed in the factory lengthy
negotiations followed before a labor grade was established. However, the
company had the final authority to set the labor grade for the job and only
had to provide the union with its rationale. Not surprisingly,
management slotted every new job at the lowest possible level. This
prompted the worker on the job to grieve his or her labor grade and
resulted in several arbitration cases. 19
In summary, three features - precise job descriptions, labor grades
governing transfers, layoffs and recalls, and the AAIM rating system -
established a formal, rule-bound system regulating worker movement
throughout the plant by the early 1950s. By the mid-1940s a management
team was established to keep track of the paperwork required to document
this system, while the union won the right to have a member of their
elected Seniority Committee present at all layoffs to advise workers on
their various options. Workers knew their labor grade and classification
numbers the way a returning World War II veteran could recite the
numbers on their dog tags.
Economist Richard Edwards argues that this entire system was
designed by management to gain bureaucratic control over the factory
floor. For Edwards, "bureaucratic control is embedded in the social and
18 Bosch job Rating Manual p. 11.
19 Bosch Job Rating Manual, p. 1. The AAIM manual was entitled Definitions of Factors
And Respective Degrees Used in Rating Production, Maintenance and Service fobs .
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organizational structure of the firm and is built into job categories, work
rules, promotion procedures, discipline, wage scales, definitions of
responsibility and the like." This accurately describes the AAIM approach,
and places Charles Perelle's reorganization of the labor relations
department and his drive to limit union involvement in plant
production decisions in the context of events taking place across U.S.
industry. Edwards is correct when he points out that as the system
developed unions were drawn in to it, giving up such things as the right
to strike during the life of a labor agreement, in return for fairly
predictable wage increases, modest pensions, and other benefits. However,
as the Bosch case demonstrates, workers were quite capable of
manipulating the system to slow down and block management attempts
to establish authority on the factory floor. 20
The Grievance Procedure and Corporate Consolidation
Under Perelle Problems are Not Solved
By the mid-1950s the Bosch grievance system was in disrepair. A
1956 Labor Bulletin ran a front page cartoon showing Director of Industrial
Relations James Mote seated at a table across from a sweating and gagged
foreman who was rubbing a magic lantern with 'answers' written on it.
The word 'NO' floated in a cloud above the foreman's head. Off to the
side of the table was a file cabinet with grievance forms spilling out of the
drawers. In a near-by waste basket lay a copy of the labor agreement. An
^u Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the
Twentieth Century (New York, 1979) p. 132.
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accompanying article reminisced about the old-days when labor relations
personnel had open and tolerant minds and negotiated settlements
instead of issuing dictatorial ultimatums. "We cannot help but recall," the
article went on, "the many pleasant hours spent with men of high
principles who treated us as human beings and received the proper respect
reserved for those who lead us." The message was clear: The timely
resolution of problems on the shop floor, was not taking place.
Foremen were no longer allowed to answer grievances in the first
step. Every issue had to be handled by Mote's labor relations department.
This meant delay, and often compounded problems for stewards and
foremen. The irony here is that speedy dispute resolution could have
contributed to management's concerted efforts to increase plant efficiency.
However, by delaying the settlement of even the simplest problem, the
aggrieved worker often slacked off in quiet, personal protest. 21
What Bothered Local 206 Members?
Table 7.1 is based on a sampling of two hundred Local 206
grievances filed from the early 1950s through 1968. How do the issues
here compare with Derber's and Meyer's findings? Each studied an earlier
period, but there is a great deal of continuity between issues workers
deemed significant in the 1930s through the 1950s and 1960s. 22
Z1 LB, April, 1956, p. 1. Mote had now been given the nickname 'Mote the Goat' in honor of
what workers believed to be his stubborn and mean-spirited personality.
22 The local maintained excellent grievance files by worker and department. Hundreds of
these files are well organized in the UMass archives and provide a rich source for a more
exhaustive study of grievance activity in the plant. In many instances the grievance
committee's notes are attached to the original grievance and in almost all cases the
company's formal written response is attached as well.
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Rate Grievances
.
On rates, Bosch workers argued, "I find the rate
given to me to be extremely low. I want a new rate taken that will be fair
and equitable;" "Time study eliminated my fatigue allowance;" "I cannot
Table 7.1: Sample of 200 Local 206 grievances 1953 - 1970.
Rates of payment on piece work 30%
Job classifications 26%
Foremen performing union work 11%
Miscellaneous 11%
Seniority in layoffs and recalls 8%
Working out of classification 3%
possibly do the work assigned, I am already overloaded;" "I claim speed-
up." In the drill press area of the shop, where the company made a
concerted effort in the mid-1950s to reorganize production well over 50
percent of all grievances filed concerned new piecework rates. In the
entire sample 30 percent of grievances were on rates and improper time
studies.
In early 1960 the issue of fair rates intensified to the point that
union leaders had to caution angry workers not to walk out over the
proliferation of unresolved rate grievances. In a letter to officers and
stewards union president Depathy warned "employees if walking out in a
body are subject to disciplinary action. Instead, he instructed workers to
place a grievance on "each and every part number and operation number
and on all set-up time studies."23
23 Local 206 files, Series III, grievance files. Letter to Officers and Stewards found in
Series 3, grievance files. The job classification issue will be analyzed in the next chapter
when the job rating and seniority systems are discussed.
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The answer to one such grievance demonstrates the complex nature
of rate complaints as well as how rate setting was integral to
management's efforts to exert greater shop control. After a 1959 grievance
hearing Shop Superintendent Charles McCobb wrote, "The elements in
the study were all found to be correct. However we did deem it advisable
to increase the utilized time factor which increased the rate from $8.60 to
$9.78 per 100 parts produced." This largess was followed with an explicit
warning to the worker to increase production: "With this change in the
rate I am sure there is no violation of the contract and operators can
produce much more than they are presently turning in."24
By the late-1950s, as rate setting became more complex workers' use
of the grievance procedure to protest bad rates heightened. 25 An undated
five page union memo provides an analysis of rate-related problems from
1942 - 1966 in Department 110 demonstrates this. The department
contained lines of large Warner and Swasey chucking machines and Acme
Gridley bar-fed automatic screw machines. It had the largest concentration
of skilled set-up men and the most skilled machine operators in the plant.
Workers were responsible for keeping three or more of these machines
running. The entire department was paid on a group output basis. The
first memo entry read, "During the war years and for a period afterwards
the many problems were kept in the department and resolved by an
aggressive group of old timers, so written grievances were at a
minimum." 26
24 Series III, Box 10 grievance files.
25 Local 206 1941 Labor Agreement, p. 36. In 1941 the contact read: "The policy regarding
the speed of operations is that time studies shall be made on the basis of fairness consistent
with quality workmanship, efficiency of operations, and the reasonable working capacity
of normal operators."
26 Department 110 Grievance History Memo, author unknown (Local 206 files).
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When Perelle began his modernization program Department 110
was one of the first to receive new machine tools with simplified set up
procedures, automatic part loading attachments, and increased tool
capacity to boost output. After 1953 grievances were filed to resolve the
issue of how many machines each operator was required to run. Workers
protested whenever the company attempted to reduce the number of set-
up men in the department, and there were continual skirmishes regarding
the number of floor inspectors assigned to the area. Such grievances
mitigated against management's position that they determined staffing
patterns on the shop floor.
Workers in the department also protested the way they were
compensated when machines broke down during production. In January,
1954, for example, a 'downtime grievance' resulted in a chart being made
by a time study engineer so that a standard formula could be applied. By
March, workers grieved the accuracy of the chart, and in April it was
discarded and another prepared.
Whenever management introduced production changes workers
argued that their jobs changed as well, necessitating reevaluation and
possible upgrading. During the 1940s and early 1950s operators in the
department mainly roughed out parts to be finished in successive
operations elsewhere. By the late 1950s, engineering and tooling
improvements in the department made it possible to produce parts closer
to finished dimensions. Management then laid-off large numbers of
milling and grinding machine operators who had performed these
secondary machining operations. To protect jobs, grievances were filed
which asserted that since the "tolerance and closeness of work has greatly
increased since these machines were first installed to do just blank work,"
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and "now a more finished product is demanded under conditions far in
excess of capabilities of machines and personnel; 1 the jobs should be
changed to the way they were. If not, operators should have their job
grades elevated, base pay increased and several more floor inspectors
added to the department to insure the close tolerances required off the
machines were being maintained. There is no evidence in the union's
arbitration files that such grievances succeeded. 27
When a department grievance like this was written every worker
signed it and attended the hearing. The work area would become deserted
and production could cease for hours. Not surprisingly, such group
grievances were unnerving for management. In the case of Department
110 this was especially so, for roughly 80 percent of all parts machined in
the factory started there. These grievances were empowering to workers,
who witnessed a mini-shutdown that was perfectly legal under the
collective bargaining agreement. 28
Supervisory personnel performing what was considered union
work generated large numbers of grievances, particularly following layoffs.
These grievances were usually written by stewards who most likely were
instructed by union officers to crack down on these practices. Foremen
were written up for such things as moving pallets of work, carrying a
handful of parts from one work area to another, inspecting parts, carrying
tools from the tool crib to a machine, and adjusting machines. The
27 Department 110 Grievance History Memo. Grievance that involved arguing for a job
upgrade were seldom successful. In a review of 15 arbitration cases, the union won only one
upgrade.
28 Department 110 Grievance History Memo. It is instructive to compare the scene of
collaboration Derber described in the late 1930s at Westinghouse with this almost constant
battle in what can be arguably viewed as the most important production department in the
Bosch. The company tried repeatedly to change grievance procedure language in order to
limit the number of workers attending a hearing but the union resisted these efforts.
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company responded after one such grievance hearing: "The arguments of
the union have been reviewed and considered and it is the company's
opinion that the contract was violated by the supervisor going to the tool
crib to find the correct boring bar." On another occasion a foreman going
after the tooling for a set-up was charged with a contract violation. In a
third example, the company stated it "does not condone or have any
intention of permitting foremen to secure and transport gages and
fixtures."29
Like group grievances, these too were empowering. The steward
and workers who witnessed the illegal activity had the authority to stop
their own machines, request a meeting with their boss, and inform him
he was in violation of the labor agreement. Overbearing foremen ran the
risk of having production tied up for several minutes a day by skilled
stewards determined to uphold the contract. During the company drive
for increased productivity such interruptions were costly and shined a
spot-light on a department's leadership. Stewards could use this to their
advantage. In addition, foremen suffered personal embarrassment if the
issue proceeded through the grievance procedure and a hearing was held
with plant labor relations personnel. When the company put in writing
that supervisors were wrong for performing union tasks, workers had
license to ridicule foremen. This also undermined management efforts to
gain control on the factory floor. These grievances remained one of the
few ways for the union to exhibit a modicum of power and control, and
resist Perelle's speed-up campaign.
29 Series III, Box 12 grievance files.
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Tob Ratinp and Classification GriPvanrpg Grievances on job
classifications were the second most common filed in the plant after rate
ones (Table 7.1). Set-up men continually filed this type of grievance when
ordered to move completed work from one department to another,
complaining that they were not stock chasers. Set-up men also reacted
strongly against instructions to run production work once a set up was
completed and the job was ready to run. Workers in the Chucking
Machine department filed numerous grievances regarding requirements
to move parts and inspect finished work. Like Department 110, the
majority of workers had high seniority and the machines in the area were
some of the most difficult to maintain in the factory. Management
continually tried to force operators to run more machines or perform
more of the support tasks needed to keep the department running,
including, moving work, inspecting parts, oiling machines, and doing
simple set-ups and tool changes. Since none of these tasks were contained
in their formal job descriptions, workers resisted what they believed were
management encroachments on their jobs. The company response to one
such grievance: "At times operators will have to relocate parts from one
area to another within the department or walk a greater distance than
usual to get parts to load into the machine," captures the essence of this
issue. 30 A second answer makes it clear that the company sought some
flexibility in making these types of assignments, while the union was
unwilling to accede to this easily. Set-up men were upset that they were
being forced to clean machines, claiming it was a maintenance department
30 Series III, Box 12, ff 125, grievance files. Two workers in the department , Vincent Motyl
and Donald Staples, filed numerous grievances on theses. Each became a union stewards
and eventually were elected to more responsible positions in the union during the 1960s and
1970s. But they made their reputations as strong unionists in these departmental
skirmishes.
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task. The company denied the grievance and informed the union that
"during peak loads, to meet production demands, we may need to assign
this to set-up men."31
Union leaders viewed these classification violations as a jobs issue.
When shop floor reorganization plans were introduced large numbers of
stock handlers, packers, and other non-machine personnel were laid off.
The company then attempted to get this work done by temporarily
reassigning operators to these tasks. A brief newspaper article made the
union's position clear on such a tactic: "Operators working out of
classification on day work jobs must be halted. Let's hire the needed help
for efficiency and productivity's sake."32
Issues of job classifications, descriptions, and the assignment of
work became so nettlesome that quite often special contractual side-
agreements were negotiated to resolve them. For example, in 1954 the
union and company signed a document to "promote and maintain a
harmonious relationship among the skilled maintenance workers." Job
Grade 4 millwrights, painters, and masons were reclassified to Job Grade 3
with a seven cents an hour increase, as a result of a grievance filed against
their being ordered to move machines around the shop. In return for the
upgrade, the union agreed to language that stipulated "maintenance work
often arises in large quantities, particularly during the movement of a
department. In the interest of efficient maintenance operations, it is
necessary at times to have maintenance workers perform other types of
work than their classification imply."
31 Series III, Box 12, ff 126, grievance files. The union saw this as a jobs issue and in one
newspaper article wrote "Operators working out of classification on day work jobs halted.
Let's hire the needed help for efficiency and productivity's sake.
32 LB, October, 1959, p. 3.
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Grieving skilled tradesmen may have been attempting to maintain
some vestiges of craft distinction in job assignments. But the side-
agreement ended this notion when the union and company agreed "In
consideration of this upgrading of these classifications it is agreed that
maintenance workers shall perform such maintenance work as may be
assigned to them by their Supervisors without detailed regard for job
descriptions or job content."33
Conclusion
Frequently the union utilized the grievance procedure and the job
classification system to gain a measure of respect and recognition from the
company, correct inequities, and slow down management's shop-floor
reorganization. The filing of group grievances, the determination to have
rates set which included proper allowances to insure a fair day's pay, the
vigorous efforts to limit supervision's encroachments on union work, the
attempt to protect laid off workers' jobs by grieving when ordered to work
out of classification, are very much connected to the notion of working
people's self-worth and honor that labor historian David Brody writes
about.
The issue of fairness was integral, as was the attempt to achieve a
degree of job security in a factory with wild employment swings. While
the union fell eerily silent when it came to publicly protesting mass layoffs
33 1954 Supplemental Agreement found in Maintenance Department grievance files. This
agreement actually supplemented an earlier one in 1953 which could not be found. By the
late 1970s there were over 20 side-agreements like this one resolving classification issues,
including a six page document titled "Split Class Agreement" which broke 30 occupations
into even more distinct categories and included lay-off and recall to work language. One
occupation. Experimental Machinist, now had 12 categories, while another, automatic
screw machine operator, had seven.
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and the possible closing of the plant, workers did stand-up for themselves
in the plant. They were also willing to support other unionists when the
occasion warranted, even at considerable risk to the jobs they were
attempting to protect.34
1958 Wildcat Strikp
Background
During 1957 contract negotiations while small gains were made in
the pension and insurance plans, Local 206 failed to gain a highly sought
cost of living clause. The company granted a small raise and both sides
agreed to hold wage reopener talks in August, 1958. Union negotiators
gambled that the business climate would improve in a year and that they
would have better results. During the first half of 1958 the plant received
orders to build test equipment for the government's B-52 bomber
program. With slight employment gains workers believed they were in
the best bargaining position they had been for several years. The
negotiators' gamble appeared to pay off. But no agreement was reached.35
The union argued hourly rates were nine cents below the local
average. A company spokesman countered that Bosch average hourly pay
of $2.66 exceeded ten similar firms in the region by 19 cents. "The
company naturally doesn't want a strike," a press release read. "However
we don't want to go through negotiations similar to these each year, and
34 For Brody's recent thoughts on this subject see "Workplace Contractualism," in
Lichtenstein and Harris, eds., Industrial Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise
( New York, 1993).
35 SMU, August 31, 1957, p. 14; September 6, 1957, p. 1.
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we're not going to." The company added that it had spent six million
dollars over the past six years to improve plant efficiency and meet the
challenges of foreign competition and that the increase the union sought
would cancel the investment.36
All finished and nearly finished products were moved to
warehouses in anticipation of a strike. The move seemed reasonable since
in early August the membership had given their negotiating committee
the authority to call a strike. But when newly elected Local 206 president
Ernest Depathy remarked that the membership was divided over the
strike vote, and his remarks were reported in the local newspapers,
company negotiators realized the union was in a weak position. Talks
broke off, but unlike the 1955 negotiations when the union took a 'no
contract - no work' position, production continued. After a few more days
agreement was reached on a seven cent an hour increase. However, the
union failed to gain cost of living protection; the company's aggressive
negotiating stance seemed successful.37
The Walkout Takes Shapp
After such disastrous negotiations union leaders may have felt a
show of internal unity was in order. When picket lines were set up early
on the morning of October 10 by the 175 members of the company's
striking Engineering and Architectural Local 112, Local 206 had the
Jb SMU, August 14, 1958, p. L Leslie Neville, director of public relations, told newspaper
reporters that warehouses were stocked with products and that the company was ready for
a long strike.
37 SDN, August 14, 19, 1958. The 1955 two-day strike was the first in since the plant was
unionized in 1936 and broke what the Springfield Union called an "astounding record of
tranquillity" (SMU, September 2, 1955).
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opportunity it was looking for: Machines fell silent for several days as
1,300 Local 206 members, in a show of solidarity and defiance to
management, refused to cross picket lines set up by the engineers. Local
206 business agent Jim Manning explained: "We cannot promote or assist
a strike without being in violation of our contract with the company." He
added, "We cannot, however, control the actions of individuals in our
local."
The Daily News carried a front page photograph of striking workers
and Local 206 members blocking the front gates of the plant while
hundreds of other union members could be seen sitting on a hill across
from the plant. The hill, where workers congregated for several more
days, was directly across the street from all the corporate offices in the
factory. Seeing hundreds of union members perched on the hill every
morning angered management and represented a challenge to their efforts
to gain greater control in the plant.38
The pace of events quickened on the second day of the 1958 stay-
away. Company officials notified Manning that the union was in
violation of its contract. Personnel manager James Mote also sent letters
to the homes of every Local 206 member informing them they were
participating in an illegal work stoppage. Manning once again told the
local press that "I've told my people the plant is open and they can go to
work but they say they don't want to be called scabs."39
M SMU, October 10, 1958, p.l. The Union reported that on the first day of the walk-out
workers refused to enter the plant lobby to receive their paychecks. The October 10 Daily
News carried a front page photograph of striking workers and Local 206 members blocking
the front gates of the plant while hundreds of other union members could be seen sitting on a
hill across from the plant. The hill, which workers congregated on several more days, was
visible from the various corporate offices in the factory.
39 SDN ,October 11, 1958.
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Talks broke off between Local 112 and Bosch negotiators with
neither side willing to move from its last wage proposal. The union
sought a 3.5 percent hike while the company was proposing 3.1 percent. A
federal mediator was called in. To compound the corporation's problems,
the Columbus, Mississippi IUE local went on strike October 9th as their
contract expired. ARMA's head of labor relations, W. Gerard Tuttle,
hastily left Springfield, where he had been negotiating with the Engineers,
and raced to Mississippi in an effort to end that strike as quickly as
possible. The head of the engineers' local charged that the company did
not want to settle the dispute and was more interested in testing the
resolve of Local 206. If that was the company's intention, corporate
officials underestimated the depth of anti-company feeling. Picket lines
held firm over the weekend, blocking trucks from moving work out or
materials into the plant. Tuttle remained in Mississippi, and the company
now informed Local 112 that there would be no talks until his return.40
By the fifth day of the stoppage Local 206 members started referring
to the walkout as the "49-cent strike". Forty-nine cents represented the
weekly pay differential between the company and union wage proposals.
The company sent a second letter to Local 206 members urging them to
cross the picket lines and return to work, but to no avail. Workers still
occupied the hill across from the factory each morning, and the shop floor
remained dark and silent. Tuttle was called back from Mississippi in an
effort to break the negotiating stalemate. In his first action he refused
Local 112's request to send the dispute to binding arbitration and return to
work.
40 SMU, October 11, 1958; SDN, October 11, 1958, p. 1; SDN, October 13, 1958, p. 24. Local
206 members finally received there pay when the company agreed to distribute checks in
the plant's cafeteria, located across the street from the main production facility.
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Nine days into the strike not one Local 206 member had crossed the
Local 112 picket lines. For a third time management sent a letter urging an
end to the walkout. It read in part "Next Friday you will receive no pay - is
it worth it for the small amount that divides Local 112 and us? If it is not
money, what is it then? There must be a great principle involved." It
concluded:
After lengthy negotiations your union gained for you
increases averaging approximately seven cents an hour,
which is $2.80 a week. Do you realize that you have already
lost 43 weeks of your recent increase by your six days absence
from work? You will never make up the pay you are losing."
Since union members were unhappy with their August wage
settlement this reminder may have stiffened their resolve.41
The Local 112 contract was settled on October 20 when engineers
agreed to the company's 3.1 percent pay increase. Local 206 members
returned to work after suffering wage losses that averaged $121 per
worker. They maintained a strong sense of labor solidarity throughout,
risking their jobs to support other unionists as well as letting management
know how they felt about events in the plant. On the first day of the
walkout a perceptive news reporter may have come closest to explaining
why Local 206 members stayed off the job when he wrote: "A vivid
contrast in business conditions was provided by today's walkout. In 1955,
the strike idled 3,500. Today, no more than 1,300 were involved."42
SDN, October 18, 1858, p. 1. Four hundred workers filed unemployment claims during the
second week of the walkout. The company informed the local newspapers that it would
fight every claim. There is no evidence that management every filed unfair labor practice
charges against the union or sought injunctive relief from the courts during the entire
dispute. There is also no evidence of any attempts to pressure the city to provide a large
enough police presence to escort any willing workers into the plant.
42 SMU, October 10, 1958, p. 1.
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In an effort to capitalize on unity in the plant Local 206 struck at the
expiration if its contract on August 14,1959 hoping once again to gain cost
of living language. But the economy did not help the union cause:
Massachusetts unemployment was high as the country struggled through
the 1959 recession. The U.S. Department of Labor determined that
Massachusetts had seven of the 33 labor markets in the country with
unemployment rates exceeding six percent. Springfield was one of them.
With employment so unpredictable, workers wondered if a lengthy strike
made sense.43
However, it appears the company looked forward to the
opportunity to reassert its control after the nine-day illegal walkout a year
earlier. Company negotiators gave their counterparts a wage proposal just
two hours before contract expiration, forcing the union to strike or quickly
settle without time to review the proposal in detail. Bosch spokesperson
Lesile Neville also informed the media that "The company is in good
shape for a long strike and has a warehouse stocked with products." The
company now demanded a three-year labor agreement in order to gain
more wage stability in the face of increased foreign and domestic
competition. When the strike began union negotiators were warned that
money issues would not be discussed unless they were willing to consider
a three-year contract. To increase the pressure further on negotiators,
management sent a letter to workers on August 21. It stated that Bosch
faced a serious challenge from foreign companies and that only a small
wage increase was possible in order to keep the price of pumps
competitive.
43 SMU, August 17, 1959, p. 3. A Federal Reserve Bank study released in August noted that
in all three post-war recessions employment declined more on a percentage basis in New
England than in the rest of the country (SMU, August 18, 1959) p. 1
.
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After 13 days a settlement was reached, with the company gaining
the three-year agreement it sought. Once again the union failed to gain
the cost of living protection it demanded. The union did get improved
contract language that allowed them to grieve new rates in the plant when
they were set. Previously an operator had to run a job and try out the new
rate before it could be protested. This was hailed as a "protection against
automation." But problems with the grievance procedure, especially the
company's failure to abide by time limits, made utilization of this new
contract clause difficult. The rank-and-file also found it difficult to become
too excited about the clause after losing 13 days pay on the heels of the 9
days lost in the 1958 walkout.44
At the union ratification meeting Manning stated, "We took these
people on and we beat them". He added, "When they back us into a
corner you have to fight. I don't believe you'll ever have to fight again."
Just ten weeks later Manning was soundly defeated in the race for business
agent by Ralph Chicketti, ending his almost fifteen years as an office
holder in the local. Chicketti was a founding member of the local in 1936
and had worked with Manning to defeat the United Electrical Workers in
1949 and 1950. Manning received just 220 votes out of 823 cast. The rank
and file did not share his views on the outcome of the strike, or support
his role as their chief negotiator 45
44 SMU, August, 14, 15, 17, 21, 26, 29, 1959.
45 Local 206 election results, Series 1, Box 3, ff. 34 - 36, UMass Labor Archives. Total votes
cast in the shop elections of 1955, 1957, and 1959 are indicative of the problems unionists
faced in the factory. Vote totals dropped steadily, from 1,642 in 1955 to 1,320 in 1957, and
finally 833 in 1959. This is almost a 50 percent decline.
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Conclusion
During the decade of the 1950s the labor force dropped an
astonishing 70 percent, to under 750 from a post-World War II high of
2,500 in 1955. Over the same period corporate sales and profits were
equally erratic. For example, sales jumped to $134.3 million in 1957 from
$73.8 million in 1955, then dropped back to slightly under $120 million in
1958. Bosch and other divisions were hurt by the 1958 - 1959 recession and
new product development failed. Profits surged to a high of $5.1 million
in 1957, but to the dismay of stockholders, plunged to $1 million in 1960
on sales of $125 million as the corporation reached its nadir, hitting record
lows on the New York Stock Exchange. Neither Perelle's strategies to
boost productivity, or his global expansion efforts achieved the desired
financial results.
Meanwhile Local 206 remained excluded from all discussions about
the future of the plant. Union leaders still urged workers to: "Exercise
utmost care in manufacture of parts or in assembly. Take pride in your
craftsmanship." In an April, 1960 Bulletin article titled "Our Jobs"
unionists were told "The business is there, it won't come to us, we have to
secure it by quality, fair pricing, and dependability. It can be done with the
same people that led Bosch on top once, the membership of Local 206."
But management never looked to the union for help to solve difficult
shop floor problems. When this was written unionists had no idea that
the corporation had commissioned a study to determine the viability of
the Springfield plant.46
46 Both quotations from LB, April, 1960, p. 1. For example, in April, October and November
1959 and again in February, 1960 Local 206 called on management to form a joint automation
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In 1960 stockholders watched in disbelief as German competitor
Robert Bosch wrested 70 percent of Springfield's fuel injection business.
However, Defense Department orders associated with escalating military
activity in Viet Nam arrived in Springfield. This resulted in millions of
dollars of new contracts and hundreds of recalls and new hires by the
mid-1960s. The orders masked two underlying problems in Springfield:
Demand for commercial automotive, agricultural, and truck products
remained weak; and foreign competitors continued to gain market share
at the expense of the plant.
With the plant study completed, Perelle decided in late 1960 it
would be better to spend more money in Springfield on machine tools and
product development in an effort to revive the facility, than to attempt to
shift all the work elsewhere. The union, no longer as interested in
solving factory floor problems as it had been in the early 1950s, turned to
securing the best wage and benefit packages possible. By 1960, the plant's
job roller coaster resulted in there being a core of high seniority workers
along with large numbers with less than five years in the factory. These
high seniority workers were concerned about pension improvements,
more vacation time, and job security. They were unwilling to
compromise regarding such things as labor classifications and seniority,
believing contract language protected their employment. Unlike former
business agent Manning's earlier contention that workers in the plant
would never have to fight again, these unionists conducted three
committee. The committee is the "sane and intelligent course," and it will benefit everyone,
together we can deal better with the issue," LB, December, 1959, p. 1.
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defensive strikes between 1960 and 1971 to hold onto rights and benefits
they believed the corporation was trying to take away.
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CHAPTER 8
EXPANSION ABROAD, SPRINGFIELD INVESTMENTS
AND LABOR DISQUIET: 1960 - 1971
Introduction
In a 1993 collection of essays on the impact of corporate strategies on
workers and communities, editor Bruce Nissen describes what he and
several other historians of post-World War II labor history call the 'Social
Accord'. The Accord sprang from the United Auto Workers' contracts in
the early 1950s, especially the 1950 agreement with General Motors (GM).
The five-year contract established direct links between increased
productivity and wage increases, established an annual wage increase over
the life of the contract, and boosted pension and other fringe benefits. By
the early 1950s UAW agreements contained supplemental unemployment
benefit protections that guaranteed workers several weeks of wage support
above their normal unemployment compensation. 1
The 1950 contract gave GM a needed degree of stability in their
relations with the UAW, particularly in the area of labor costs. By locking
in wage increases over a five year period GM gamed a tremendous
advantage over Ford, Crysler, and other automotive companies struggling
to control labor costs and unit prices. GM also gained control over
managerial decisions regarding plant location and construction,
technology acquisition and utilization, and product pricing. These were
the issues UAW president Walter Reuther raised in the union's
1 For a discussion of the Accord see Nelson Lichtenstein, "UAW Bargaining and Shop-Floor
Conflict: 1946 - 1970," Industrial Relations, 54 (Fall, 1985) p. 360 - 381.
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acrimonious 113- day strike in 1946. The union, in return, gained annual
pay increases and a modified union shop that provided a modicum of
membership stability. According to labor historian Nelson Lichtenstein,
who has researched and written extensively on the UAW, the union soon
after the strike tied its fate more closely to that of the industry and
increasingly subordinated the endemic shop-floor struggle over working
conditions and production standards to the UAW's national bargaining
program. Reutherism moved, according to Lichtenstein, from a demand
for structural change in the auto industry to negotiating wage and
supplemental benefits for autoworkers while leaving power relationships
in the industry unchallenged. 2
Much of post - World War II labor history is framed by these
Accord parameters. It is generally accepted that industrial unions, for
better or worse, operated within boundaries circumscribed by the 1950 GM
- UAW labor agreement. Whether cajoled, forced, or willing partners,
unions gave assurance to management that they had the right to run their
business. This included a free hand to make capital investments, new
technology, and plant location decisions. From there, workplace
contractualism took over and unions focused their energies, to the
exclusion of almost all else, on getting the best financial packages possible
for their membership at contract time.
In 1950 the UAW agreed not to strike over the life of the five-year
contract. This provided GM with the ability to better determine labor
2 Frederick Harbison, "The General Motors - United Auto Workers Agreement of 1950,"
journal of Political Economy, 58 (February, 1950) p. 397 - 411. GM called the agreement
"unprecedented in labor-management relations" and noted that now "all concerned can face
the future with added confidence," Harbison, p. 399. Lichtenstein, "UAW Bargaining and
Shop-Floor Conflict," p. 362 - 363. The result was dramatically improved pensions,
supplemental unemployment benefits, cost of living and productivity wage improvements.
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costs as well as set production schedules with little tear of a labor Stoppage.
Soon one-year agreements, which had been the norm in all basic industry,
were a thing of the past. In return, corporations ostensibly acceded to
labors concerns by insuring steady wage and benefit gains, speedy dispute
resolution through the grievance and arbitration procedure, and a
semblance of job security.
But did the Accord have the deep roots attributed to it? Did unions,
like Local 206, that were not involved with national pattern bargaining,
gain the wage, benefit, and job security guarantees attributed to the
Accord? If the Bosch case is typical, the answer is no. The Accord frames
the discussion, it should not close it off. Also as Mike Davis points out, the
Accord was contingent upon the continued success of American
capitalism. He writes, "... any slowing of mass consumption, import
penetration of the domestic market, deregulation or decline in defense
spending would directly undermine and destabilize bargaining structures
and progressive wage agreements." 1
Local 206 and the 'Treaty of Detroit 1
As the previous chapters demonstrate, the Bosch plant's history
shows the danger of writing post-World War II labor history primarily
through the prism of the United Auto Workers and the Accord.
Springfield events, from the UL-IUL split, to the Mississippi decision, to
* On the Accord see "A Post-World War II 'Social Accord," in Nisscn, cel., U.S. Labor
Relations, 1945 1989: Accommodation anil Conflict (New York, L990) p. 173 - 208. For a
critical examination of the impact of corporate strategies on workers, unions, and
communities see Nisscn and Craypo, eds., Grand Designs: The Impact of Corporate
Strategies on Workers, Unions, anil Communities (New York, 1993). Mike Davis, Prisoners
of the American Dream: Politics ami V.conomy in the History oj the US Working Class
(New York, L986) p. 1 18.
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the creative uses of the grievance procedure, and the 1958 solidarity
stoppage, are rich, complex, and difficult to force into such a paradigm.
Certainly, lor a period after the war, a measure of wage improvement and
job security were offered to workers employed in large, oligopolistic mass
production corporations like General Motors and U.S. Steel. Above many
market forces, they could raise prices, pass along part of this gain to
workers, and still satisfy their shareholders. But this advantage was short-
lived for most companies, and the so-called Accord eluded most
Springfield metalworkers. 4
Job security was non-existent. The plant's wild employment swings
have already been discussed. Worker anger on this issue simmered over
in I960 when layoffs mounted and membership fell to close to 600, down
from 1,400 in mid- 1958. These deep cuts were caused by the relocation of
work to the Mississippi plant and the 1958 - 1959 recession's ^(\cci on
agricultural equipment producers and truck builders, two of Bosch's
largest markets. In 1960 unionists asked: "We are supposed to possess
some real brain-boys upstairs. How about getting a lew of these experts
together to formulate a plan so that we can have an even flow of
employment?"5 Unlike their brothers and sisters in auto, Local 206 failed
to gain income protection through a cost-of-living clause until late in the
1970s. This became a precipitating factor in three strikes in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. The local also never gained pay increases tied directly to
productivity gains.
4 SiH" Filippdli, "The Historical Context of Postwar Industrial Relations," in Nisson, U.S.
Labor Relation*, p. 137 - 172.
5 ill April, 1%0, p. 3.
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Two failed research and development efforts in the late 1950s,
growing foreign competition, and the relocation of work to Mississippi
meant that union bargainers rarely negotiated with employment and
work on the upswing. Consequently, management had little concern that
a walk-out would hurt their customers and used labor negotiations as a
way to try to control product costs at the expense of the workforce. During
the 1959 strike, for example, company negotiators maintained they had to
do everything possible to hold down product costs or run the risk of losing
significant market share. These were not idle negotiating threats: Less
than six months after the strike the plant went on a four-day week after
almost 70 percent of its diesel fuel injection business was captured by its
chief rival, Germany-based Robert Bosch. However, during this same
period of time workers were in fact arguing that they should be allowed to
participate in shop floor reorganization efforts so that their expertise could
be utilized to more efficiently make products and hold down final costs.
As has been seen, management turned a deaf ear to these overtures.6
The grievance procedure failed to adjudicate problems as intended.
Long delays in resolving disputes caused tensions to build in the plant and
on more than one occasion workers were warned by union officials not to
walk-out of the shop in protest. As shown in chapter six, workers
resorted to creative utilization of the grievance procedure to stage mini-
slowdowns when they believed rates or working conditions were
unsatisfactory and to confront particularly onerous foremen. By the late
1960s the dispute resolution aspect of the grievance procedure had
collapsed and the union argued "that use of the arbitration process is of no
value because there are so many violations it would be too costly and time
6 SMI, July 19, I960, p. 9.
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consuming, and furthermore, the company would not honor the
awards."7
The union now methodically used the grievance procedure to
thwart company reorganization efforts and slow down production. For
example, in 1966 management decided to monitor workers performing
set-ups with movie cameras so rates could then be established on
pieceworkers whenever they changed machines over from one job to
another. Workers who exclusively did set-ups protested, concerned that
this was a step toward establishing set-up rates throughout the plant. Set
up work was notoriously difficult to time as in many cases it required a
series of fine adjustments to bring tools into their proper settings to
achieve required production tolerances. Interested in increased
productivity, management wanted desperately to be able to determine
how many set-ups could be expected in a day in order to plan production
scheduling with greater accuracy. Since the contract required that
pieceworkers were taken off of incentive rates and paid their average
hourly rate of pay for time spent on set-ups, Stephen Jaross, the union
business agent, informed the company that the attempt to gather this
information was a contract violation.
A union memorandum summarizes what transpired next.
On May 27 the company approached an operator to start
taking studies, a pre-set arrangement made with the Business
Agent and the steward to have this operator called off the job
on union business and to meet with the business agent to
discuss the situation took place. At this point the company
was aware that as each operator was to be studied, the same
7 Local 206 files, Series III, Box 25. Comments were contained in a National Labor
Relations Board charge.
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procedure would be followed by the Union, and as
everything being done followed a pattern, the company
stopped all further taking of studies.8
The company never attempted to establish rates on set-ups again.
Can the union's application of the grievance procedure to block
management be viewed as workers winning a degree of job-control as
some labor historians would argue? Or is this more accurately assessed as
a defensive and desperate effort to hold on to some vestiges of self-respect
as Nelson I.ichtenstein and others contend? The machine operators and
set-up men who took collective action, and staved off the company's effort
to gain more control over the work day surely saw the victory as positive,
as did other workers, well aware of what was at staked
From the Bosch case study, it appears post-World War II labor
history is richer and more contentious at the shop floor level than some
labor historians have contended. Lacking forward-thinking theoretical
and strategic leadership at the national level on issues like runaway
shops, corporate investment strategies, in-plant production problems,
local leaders were left to their own devices. In plants like the Bosch -
where much of the work was still skilled and semi-skilled and
unregulated by automated assembly lines - vestiges of craft identification
and pride in workmanship remained strong. Workers believed they
i^ Local 206 Iftirr to /(//.' Legal Department, (Stephen Jaross to Attorney Mel Warshaw)
September 36/ 1966, Local 206 archives, Correspondence Series it, box 5.
l
' Local 200 letter to III!', Legal Department, Stephen Jaross to Attorney Mel Warshaw,
September 36, 1966, Local 2i)o archives, Correspondence Series H, box 5. For .1 discussion see
Lichtenstein, "UAW Bargaining and Shop-Floor Conflict."
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could make the plant run smoothly and asked to have their skill and
knowledge utilized. While Walter Reuther and the UAW and Philip
Murray and the USW shifted away from the ideas regarding industrial
councils they had espoused through the 1940s, this was not the case
everywhere. 10
The 1958 wildcat strike was one of the local's last concerted attempts
to let management know workers counted for something. The disastrous
negotiations of the previous year, the repeated failure to receive cost of
living language, and continued rejection of union calls for automation
and quality committees, culminated in an unprecedented, and illegal
eight-day walkout in support of another union in the plant. In effect,
unionists demonstrated they were needed if products were going to be
shipped on time to customers. However, the corporation was unmoved.
For the next ten years a plant that had just a two-day walkout since it was
organized in 1936, had three walkouts including lengthy ones in 1968 and
1971. Calls for cooperation to solve production-related problems all but
disappeared as the union tuned to securing the jobs of the plant's high
seniority workforce and exacting the greatest possible wage and benefit
gains. This set the union and company on a collision course since
management believed the way to be competitive in the global markets
they sought was to hold down U.S. labor costs and/or find places to
manufacture more cheaply.
1U For a discussion of many of these issues see David Brody, In Labor's Cause: Main Themes
on the History of the American Worker (1993) esp. chs. 5 and 6. In ch. 6, "Workplace
Contractualism" Brody writes: "What happens on the shop floor is not a secondary affair
in the lives of working people. On the contrary it engages their innermost sense of self-
worth and honor." The concern for production-related issues in the union newspaper is
certainly a manifestation of this.
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The high seniority workforce posed problems in this regard. By
1956 close to 30 percent of the workforce had over 25 years seniority; in
one department alone five men collectively had 180 years of total service.
In 1959 an in-plant party was held for 40 workers celebrating their 45th
year of service. For them, the Bulletin comment "Gone is the fraternal
spirit of teamwork and friendship that has always been associated with
management and labor" had deep resonance. The pension and vacation
demands the union began making for this group added significantly to the
wage differentials the company saw when comparing production costs in
Europe, Japan, Mississippi, and Springfield. However, the demands could
not be ignored since the group was a sizable, vocal, and unified segment of
the workforce at contract time. 11 One can only wonder what many of
these high seniority unionists must have been thinking when they sat
down at the union's 25th anniversary dinner and heard their long-time
nemesis William Tuttle, manager of labor relations for the entire
corporation, remark: "Local 206 exemplifies a situation where labor and
management working together have created a strong union and a strong
company." 12
1
1
In 1956 there were 378 members of the 25-year Club out of 1,200 working (LB, April, 1956,
p. 3). The quote is from LB, April, 1957, p. 1. See also Progress, January 23 and March 13,
1959. The company newsletter continually ran articles about long-service workers and their
importance to the success of the plant even as they disdained their input on the shop floor.
12 Progress, September, 1963, p. 1.
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The Corporation
Military Sales Lead the Way
A key to the Bosch plant's success in the 1960s was defense sales.
Profits and employment had fallen steadily from mid-1958 through 1961.
While corporate sales were up slightly, total profits fell to $1 million in
1960 on sales of $125.5 million. The up and down sales record was
indicative of economic shifts occurring in the post-World War II global
economy.
In The Deindustrialization of America economists Barry Bluestone
and Bennett Harrison point out that by the 1960s the percentage of total
world sales by US producers in several industries was flat
, and
concentrated in fewer firms. In electronic components, for example, the
sales of the four largest corporations jumped to 36 percent of the market
from 13 percent. According to Bluestone and Harrison this led to "the
control over capital location, and therefore jobs (being) wielded by a small
set of decision makers." 13 Even though its profits had fallen sharply,
with 1960 sales of $125.3 million and assets of $64.5 million, as an
international leader in the production of fuel injection systems, ARMA
could make capital location decisions. This left workers vulnerable to
plant relocations. At the same time, according to Jules Backman, an
expert on the industry, because there was such intense interunion and
intraunion rivalry in the electrical machinery industry, "more so than any
13 Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant
Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York,
1982) esp. ch. 5.
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other mass production industries in the nation," a coordinated labor
response to corporate relocations was highly unlikely. 14
Table 8.1: Sales and Profits 1955 - 1970. 15
Year Sales (millions) Profits (millii
1955 73.8 3.4
1956 86.7 3.2
1957 134.3 5.1
1958
—
4.1
1959 H9.9 3.5
I960 125.5 l.O
1961 133.6 2.0
1962 H9.6 2.9
1963 84.3 2.4
1966 H2.8 4.5
1967 H9.3 5.9
1968 151.0 6.3
1969 160.0 6.4
1970 155.9 1.6
Weak profits in I960 and 1961 alarmed stockholders, but in April,
1961 the first two of what would be millions of dollars of defense-related
orders reversed the downward slide. Bosch received a $2.5 million order
to build weapons control systems for the government's B-52 bomber
program and a $3 million order to produce fuel injection systems for 792
14 Jules Backman, The Economics of the Electrical Manufacturing Industry (New York, 1962)
p. 213, Appendix Table 2, p. 359.
15 Note: Data taken from local newspaper reports, issues of Progress, and the AMBAC
Industries Prospectus, for April 1971. Figures from 1950 forward are for the entire
corporation, not just the Springfield plant. It is difficult to disaggregate Springfield Bosch
figures.
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M-60 tanks currently under construction by Michigan-based Continental
Motors. 16
Bosch engineers were always concerned that the fuel injection
systems they developed were too costly for the automobile market, as had
been the case in the late 1950s. With defense orders increasing, a decision
was made to abandon the development of a gasoline fuel injection system
first experimented with in 1957, and focus product development on
military applications. The decision was momentous since independent
tests conducted by Dupont Corporation showed that even in the early
developmental stages the systems saved 14 percent in automobile fuel
consumption. 17
Even greater defense sales convinced corporate officers the decision
to focus on military markets was correct. The Studebaker-Packard
Corporation of South Bend, Indiana ordered 4,000 multi-fuel injection
systems for military trucks it was building. The multi-fuel pumps were a
unique engineering design that allowed the user to easily convert a
vehicle to run on any of three available fuels, regular gasoline, diesel fuel,
and kerosene. 18 This flexibility made the pump attractive to the military
in battle field situations. It was anticipated that close to 500 jobs would be
added by the end of 1961 to complete new orders. The final total was closer
to 350, however, because commercial business continued to slump badly,
16 SMU, April 27, 1961, p. 10.
17 SMU, November 26, 1961. This is an important example of how defense production and
manufacturing research were linked during the Cold War. Had Bosch engineers continued
to develop the new gasoline injection system in the early 1960s there is no way of
determining how much more viable the plant may have become once defense work abated.
For a discussion of Pentagon influence over manufacturing research and development see
David Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York,
1986) esp. chs. 2 and 3 and Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War
Economy (New York, 1992) esp. chs. 1 and 3.
18 SMU, June 24, 1961.
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especially in automotive and farm equipment.19 But by fall, 1963 greatly
expanded military orders resulted in union members climbing to 1,200, up
from under 750 in January, 1961. The Army now agreed to purchase the
fuel injection systems for all of its 5-ton trucks from Springfield with
delivers to begin in early 1964 and run through late 1965. This was
followed by a contract for fuel injection systems for 2.5 ton trucks that was
renewed again in early 1965. The total value of the contract was $9
million. A decision was made to invest $2 million in new equipment to
boost military production even further.
Business also improved when, for the first time in three years,
Bosch received a substantial order from General Motors for a fuel
injection pump for small truck engines. Export sales were growing as
well, reaching record highs in 1963 and accounting for six percent of
Springfield's total sales. Since 70 percent of the sales were to Latin
America and Canada, new distribution groups were started in Europe and
the Far East to stimulate sales there. All of these multi-year production
contracts helped management develop a coherent production schedule,
and in turn provided a greater degree of workforce growth and stability in
the plant than at any time since World War II.20
The Bosch defense connection was not unique. In fact, increased
military spending during the Korean and Vietnam Wars masked
significant structural changes in the Massachusetts economy, reflected in
sharp economic contraction and high unemployment at the conclusion of
19 SMU, March 7, 1961; March 15, 1962. Progress, April, 1962, p. 4.
20 SDN, October 31, 1963; Progress, May-June, 1964, p. 2; SMU, August 28, 1964. On exports
see SMU, March 24, 1964, p. 11. By the end of 1964 ARMA had a $24 million backlog in
defense work, over 60 percent of this in Springfield. However even with this defense gain
total sales and income dropped from 1963 to 1964 reflecting a continued and troubling
weakness in commercial sales.
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each conflict. Near the conclusion of the Vietnam War Massachusetts was
receiving over 10 percent of the nation's total prime defense contracts. By
the mid-1970s when this spending was cut, the state's unemployment rate
led the nation. Bosch workers were among the thousands in greater-
Springfield who lost their jobs as a result.21
Charles Perelle Steps Down
In the midst of the remarkable early 1960s turn-around Charles
Perelle stepped down after ten years as president and chief executive
officer of ARMA; he remained chairman of the board. Elected by the
Board of Directors to replace him was Charles Beck, president and chief
executive officer of Philco Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ford
Motor Company. It was hoped his knowledge of the automotive industry
would secure increased sales in that slumping but important market.
Perhaps the growing international competitive pressures had worn Perelle
down. Just months before his decision to step down, Perelle had
negotiated a manufacturing and sales agreement with Germany-based
Robert Bosch, to give a major competitor rights to manufacture a newly
designed diesel injection systems in its Stuttgart plant in return for sales
royalties. The deal was an admission that the US company was having
difficulties entering European markets. 22
21 For a discussion of Massachusetts and the impact of defense spending on industry see Jack
Tager, "The Massachusetts Miracle," Historical journal of Massachusetts, Vol. 19 (Summer,
1991)
,
esp. p. 122 - 128; Robert Forrant and Elyse Cann, The Demise of the Massachusetts
Defense Connection, (Springfield, 1993). Tager states that this defense link was well-
established by the end of World War II. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for
example, saw federally-sponsored research jump from slightly under $20,000 in 1939 to close
to $44 million in 1944 -1945 (Tager, p. 122). The Springfield unemployment rate in 1975 was
11.2 percent compared to a national average of 8.5 percent.
22 Progress, July-August, 1964, p. 1.
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In his first public reception, held at the Longmeadow Country Club,
Charles Beck declared "The American Bosch Division is very important
and so is Springfield as a community." His words may have been
comforting to union officials in attendance at the gathering
. Beck
informed those in attendance that the Springfield plant was now the
largest division in the corporation, surpassing the Arma Long Island
facility which just lost a major defense contract. He added that overall
corporate growth for the foreseeable future would come from three
sources: internal product development; further penetration of present
markets; and the acquisition of other companies. 23
Springfield Investments Pick-tip
In March, 1964, to back up his Springfield commitment, Beck
announced plans to invest in new engineering and product testing
equipment. At the same time three new machines, valued at $300,000,
arrived at the plant, two automated finish grinding machines and an
automatic indexing drill with 24 tool stations. In addition, a $500,000 order
was placed with the Keene, New Hampshire Kingsbury Corporation for
three multi-station machining centers, and a $60,000 order was placed with
the DeHoff Gun Drill Corporation in Cranston, Rhode Island for two
machines. The purchases provided a boost to the Northeast's slumping
machine tool industry.24
23 Progress, November-December, 1964, p. 1. SMU, November 13, December 17, 1964. Beck
had a Master of Science in Business Administration from Wayne State University and had
assumed a number of progressively responsible positions in the planning department at
Philco before becoming president.
24 SMU, March 28, 1964, p. 16; Progress, May-June, 1964, p. 4. In Progress a company
official indicated that machine tool purchases would be made from New England
companies whenever possible.
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On the negative side, with defense work keeping the plant busy, a
decision was made to subcontract the production of a small fuel injection
pump used on farm equipment to the New Jersey-based Singer Sewing
Machine Corporation. Singer had no prior experience machining close
tolerance parts and assembling diesel pumps. Soon after the deal
completed the union complained that rejects from Singer shipment
as high as 60 percent and that defective pumps were being shipped to
customers. 25
Early in 1965 a $2 million investment was announced by Robert
Scott, vice-president for commercial operations. While past machine tool
purchases had been mainly for defense work, these acquisitions were for
commercial production. Scott was attempting to boost flagging truck and
farm equipment sales in the eventuality of a defense spending cut.
Acquisition of the equipment was hampered by delivery delays of up to 40
weeks for many machines, setting back the company's aggressive effort to
gain a larger market share. 26
In March, 1965 ground was broken across the street from the main
production facility for a $2.6 million research center. This was the first
plant construction at Bosch since World War II, and solidified Bosch as the
largest of the corporation's four manufacturing divisions. Scheduled to be
fully operational in 1966, the new facility would hire 72 new engineers and
technicians. The center was needed if Beck was to succeed with his plan to
10 LB, November, 1964, p. 2; February, 1965, p. 2. Since the end of World War II one of
Bosch's chief marketing slogans was 'The world knows it can depend on premium
performance from any product that bears the name American Bosch.' Workers worried that
this was no longer the case. The slogan was first used on the cover of the May, 1948 issue of
The Craftsman.
26 SMU, January 28, p. 16, May 14, 1965, p. 12.
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boost engineering and product development capabilities by 40 percent over
the next two years. 27
In a May, 1965 public relations effort Beck released figures on
Bosch's role in the regional economy. Ninety percent of the company's
total workforce of 2,101 lived within a 30 minute drive of the plant. Along
with a $14 million payroll, an additional $4 million was spent locally on
services and supplies. Two million dollars had also been spent purchasing
new machine tools from New England firms. 28
Engineering center construction was followed a year later by a
decision to build a $2 million assembly building to house all fuel injection
assembly work along with packaging, shipping, and receiving. Plans
included an automated monorail to move all parts from the production
facility to the new area, and a temperature-controlled assembly room for
extremely close tolerance hand-fitting of special products. The expansion
created 30 percent more production space in the old building, as well,
when assembly equipment and personnel were relocated. Company
spokespersons stated the expansion would provide adequate
manufacturing space through the early 1970s, and that 700 additional
workers would be hired by 1970, bringing total employment to 3,000,
compared to 1,400 in 1961. Optimism soared further when sales increased
39 percent for the first half of 1967.29
z/ SMU, March 2, March 23, 1965. The total corporate investment in the city now reached
$13 million since 1956. Progress, March, 1965, p. 1.
28 SMU, May 4, 1965, p. 1. Firms that received the largest dollar amount of work included
the long-established area metalworking companies Hampden Brass and Aluminum, Moore
Drop Forging, Agawam Tool and Die, and Production Tool and Die.
29 Progress, February-March, 1966, p. 2; SMU, March 1, 2, 1966, July 28, 1967.
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Corporate Expansion: Foreign Vpntures Lead the Way
At the end of 1959, it will be recalled, Perelle had commissioned a
study to determine the feasibility of buying components abroad for
assembly into fuel injection pumps in Springfield. Final assembly and
pump calibration required a great deal of skill and knowledge of the
product, something not easily reproducible at a lower labor cost elsewhere.
A decision was made to continue local production, preserving the jobs of
several hundred workers. But, at the same time, Perelle completed a joint
venture in 1960 with the British conglomerate DeHaviland Holdings, Ltd.,
to increase production capabilities and establish a presence in important
European markets. DeHavilland had recently acquired S.G. Brown, Ltd.,
England's leading manufacturer of precision navigation instruments, had
close financial ties to the Hawker Sidney Group, a major industrial
organization with interests in aircraft engines, missiles, diesel engines,
and automotive products. While Perelle hoped to make the Bosch diesel
business successful, he was trying to position ARMA Corporation to enter
European markets. If this failed he was willing to sell Bosch's diesel know-
how to other corporations. Merger talks were also undertaken with
Illinois-based Standard Kollsman, a manufacturer of electronic
communication equipment, and Lionel Corporation, the maker of toy
trains, which had just entered the guided missile market and was seeking
partners. Neither discussion yielded much, but did demonstrate the
corporation's aggressive expansion effort.30
Charles Beck continued Perelle's acquisitions strategy. In 1965
Bacharach Instruments was purchased for $8.5 million and in 1967 Packard
30 SMU, June 11, I960, p. 14; March 27, 1962, p. 17.
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Instruments for $12 million. Packard and Bacharach were major
producers of a variety of measuring and testing instruments for medical
and radiation research. Also in 1967 Hispano Suiza, a Dutch company,
and Steelweld, Ltd., a British firm, were acquired. Each was a leading
producer of factory automation equipment. In 1968, Pace Industries, a
Tennessee defense manufacturer, and Michigan Dynamics, a producer of
scientific and medical instruments were acquired.
At the time of the European acquisitions Beck commented on
growing world-wide competition: "Our job is going to become
increasingly more challenging and we are developing a master plan to
meet that challenge." For Beck the challenge was "the skilled wage
differential between the Springfield plant and those in Europe - an average
of $1.52 an hour in England, Holland, and Germany as against $4.45 here,
including fringe benefits." He added that "competitive market conditions
will determine the future of any facility in Bosch's corporate structure."
He pointed out that Bosch's chief competitor Robert Bosch had average
labor costs of approximately the same $1.52. To succeed against this
competition, especially because in Beck's estimation Europe and Japan
were closing the technology gap, "labor must maintain the highest degree
of productivity," and this meant for Beck "automation to the nth degree."
Beck also noted that the greatest growth potential for the corporation was
in electronics, thus the Packard and Bacharach acquisitions. The union
should have been concerned: There was no electronics production in
Springfield.31
31 SMU, March 23, April 8, 1967. For wage comparisons between England, West Germany,
Italy
,
japan
,
and the U.S. see Backman, The Electrical Industry, p. 291 and Appendix table
31, p 363. Backman determined that the gap between U.S. electrical industry hourly wages
and those in the other countries studied widened between 1950 and 1958. For example, the
differential between West German and U.S. hourly wages, was $1.15 in 1950 and $1.56 on
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Beck's efforts in Europe were part of a dramatic expansion of U.S.
corporate foreign spending between 1965 and 1980. According to
economists Harrison and Bluestone total direct investment abroad in
factories, office buildings, machine tools, and office equipment was less
than $50 billion in 1965
,
reached $124 billion in 1975 and surpassed $213
billion in 1980. They note that profits from these investments "grew even
faster, from $5.2 billion in 1965 to more that $424 billion in 1980.. ."32
In-plant Strategies: Workers Still Excluded
To insure new orders at competitive prices, shop floor
reorganization efforts proceeded, building on efforts undertaken in the
late 1950s. Two critical aspects of the plan were the installation of an
International Business Machines (IBM) data collection system and the
implementation of a value analysis engineering program. The entire IBM
unit, complete with 25 data entry stations interspersed throughout the
factory was capable of doing the payroll and performing inventory and
production analyses.
Management estimated that there were 130,000 separate machining
operations to monitor, as various components moved through the plant
to final assembly. According to a company press release, the computer
system "reduces by at least 48 hours the time lag between completing and
reporting a manufacturing operation." The location of computer stations
in each manufacturing department also meant that production employees
1958; between England and the U.S., $1.15 in 1950 and $1.19 in 1958. With the final
machining and assembly of fuel injection pumps still very labor intensive, labor savings
gained by shifting production out of Springfield were significant.
32 Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and
the Polarizing of America (New York, 1988) p. 26.
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would walk 15,000 fewer miles a year. In addition the system was capable
of tracking operating time on various machines so that the maintenance
department could better schedule preventive maintenance to avoid
lengthy equipment breakdowns. With close to 1,600 machine tools in the
factory this was quite important, especially to insure minimal work flow
disruptions. The data could also be used, the union feared, to monitor
individual workers in an attempt to speed them up and cut rates.33
The IBM system provided the capability, for the first time, to "deal
efficiently with the flow of work as it progresses through the various
operations." At the same time an attempt was made to reorganize the
factory "along the concept of product line assembly" so that systematic
layouts were established for the complete assembly cycle of one product.
However, the problem persisted that the machining of the thousands of
highly specialized components was not done by product line, but by
machining function. In other words, parts to be ground went to a general
grinding machine area and parts to be milled went to the milling area in
the plant. But, even with the sophisticated IBM system, parts-in-progress
still traveled a crazy-quilt pattern back and forth the length of the
sprawling manufacturing building as they went from one process-
oriented department to another. Just three years after installation, the
system was totally upgraded for an additional $1.3 million based on
anticipated sales growth for the plant. In the end, rather than make the
M The number of machines was contained in Progress, September-October, 1964. p. 2;
Progress, April-May, 1966, p. 2. Mike Davis argues that the introduction of technologies
like the IBM system were part of U.S. managements' effort to break the power of shop
stewards through the control of vast amounts of information on production and that this
amounted to significant speed-up and a diminution of union shop-floor power (Davis, p.
122).
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plant more productive, the expensive computer system simply allowed
management to more effectively track this work flow anarchy .34
The value analysis program consisted of a careful study of every
part produced in the plant to determine cheaper and easier ways to
produce it. Two examples clarify the program. Operating levers on one
series of pumps had always been machined using steel stock. After
review, it was determined the levers could be produced using a stamping
operation and cheaper material. This resulted in a 66 percent labor cost
savings on the levers. Spring guides on injection pumps had always been
turned in a very time consuming series of machining operations out of
bar stock. Value analysis determined the springs could be made out of
molded plastic at 33 percent of the original labor and material costs. With
over 250 components in a typical fuel injection system, and close to 200
different systems built, savings possibilities were significant. In 1964 the
company claimed it was generating $200,000 annually in savings.35
At the end of the decade it appeared that the investments were
paying- off: Record sales and profits were now recorded. Total sales
reached almost $170 million by 1970. The Springfield plant was now the
single largest supplier of fuel injection assemblies to Mack Truck and the
General Motors Truck and Coach Division.36
J4 SMU, December 10, 1963, p. 17. The saved time translated to a gain of almost 4,000
additional production hours in the plant. The system had another, more subtle advantage.
Stations in each department helped foremen reduce the numbers of workers walking the
aisles to report their work and get coffee, gossip about sports, discuss union politics, and
complain about the company.
3^ SMU, February 14, 1964, p. 11. The head of engineering told the local newspapers
"every material, design feature and manufacturing operation will be analyzed to determine
if parts are over-designed for their intended purpose."
36 On Mack Truck and General Motors, SDN, May 9, 1966, p. 21
.
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It is likely that workers viewed these developments favorably and
assumed their employment was secure. However, closer scrutiny would
have revealed the investments were mainly in the engineering and
product design area. Once developed, new products could be
manufactured in a number of the corporation's production facilities.
Workers would have noticed, as well, that the overwhelming number of
machine tools in the three football field-long factory were not upgraded.
The purchase of 25 to 30 technically sophisticated machines was dramatic,
but hardly sufficient, when there were 1,600 machines in the plant.
Islands of efficiency in a sea of production confusion were no match for
the new plants being built elsewhere by the corporation.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the rapid expansion of
production capacity should have greatly troubled union leaders. The
major source of employment growth in the 1960s was defense orders:
What would fill the void created when weapons procurement wound
down?37
A Long. Hard Struggle: Local 206 in the 1960s
Background
In the 1950s and early 1960s organized labor in the United States
enjoyed its greatest gains. Higher productivity and profits in large
corporations in auto and steel led to higher wages, shorter work weeks,
and an increased standard of living for workers fortunate enough to be
employed in such sectors. And as has been seen already, spending by the
37 SMU, March 5, 1968; February 7, 1969; SDN, May 9, 1966, p. 21.
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military-industrial complex meant that unions in aerospace, electronics,
steel, and weapons production were able to win wage and benefit
improvements for their members. Historian Patrick Renshaw noted in
American Labour and Consensus Capitalism that "At the start of the 1960s
American labour appeared to be in a powerful position. After eight years
of Eisenhower the Democrats won the White House." Defense spending
accelerated and unemployment dropped as the Vietnam War escalated.
But by decade's end labor's position had been eroded. Automation was
reducing the need for workers in several basic industries. Renshaw cites
GM president Harlow Curtice's remark to the UAW's Walter Reuther
while touring a highly automated car plant: "Walter, in the future the
UAW will not be able to call the machines out on strike." Relocation
strategies and foreign investments had curtailed production. Union
membership in basic industry began to drop. On U.S. factory floors, as
Harvey Swados in "The Myth of the Happy Worker," and Eli Chinoy in
Automobile Workers and the American Dream pointed out in the 1950s,
workers were increasingly alienated from their work.38
1962 - 1968: Things Are Good For a While. But Quickly Go Bad
The 1962 contract was ratified without controversy, attributable in
large measure to the steady growth in defense work. The company did not
want to risk a walk-out that might cause defense prime contractors to
question the reliability of the plant and jeopardize the cost-plus contracts
38 Patrick Renshaw, American Labour and Consensus Capitalism, 1935 - 1990 (Jackson,
1991) p. 152, p. 170. On the 1960s see James R. Green, The World of the Worker: Labor in
Twentieth Century America (New York, 1980) esp. ch. 7. Green points out that by 1970
skilled workers had decreased as a proportion of the working class, while between 1950 and
1970 the number of service workers doubled to 9.0 million from 4.5 million (p. 226 - 227).
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the plant now had. Union negotiators were well aware of the leverage
they had. Bolstered by the rank and file's authorization to call a strike, the
committee achieved significant wage and benefit improvements for the
first time in ten years.39
The cost-plus arrangement meant that Bosch passed on to its prime
contractors all production costs that acceded initially agreed upon
estimates. For example, if a single pump was priced at $475 and Bosch
claimed the pump ultimately cost $560 to manufacture, the prime
contractor paid this amount and in turn charged the government because
the overall cost of the truck increased accordingly. In Dismantling the
Cold War Economy, economist Ann Markusen cites a study that found for
twelve large defense projects in the 1950s and early 1960s final costs were
on average 320 percent of original estimates. According to Markusen
defense contractors benefited as well because they were often the sole
source for the weapons system or components being produced. This was
in fact the case with the Bosch multi-fuel pumps. Finally, Markusen
states, government demand was relatively "inelastic." It was quite
unlikely, Markusen contends, for the government "to cancel orders or buy
fewer weapons if unit costs escalate. Oligopolistic companies dealing with
a client with relatively inelastic demand can raise prices considerably
above costs without losing business." Unionists now took advantage of
this and obtained long sought wage increases as sales climbed in the Diesel
Division to $48.1 million in 1968 from $27.7 million in 1964.40
39 LB, June, 1962, p. 1.
40 Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy (New York, 1992) p.
94. The authors cite studies that conclude that costs in the absence of competition were
usually 25 percent higher. Sales figures in AMBAC 1971 Annual Report.
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While the corporation continued its parallel strategies of investing
locally and securing production partners abroad, in-plant relations did not
improve even though wages increased. Union officers challenged
management to improve its relations with the local. Why risk a multi-
million dollar investment, they asked, by turning shop floor workers
against you? The ARMA Long Island plant dropped to under 1,000
workers in 1965, from 4,800 two years earlier. Even though Springfield
employment was still up, the rapid growth of the early 1960s ceased.
Workers now wondered, and with good reason, what might happen if
defense orders were cut, when a 1965 contraction of military work resulted
in 125 workers losing their jobs. This was followed by a lay-off of 500 in
1966. The union complained that subcontracting to local machine shops
added to these reductions. The union was also angry over the suspensions
of six workers from department 300 for refusing to work overtime while
the layoffs were in progress. Two of the six were active unionists, and
officers indicated in the Bulletin that a full-scale walk out almost followed
news of the suspensions.41
By mid-1964 management expressed its unhappiness with the
union newspaper's repeated attacks on company policies and supervision.
The paper carried a front page article explaining that management had
met with union officers and asked them to tone down the paper's rhetoric.
Union president Al LeBeau seized the opportunity to once again criticize
management for not living up to the contract. He blamed a decision to
subcontract large amounts of work from departments, 110, 120, 160, and
300 for large numbers of layoffs and charged that the company's recent
elimination of floor inspectors led to an increased scrap rate.
41 LB, May, 1964, p. 3.
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Finally, he turned the tables on management and compared Bosch
supervisory staffing patterns to those in foreign companies. While it is
true that management needs to find ways to cut costs in order to compete
and stay in business, LeBeau suggested there was:
... another way to compete with foreign competition, let's
bring the level of "Top Management" down to what most
foreign companies have, not a heavy overloaded drain on
the profits of the company with high salaries but competitive
in the same sense as the average worker is informed he must
be. Seventeen high level management personnel drew
salaries and remuneration totaling $837, 171 as per last year's
annual report to the stockholders.42
He concluded by warning unionists, "This is only the beginning of a long
hard struggle in which everyone must do his or her part in order to
survive the viciousness of management in protecting our jobs and
security."43 By the end of the summer the union escalated their rhetoric.
"Remember one thing management," a front page editorial read, "we are
people of what you consider the lower class, but we are still the people that
make all those fantastic profits for the stockholders."44
However, in 1965 the rank and file set aside their anger and voted
671 - 310 against the strike recommendation of their negotiating
committee and executive board, accepting a three-year contract with a 26
cents an hour wage increase. The contract contained long sought benefits,
including upward wage adjustments for the skilled trades, early
42 LB, June, 1964, p. 1. LeBeau added, "You cannot keep giving your customers excuses for no
delivery of parts or bad parts without eventually losing them."
43 LB, June, 1964, p. 1. There is no actual proof, but it seems likely that the refusal to work
overtime was at least in part a protest against subcontracting.
44 LB, September, 1964, p. 1.
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retirement language allowing a worker 55 or older with at least 10 years in
the plant to retire without any reduction in pension benefits, and an
additional fifth week of vacation for those with 30 years or more service.
The wide margin of acceptance was a rebuke to union leaders, especially
business agent and negotiating committee chairman Jim Manning.
Manning was defeated for business agent after the 1959 strike but returned
to office in 1962. However, soon after this he decided not to run for
another term. The easy ratification indicates that management correctly
determined what was important to a majority of workers. The raises, ten
cents in the first year, were not high. However, the high seniority
workforce received improved pension language and extra vacation time,
while the skilled trades, still a substantial group, received raises above the
gains others made.45
Large layoffs in 1966 disrupted the momentary calm. A poem in the
Bulletin, entitled "My Boss" summarized the changed mood.
He's my boss, tho' he looks down
As if I crawled out of the ground
When I make a little mistake
He jumps on me, there is no break.
Why can't he learn I'm not a machine.
I have faults, if you know what I mean
Even an automatic breaks down,
I'm not the one wearing a frown.
45 SMU, August 21, 1965, p. 1. The pension gains were no small matter. Before the new
language was added high seniority workers could lose three percent from their monthly
pension check for every year they retired before age 65. For example under the old contract,
a worker with 40 years service who retired at age 65 would receive $10 multiplied by each
year of service for a $400 a month pension check. If the same worker decided to retire at age
62 he would now receive 37 years times the $10 for $370 but be penalized 9 percent for
retiring three years before age 65. His check would be approximately $337. Under the new
language he would be able to retire early and get a monthly check of $370, a significant
difference, and one that made early retirement more attractive to many.
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We are people, human beings,
Do you know just what that means.
Children, problems, bills and such
Things that get us into dutch
We are working hard and true
Why do they just make us blue?46
The 1968 Strike
The five week 1968 strike and fifteen week 1971 strike were turning
points in the history of the plant. In 1968, for the first time, police used
their night sticks on picketing workers and forcefully escorted supervisory
personnel through picket lines in an effort to keep production going. The
company made direct appeals to the rank and file to break with their
leaders. Letters were also sent to strikers homes warning them that pay
increases were impossible, and that the plant might have to close. These
strikes marked a watershed for labor solidarity in the region as well.
Events leading up 1968 negotiations made a strike all but a
certainty. Throughout the year the company's appeals for wage relief from
foreign competitors were met with derision, as was management's
argument that Bosch wages were higher than those in surrounding
factories. Workers were well aware of the large investments being made
in Springfield and elsewhere because the company newspaper profiled
them. Union negotiators believed money was available and had been
saying so for several months. In union elections a new business agent,
Steve Jaross, was elected 318 - 300 over longtime officer Ralph Chicketti.
Jaross claimed during his campaign that if elected he would achieve a
46 LB, June, 1966, p. 3.
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contract settlement that included wage improvements. For the first time
ever, representatives from seven Bosch unionized plants met together to
compare contracts and negotiating experiences.
The union now reacted negatively to each company effort to
improve quality, arguing that as long as rates were cut and foremen were
attempting to speed up workers quality work was out of the question.
"You keep cutting the rates until a machine operator has to beat his
shadow to make a buck," one Bulletin article charged. "Some jobs have
thirty gages on them yet your time study men never time the checking."
A second article challenged management and issued a warning: "You're
wheeling and dealing and cutting and down right cheapness is going to
make your industrial grave."47
The showdown came when the company failed to offer a wage
package until one hour before the midnight April 15 contract expiration.48
The union wanted a cost of living clause, extra wage increases for the
skilled trades, and additional vacation time for workers with 10-20 years in
the shop. Union leaders did not anticipate a quick settlement and started
to organize collections at area factories to bolster their strike fund and rally
union members. Surviving records of the strike contained a listing of the
19 plants visited. In one week $12,330 was dropped in collection cans.
The money was used to run a soup kitchen for picketers in the basement
of the union hall.49
47 LB, November, 1967, p. 3.
48 LB, August, 1967, p. 1. Two of the plants were in Perm., 3 in N.Y., 1 in Miss., and 1 in Ma.
SMU, April 15, 1968, p. 1. The unionized engineers refused to cross Local 206 picket lines just
as the IUE had not crossed their strike lines ten years earlier.
49 1968 Plant Gate Collection List, Local 206 archives, Series III, Box 8, ff 83. Plant gate
collections have historically been a way for union locals to gain some financial support and
help publicize their strike issues. One effect of such collections was to build a sense of a
labor movement in a region. When walking the picket line it was nice to know you were not
alone. This sense of solidarity is a casualty of the spate of metalworking closings that is
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For 24 days the plant was shut tight. Then supervisory and other
non-striking personnel were ushered across picket lines by police to
resume production in an effort to complete and ship orders. No
negotiations had been held since the strike began and the company
continued to claim that its financial offer of 50 cents over three years was
"fair and equitable, while allowing the company to price products
competitively. "50 Management attempted an end-run around the union's
leadership with a letter to every striker. In it they claimed they had been
very fair with their offer. The original wage and benefit proposal of 44
cents over three years had now been increased to 50 cents. "Why/' the
letter asked, "have your union leaders not allowed you to vote on our
offer?" E.F. Shannon, Bosch vice-president, concluded the letter by asking
workers to "urge the union committee to call a membership meeting so
you can express your opinion of our final offer."
The union response was swift and took the form of a leaflet
distributed at all plant gates. Shannon was castigated for attempting to
divide households with the letter, and for being incompetent. Top
corporate officials seem to have concurred, for on May 10, almost a month
into the strike, Shannon was sent on a trip to Europe. Charles Beck met
on May 16 with the union's executive board, steward's council and
negotiating committee, and four days later the strike was over. The final
package, valued at 56 cents an hour, was 12 cents above the company's
original offer. Once again skilled workers, including all electricians,
not often considered when historians and economists discuss the decline of manufacturing in
a region. For example, of the 19 plants on the Local 206 collection list 13 are now closed.
50 SDN, May 15, 1968, p. 1; SMU, April 25, 1968.
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mechanics, tool and die makers, and experimental machinists received
additional increases averaging 20 cents an hour over three years.51
The 1971 Fifteen Wepk StrikP
Diesel No Longer Number One. Information contained in the 1971
corporate Prospectus and the AMBAC Annual Report provide a context
for the April 1971 contract negotiations. The Prospectus described two new
production facilities under construction in Italy and the Netherlands. The
$4 million Brescia, Italy plant, 80 percent AMBAC-owned, was a 65,000
square foot facility set up to build diesel fuel injection systems and
components ostensibly for the European market. However, the first
pumps actually produced in the plant were for U.S. agricultural
equipment maker International Harvester. The development and all
prototype machining for the new pump had occurred in Springfield. The
$3 million Breda, Netherlands factory was a wholly owned subsidiary of
AMBAC constructed in 1967 and twice the size of the Italian plant. It, too,
built pumps mainly for International Harvester during its first year of
operation.52
By 1970 the corporation had six divisions: diesel and fluid power,
electrical products, scientific and medical instruments, aerospace,
industrial products, and ordnance. With a continued over-reliance on
defense contracts - in 1970 the corporation still amassed 35 percent of its
total sales from the U.S. government - every division felt the affects of the
51 1968 Strike Letter, and Local 206 Response, Local 206 archives Series III, Company-
Union Relations, Box 8, ff 82; SMU, May 20, 1968, p. 1; LB, lune, 1968. The union article
dubbed the Beck discussions "the family meeting."
52 AMBAC, 2972 Annual Report; AMBAC Industries, Securities and Exchange Commission
Prospectus, April, 1971.
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decline in Vietnam War spending. Sales slumped slightly between 1969
and 1970, falling to $155 million from $160 million. But net income
plummeted to $1.6 million in 1970 from $6.4 million a year earlier.
Remarkably the $1.6 million was only slightly better than figures at the
start of the decade, before the reorganization and investment programs
were implemented. Diesel sales fell to $30 million in 1971 from $48
million in 1968 (Table 8.2). Aerospace dropped to $15 million from $25
million. Only two divisions had strong sales gains between 1968 and 1971.
Scientific and medical instruments climbed to $36.6 million from $22.6
million while electronics went up to $26 million from $20 million.
Table 8.2: AMBAC Net Sales in millions by Division 1964 - 1971.
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Diesel Systems 27.7 33.9 40.6 43.6 48.1 47.9 34.0 30.0
Electrical Products 13.4 14.9 17.4 16.4 19.9 21.6 21.7 26.0
Scien/Med. Inst. 11.6 13.7 18.1 22.5 22.6 26.4 32.3 36.6
Aerospace 31.2 25.4 32.0 28.5 25.6 20.7 20.5 14.8
Industrial Products 3.6 3.8 4.7 8.2 12.3 12.2 16.9 10.6
Ordnance 22.5 31.2 30.4 16.8
For 1971, the Annual Report pointed out, "27 percent of total sales and 40
percent of total profits came from scientific, medical, environmental, and
industrial instruments, products all acquired or developed in the last five
years."53
53 AMBAC 1971 Annual Report, p. 3. The corporation's name was changed to AMBAC
Industries by a vote of the stockholders in 1968 to reflect the expansion, acquisition and
added divisions of the company. Divisions were now headquartered in eight U.S. and
three European cities. In the early 1950s there were just two divisions, one in Springfield,
and the other in New York.
257
Between 1966 and 1968 diesel sales had far outdistanced any other
division: This was no longer the case. After tremendous growth through
acquisitions and joint ventures, and the investment of millions of dollars
in machine tools and plant modernization efforts, management was
unhappy with the corporate bottom line, and the diesel slump focused
attention on Springfield, especially with contract negotiations pending.54
The wage differential issue promised to again be a key stumbling block in
the 1971 contract talks. The corporation was making a large investment in
new plants and outfitting them with the most modern production
equipment. While the facilities were built for specific product lines there
was no reason why other components could not be manufactured in
them. With several years of production experience in Europe, and an
established joint venture with world-class diesel manufacturer Robert
Bosch, technical expertise was available. In the past, Springfield's skilled
workforce had been hard to duplicate. This may have been the reason
why Charles Perelle decided to remain in the city in 1960 when sales
slumped like they were in the late 1960s. But technology and joint
production ventures were quickly rendering the one critical bargaining
edge Local 206 members had moot.55
Issues of Concern. Between the 1968 and 1971 negotiations the blue
collar workforce dropped by almost 450. When the slide began, union
leaders offered what they felt was constructive criticism in an attempt to
improve shop floor conditions. Business Agent Steve Jaross used his
54 Figures contained in AMBAC Industries, Securities and Exchange Commission
Prospectus, April 20, 1971, p. 3. Division sales figures in AMBAC 1971 Annual Report, p. 1.
Charles Beck's comments upon succeeding Perelle as president that the corporation's future
was in electronics were born out by these figures.
55 AMBAC Industries, Securities and Exchange Commission Prospectus, April 20, 1971, p. 8
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monthly column in the Bulletin to discuss the company's abortive effort
to relocate the toolroom and make the case once again for worker
involvement in production decisions. The company, according to Jaross,
decided to move the tool room from the third floor to the main
production area. However the choice of a new location was disastrous.
"Now does it make any sense," Jaross wrote:
to take a department such as the toolroom, where all the
tools, fixtures, and gages to be used throughout the plant are
to be manufactured at close tolerances.... and place it in an
area just recently vacated by a cast iron manufacturing
department with the added inconveniences of poor lighting,
uneven flooring for machines which must hold close
tolerances, and dust from the nearby manufacturing
departments which settles on plates and size blocks used in
the daily performance of these tool room employees and
makes their work of CLOSE tolerance almost guess work.
There are some tool room grinders, whose skill in
determining the precise amount to be ground from a tool,
fixture, or gage is judged by the sound of their grinding wheel
and this can no longer be done.
Had workers in the tool room been consulted, Jaross concluded, they
would have known the location was incorrect and saved the company a
great deal of time, the expense of the move, and the subsequent derision
from workers.56
Nine months later, in an essay titled "The Lost Horizon" union
president Al LeBeau urged the company to utilize the grievance procedure
to settle cases quickly and fairly, and requested regular meetings with top
56 LB, February, 1968, p. 1.
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management through the re-establishment of the management - labor
problem-solving committee. The company failed to respond to the
request, nor did it comment on the union's analysis of what it termed the
five critical problems on the shop floor. The five were: the consistent
failure to repair defective equipment, resulting in excessive lost
production time and scheduling problems; a lack of proper tooling when
needed to complete set-ups and keep production jobs running; incomplete
data on job processing sheets and work orders leading to inventory and
planning problems; the generally dirty conditions in the plant; and poor
work flow and production bottlenecks, resulting in lack of work for some
departments and excessive overtime for others.
The same issue featured a cartoon entitled 'Chain of Command'.
From left to right in the cartoon stood first the stockholder, fist full of
money in one hand and the other hand out looking for more, smoking a
big cigar. Next to him was the plant manager, with formulas swirling
around in his head, eyes crossed, and a vacant stare on his face. Then
came four foremen, called the pinheads. Last in line was a machine
operator with a chain fastening him to his drill press.57
Rather than deal with the substantive issues LeBeau raised, Beck
now met with union officers to discuss the future of Springfield. He
reassured everyone that the European plants were only going to produce
for foreign sales. However, the stock prospectus and annual reports
contradicted this. Beck added that should it become necessary to move
production from Springfield, it would be replaced. Having heard such
assurances in 1953 when plans to build a plant in Mississippi were
57 LB, February, 1968, p. 3.
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announced, the meeting with Beck left union leaders with
feeling.58
The Strike. Even before the contract expired union and company
negotiators were making appeals to the rank and file of Local 206. In an
April 13 leaflet the union blasted the company's effort to change the piece
work system as outright theft from workers. The company wanted to
introduce a new system that would apply pre-determined times to all
operations and movements in the plant. Every job could be given a time
using such a system including those that up until now had no rates, like
set-ups, basic machine repair, the building of a tool or fixture, and the
movement of stock and parts from one department to another. First using
cameras to establish base line times, management proposed to bring in an
outside consulting firm to go through the entire plant and re-rate every
job. The union leaflet charged the company wanted to "roll us back to the
1930s working condition era," when workers had no say over rates or
rights to argue how they were set.59
Management responded with a letter from the vice-president of
operations Ralph Hershfelt. The goal was to insure that the competitive
position of the company deteriorated no further. Production changes were
essential, Hershfelt told Local 206. He reminded them that since 1969 over
1,000 Springfield employees had lost their jobs, and wrote that the
company needed "improved control over the organization of work,
streamlined grievance handling, and an up-to-date incentive plan which
58 LB, October, 1969, p. 1; March, 1969, p. 1. It should be noted that the five points the
union articulated read like a management text book for the 1990s in the area of shop floor
reorganization. On the Beck meeting, LB, June, 1969, p. 1.
59 Union 1971 contract leaflet, April 13, 1971, Local 206 archives, Series III, Box 8, ff 90.
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will make possible increased productivity and reduce unit costs." His
letter concluded:
We are in a difficult competitive position. We have been
diligently reducing costs for more than a year. The Union
must face the necessity for changes in the Agreement to
enable to Company to maintain its competitive position and
thus continue to provide and expand employment in
Springfield.60
The strike began on April 22 and the war of words escalated.
Hershfelt was particularly upset that the union never responded to the
company proposal with a counter proposal. But the union did not want
the company's incentive plan, and in their mind there was no reason to
offer any counter to it: They wanted to maintain the status quo. The
company took the initiative by offering a revised proposal. But through
May the union held firm and refused to comment at all on the pre-
determined time study proposal other than to reject it. Hershfelt tried
during the strike's ninth week to get rank-and-file workers to pressure the
negotiating committee. He informed union members that European
production would not take jobs from Springfield, but that the chief source
of Bosch growth, military work, was going to shrink by close to 80 percent
in the next two years. "It is our responsibility," he said,
to plan a course of action for American Bosch that can insure
the survival of the Division. At this time the improved
technology and capabilities of European manufacturers, their
advanced engineering, low import duties and the low cost of
transportation bring new competition and new pressure to
60 Company letter to workers, April 16, 1971, Local 206 archives, Series III, Box 8, ff 86.
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bear with our efforts to maintain a volume of business in the
heavy-duty truck manufacturing industry of this country.6l
Hershfelt then turned his attention to the piece-rate system itself,
labeling it inaccurate, unfair, and impractical. "Some employees with less
than a reasonable effort," he charged, "can attain higher than average
earnings, and many employees have a limited earning opportunity in
spite of their very best effort." Hershfelt concluded that the introduction
of the new system would allow methods to be improved and costs
controlled so that "we could earmark a reasonable amount for wage and
pension increases in the years to come."62
For added emphasis he reminded workers of the many Springfield
plants that already closed, including Sickles Electric, Wickwire and
Spencer, the Springfield General Electric plant, Perkins Gear and Machine.
"Some of these are substantial firms," Hershfelt wrote, "national in scope,
and not really affected by a temporary set-back or recession. They left
Springfield because of a limited future considering manufacturing costs in
this area."63
Workers were not persuaded by the company letters. Finally after
15 weeks a settlement was reached on July 24, which included a 75 cents an
hour improvement in wages and fringes over three years. This was a
significant increase from the company's early June proposal of 41 cents an
hour that had been contingent on union acceptance of the pre-determined
time system, because in a bitter defeat for the corporation they failed to
obtain the new incentive program. The stop watch system remained in
61 Hershfelt to Employees, June 8, 1971, Local 206 archives, Series III, Box 8, ff 86.
62 Hershfelt to Employees, June 8, 1971, Local 206 archives, Series III, Box 8, ff 86.
63 Hershfelt to Employees, June 8, 1971, Local 206 archives, Series III, Box 8, ff 86.
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place and no attempts were made to change it until just before the plant
closed in 1986. The management negotiating team badly miscalculated
how long workers would be willing to hold out over the issue of changes
in the piece work system. They also failed to comprehend the deep
resentment toward management that had built-up on the shop floor.
During the 1965 negotiations management knew, better than the union,
what workers were willing to settle for, but not this time.64
Conclusion: Management and Local 206 Remain at Odds
At the end of the decade and into the 1970s union and management
remained contentious over three main issues: the timing of all set-ups so
that management could establish uniform rates on machine changeovers;
modification of the piece work incentive system to insure greater worker
productivity; and utilization of the newly installed IBM system to bring
order out of the excessive inventory and chaotic work flow in the factory.
Management and the union also disagreed on the proper role for workers
in resolving production-related problems. Management continued to
confront workers with the argument that labor costs had to be lowered for
the plant to be competitive.
Companies in competitor nations like Germany and Japan were
actively seeking ways to improve their productivity by engaging workers
on the shop floor. Toyota Motors and other Japanese corporations no
longer argued about whether to time set-ups; instead they were devising
techniques to alter the way set-ups were done. German companies were
not attempting to organize their factory floors through the introduction of
64 SDN, July 24, 1971, p. 1.
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computers. Instead, they were rearranging machines and developing
entirely new shop-floor layouts to achieve better work flow and eliminate
the need for expensive overhead items like stockrooms and inventory. In
the final analysis the computer system let you know you had a problem: It
did nothing to help you solve it.65
Finally, the 1971 strike over the incentive system demonstrated just
how little workers believed management's pronouncements regarding
labor costs. The union observed the corporate acquisitions, knew the plant
was the recipient of millions of dollars in defense contracts, and was well
aware of how much top executives were compensated. For the company's
central bargaining argument to be effective, there had to be a shared sense
that workers and managers were confronting a common problem, and
together were going to shape solutions to it. As chapters 6 - 8 make clear,
this was not the case.
^ For a example of what competitor firms were doing see Taiichi Ohno, The Toyota
Production System: Beyond Large Scale Production (Tokyo, 1978). "In the Japanese system,"
Ohno writes, "operators acquire a broad spectrum of production skills and participate in
building up a total system in the production plant. In this way, the individual can find
value in working," (p. 14). The purpose here is not to debate Japanese-style management
and its affect on unions and workers or to lightly treat the historical literature on the
subject but to show what competitor countries were in doing on their factory floors to solve
the same problems Bosch was struggling with. By-and-large U.S. companies took the
approach Bosch utilized, mainly an overtly confrontational one, as opposed to the team-
building and problem-solving orientation employed elsewhere.
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CHAPTER 9
SKILL ALONE WAS NEVER ENOUGH
Introduction
In a May, 1994 award ceremony in Springfield the Danaher Tool
Company received a prestigious Partners in Progress award from Sears and
Roebuck Company for being in the top one percent of its 10,000 world wide
suppliers for on-time delivery and quality. The firm's 175 machinists and
operators, represented by the International Union of Electrical Workers,
produce thousands of Craftsman wrench sets a week for Sears in a facility
located in Springfield's North End. The plant is the last one in operation
from a group of factories - including the American Bosch and Van
Norman - that at one time employed over 20,000 workers in the heart of
industrial Springfield.
Block after block of near-by triple decker wood frame apartment
buildings, first home to many of the German, Scottish, Italian, and Irish
immigrant workers who made their way to the city for the well-paying
jobs these factories offered, have been torn down or are in disrepair. In a
part of the neighborhood that formerly housed several bars and
restaurants frequented by workers before and after their factory shifts,
stands a low-rise office building housing the local cable television
company. A state recycling center opened in 1990.
The Bosch Local 206 union hall has fallen into total disrepair. Once
the scene of monthly membership meetings, union education classes, and
strike rallies, the parking lot is now overgrown with weeds and littered
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with broken glass. The main plant was purchased in early 1988 for
$250,000 by a real estate development group which resold it to a second
developer for $1.37 million several months later. The building contains
an All-for-A-Dollar discount store warehouse, and provides storage space
for several trucking companies. The near-by three-story Van Norman
factory houses a small automobile motor repair facility and several light
manufacturing companies. Near-by, the large and growing Puerto Rican
community struggles to survive and find work in the absence of the
thousands of jobs their predecessors found. The poverty rate for children
living in the neighborhood stands at 30 percent, the highest in
Massachusetts. 1
The Decline of Western Massachusetts Metalworking
Economic Restructuring
By spring 1994 the greater-Springfield economy had not rebounded
from the closings of several metalworking companies during the 1980s.
Referring to the sputtering job outlook, economist Paul Harrington noted,
"For the first time, manufacturing is not the industry leading the region
out of recession." In Western Massachusetts unemployment was higher,
real personal income growth slower, and business incorporations lower
than in greater-Boston. The slow turn-around parallels what transpired
after the 1981-1982 recession. Then, too, greater-Springfield lagged behind
the eastern part of the state, as job growth there was fueled by high
technology and defense industry growth. When recovery came it was
1 SMU, October 11, 1988, p. 1.
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based to a great extent on defense prime contractors like United
Technologies Corporation, Raytheon, and General Electric providing
smaller Springfield-area machining firms with lucrative subcontracts.
During the early 1980s these primes had laid off thousands of union
workers, including tool and die makers and experimental machinists.
Now they utilized small non-union firms to get their work done more
cheaply.
John Mullins, a professor of urban planning at the University of
Massachusetts-Amherst describes this trend toward large firms closing and
small firms becoming dependent on contracts from outside the region as
the "colonization of Western Massachusetts." In a 1991 article University
of Massachusetts-Amherst historian Jack Tager depicted the decline as part
of a continuum stemming from the fact that much of Massachusetts
industry growth in the 1970s was highly defense-related and subject to
sharp boom and bust cycles. "It is worthwhile to keep in mind the long-
term factors that constitute the Bay State's economic fabric," Tager argued.
"Federal largesse in the form of defense spending sowed the seeds for the
post-World War II Massachusetts economic miracle." The Bosch history
certainly confirms this perspective. 2
A 1993 study of the Massachusetts economy determined that
manufacturing job loss has been steady since 1982 with whole industries,
1 Christopher Geehern, "Lagging Recovery Reflects Structural Economic Changes,"
Springfield Sunday Republican, June 19, 1994, p. A - 16. Textile mills, once the dominant
industry in near-by Holyoke fled the area much sooner, and the paper mills had fallen on
difficult times as well. On the decline of these labor-intensive mills see William
Hartford, Working People of Holyoke: Class and Ethnicity in a Massachusetts Mill Town,
1850 - I960 (New Brunswick, 1990) esp. ch 8; Jack Tager, "The Massachusetts Miracle,"
Historical journal of Massachusetts, 19 (Summer, 1991) p. 132; Robert Forrant and Elyse
Cann, The Demise of the Massachusetts Defense Connection: Lost Manufacturing jobs,
Shrinking Markets, and the Future (March, 1993).
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including shoes, textiles, furniture, and machine tool building, virtually
disappearing. Across New England 86,000 durable goods manufacturing
jobs were lost between 1984 and 1988. One thousand Massachusetts
manufacturers closed their doors between 1977 and 1992. Remaining
metalworking firms are smaller, dependent on subcontracts from large
companies, and non-union.3
Laree Metal Working Companies: An Endangered Species?
At the Danaher Tool ceremony Springfield Mayor Robert Markle
remarked: "This shows that people in this revered manufacturing center
can do it - they can compete worldwide."4 Is there cause to join with the
mayor in such optimism? Should anyone anticipate a return to a
metalworking 'hay day', complete with a late-20th century version of
Rolls Royce locating on the banks of the Connecticut River?
Nineteenth and twentieth century metalworking growth stemmed
from three related factors: continual innovation in product design and
development stimulated initially by the Springfield Armory; a diverse
nucleus of locally owned machine tool builders whose expertise provided
the region with the benefits of their technological break-throughs first; and
3 Forrant and Cann, The Demise of the Massachusetts Defense Connection, p. 1 - 2. The
study noted that the region's dependence on a few dominant companies in the slow growth
defense and mini-computer industries meant that "the links in the chain that supplied
high skill - high wage work to small manufacturing firms have been weakened and in some
cases broken," p. 3.
4 The award article appeared in the Springfield Union, May 2, 1994. The working
agreement between IUE Local 228 and plant management is similar to the labor-
management production committee that flourished in many Springfield metal working
plants during and immediately after World War II. See chapter 4 for a discussion of the
Westinghouse committee. Bosch Local 206 was certainly calling for the formation of
problem-solving committees through the 1960s and early 1970s although the union never
suggested the elimination of classifications and vigorously resisted any changes in the
incentive system.
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a base of skilled workers, many of them German, Scottish, and British
immigrants, capable of performing the precision machining required to
turn out world-class products. Historian David Hounshell determined
that the region's strength was embodied in the rich problem-solving
capabilities shared by firms and their workers. When Springfield earned
its nickname - the Industrial Beehive - it was a diversified manufacturing
center with over 300 firms and thousands of skilled workers producing a
variety of products. This was no longer the case. After a slow, steady
decline from 1970 - 1980, in a five year period during the mid-1980s
eighteen metalworking firms closed or permanently laid-off thousands of
workers (Table 9.1, p. 273).
Springfield Closings
:
Ownership Changes and
Finance Capital in Control
Wieo Prestolite. Wico was founded in Brooklyn in 1897 by Thomas
Witherbee, the inventor of the portable storage battery. The firm moved
to Springfield in 1904 and moved across the Connecticut River to West
Springfield in 1925. It was bought and sold three times between 1956 and
1967 before becoming part of the Prestolite division of the Toledo, Ohio-
based Eltra Corporation. In 1974 the plant employed 530 workers, 10
percent of West Springfield's industrial workforce, producing electrical
and electronic components for small engine ignition systems and power
controls. Layoffs starting in 1980 cut the workforce in half and in late 1981
management announced the plant was closing, with all remaining work
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shifted to "support a marginally profitable operation in the Sunbelt that i
located in a modern building with more modern equipment."5
Van Norman. Charles E. and Fred. D. Van Norman, brothers from
Hamilton, Ontario, founded the Waltham Watch Tool Company in
Watertown, Massachusetts, in 1888. Two years later they moved their
business to Springfield and incorporated as the Van Norman Machine
Tool Company. The firm's engineering department helped it develop a
variety of innovative machine tools and attachments that resulted in
rapid growth in the 1920s and 1930s producing machine tools for the
automobile industry.
This success caught the attention of New York industrialist Herbert
Segal in the early 1950s. At the time Segal wanted to acquire Van Norman
and establish it as the nucleus of what he hoped would become the
'General Motors of the machine tool industry'. Through the purchase of
35 percent of Van Norman shares, Segal was able to acquire sufficient
power to force several directors off the company board, including
surviving co-founder Fred Van Norman. Corporate headquarters shifted
to New York City, and Segal began acquiring several smaller machine tool
companies. However, the recession of the late 1950s and continued
lackluster sales in the early 1960s led to a merger with the Universal
American Corporation in 1962 and a second merger in 1967 into the Gulf
and Western Corporation. Over this period Springfield employment fell
to 300 from 1,100 in 1958. Finally in 1979 Gulf and Western sold Van
Norman to Winona Tool Manufacturing of Winona, Minnesota. For a
5 Forrant, Metalworking Plant Closings, and Major Layoffs in Hampden County, 1967 - 1986
(Springfield, 1987).
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time, Winona did some work in Springfield, but it acquired the company
primarily to utilize Van Norman's reputation as a premier machine tool
builder. The plant was closed in 1983 and Winona began attaching the
Van Norman nameplate to imported Italian machines. 6
Chapman Valve. Chapman Valve was founded in the 1870s and
quickly became one of the leading producers of custom-made valves for
large construction projects in the world. By World War II the company
was one of only two U.S. firms building precision valves for submarines.
It employed 3,600 in its foundry, pattern, mold making, and machine
shops. When Chapman's chief executive died suddenly in 1958 a power
struggle ensued, and after two years of behind the scenes machinations
Chapman became part of the world-wide conglomerate Crane
Corporation.
Crane owned a non-union valve plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee
and almost immediately shifted work out of the unionized Chapman to it.
At the time of the acquisition Chapman had 2,700 employees, but layoffs,
including the closing of the foundry, resulted in there being just 200
workers in the facility mainly doing repair work on valves when it closed
in 1986. The Springfield plant had earned the corporation's ire in 1982
6 Forrant, Metalworking Plant Closings. Van Norman's demise is similar to that of
another U.S. machine tool builder, Burgmaster, richly described in Max Holland's When
the Machine Stopped: A Cautionary Tale from Industrial America (Cambridge, 1989).
Holland writes that in the 1960s, because of their profits and seeming hold over the
market, U.S. tool builders became enticing targets for conglomerates. He estimates that
two-thirds of the industry was affected. The end result of this process was that "A distant
managerial capitalism replaced entrepreneurial capitalism... ." (p. 266).
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when it became the conglomerate's only union plant not to negotiate
wage and benefit givebacks. 7
Which Plants Were T.ikelv to CIosp? While the plant closing list in
Table 9.1 is not exhaustive, trends are discernible which indicate the
Table 9.1: Permanent layoffs and closings of Springfield-area
metalworking companies in the mid-1980s.
Gorrpary Status #Jcts Qosuedate O'ship Yrs-indty. Peakerrp
eliminated
since 1960
Am Bach dosed 1,000 2/86 N;Pb 80 1,800
ChaprranValve do6ed 250 6/86 N;Pb 100+ 2700
Sp'fldFandiy dosed 75 4/86 l^Pr 100+
PortageCasting doeed 60 8/86 N;Pr 36 100
VanValkenberg dcsed 40 7/86 N;Pr 100+ 135
WicoPrestdite dosed 250 3/82 N;Pb 80 675
RaffeitySteel dosed 50 11/85 N;F 40
VanNorman dosed 275 10/83 N;Pb 90 1,200
PlainvilleCast dosed 65 4/87 N;Pr 65 75
Oxford Precision dosed 60 9/86 N;Pb 40 120
EascoHandTod downsized 2000 1980s N;Pb 75 2200
CdurbiaBicyde dosed 250 6./8S N;Pb 80+ 800
Package Mach. dosed 400 9/88 l£b 100+ 950
AtlasGopcD downsized 565 1980s N;F 70+ 800
KidderStacy dosed 90 9/89 N;Fb 100+ 250
RexnordCbelt dosed 200 6/89 N;Pb 100+ 575
NortheastWire dosed 35 1990 N;Pr 22 110
StcrmDropRirgp layoffs 125 1980s Npr 60+ 250
1979
Yes
(1959)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
(1968)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Notes: On ownership: L - local; N - non-local; Pr - private; Pb - public; F - foreign. Buy-
Out since 1979: Plant changed ownership prior to closing. With the exception of Plainville
Casting, Rafferty Brown, and Oxford Precision all plants were unionized.
difficult position unions were in the 1970s and 1980s. With just two
exceptions, none of the closed plants were locally owned, though all plants
7 Forrant, Metalworking Plant Closings. By the late 1970s Crane was getting large valves
cast in overseas foundries at a fraction of the Springfield cost, using patterns designed and
built in the Springfield pattern shop by highly skilled machinists and designers.
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on the list had been at one time. Most had undergone an ownership
change just a few years prior to their closing. In addition, outside owners
shifted work out of Western Massachusetts: The closings were never just a
case of lack of work. Capital control was an important factor here. Finally,
in most cases the closed plants were the oldest in the corporation they had
become part of. They were, thus, no match for modern, better capitalized
facilities.8 The cumulative affect of these closings created a breach in the
historical continuity of the Connecticut River Valley as a world leader in
precision metalworking that appears irreparable. The loss of the creative
and dynamic aspects of the metalworking manufacturing base is now all
but complete.9
The Bosch Closes
Shortly after the lengthy 1971 strike AMBAC put the entire diesel
division up for sale so that it could concentrate on more profitable parts of
the business. In 1978, Hartford, Connecticut-based aerospace and defense
giant United Technologies Corporation (UTC) purchased it. UTC owned
Pratt and Whitney Aircraft, Sikorsky Aircraft, and Hamilton Standard
° Forrant, Metalworking Plant Closings. For a detailed discussion of a series of shut-downs
in another community with a rich manufacturing tradition see John Cumbler, A Social
History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics and Work in Trenton (New Brunswick:
1989).
9 See Robert Forrant, Elyse Cann, Kathleen McGraw, Industrial District or Industrial
Decline? A Survey of Western Massachusetts Metalworking (Springfield, 1991). There are
currently less than 25 unionized metalworking firms in the region, each much smaller than
it was in the 1950s. Each has engaged in concession bargaining and made numerous changes
in such things as their incentive system, and seniority and classification language, areas
that produced the greatest conflicts in the Bosch. There are now various efforts underway
to work with the remaining small firms to help them find markets to replace the loss of
defense work. There are also several programs to improve training to preserve the
dwindling skill base. It should be noted that the average age of a skilled machinist in
Western Massachusetts is now 55.
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Technologies, all heavily defense-dependent. In 1978 UTC also acquired
Carrier Air Conditioner and Otis Elevator as part of a reorganization
designed to decrease their reliance on defense and aerospace. UTC had a
reputation for being anti-union, and had fought the establishment of
union shops in its many Connecticut plants for years. Problems in
Springfield now intensified. 10
New Standards Plan
Between 1978 and 1981 41 percent of the Springfield workforce was
laid off. UTC forced the union to arbitration on several issues in an effort
to weaken long-standing seniority, job bidding, and job classification
language. Finally, in May, 1981, ten years after the former owners failed in
their attempt to change the incentive system, UTC gave the local an
ultimatum. The entire piece work incentive system had to be scrapped at
once and a new one installed. If changes were made a $20- $30 million
modernization program would be instituted. If changes were rejected no
further investments would be made in Springfield.
A corporate memo mailed to each worker's home read in part:
"We are mindful of our obligations to the many loyal and hard-working
employees still a part of the company whose past and present
contributions cannot be minimized. They deserve a work climate
conducive to improved efficiency and output in order to preserve their job
security." Reluctantly, the union negotiating committee agreed to discuss
10 SMU, October 10, 1980, p. 52.
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a new incentive system at the direction of the membership even though
the they were in the middle of a three-year labor agreement. 11
As negotiations on management's New Standards Plan (NSP)
commenced, a second letter was sent. Vice-President Henry Fuller
reminded unionists that cost competitiveness and product quality were
critical determining factors in any effort to remain viable in the face of
aggressive Japanese, German, and British competitors. "The competitive
position of the Springfield facility has deteriorated in recent years," he
wrote.
Productivity has declined while our operating costs have
skyrocketed. Some of our machines and processes have
become outdated. Our options are clear. We must
modernize our Springfield facilities, introduce advanced
machining concepts and develop new processes and systems.
Or, we must develop another modern manufacturing facility
in addition to the South Carolina plant. Either option will
require a major investment on the part of the Company. The
main obstacle we face in modernizing Springfield is the
deteriorated piecework system... . In order to be competitive,
we must restructure our incentive system in addition to
modernizing the facility. 12
Fuller concluded by warning that investments would be made elsewhere
"unless we can secure an agreement by the union to cooperate by
modifying the wage incentive system." 13
11 Henry Fuller memo, May , 1981.
12 Henry Fuller memo, June 9, 1981.
13 Henry Fuller memo, June 9, 1981.
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While negotiations dragged on UTC rushed to complete a new
pump manufacturing facility in Columbia, South Carolina. The 322,000
square foot state-of-the-art plant was designed to produce every remaining
Springfield product line. However, the union was repeatedly assured that
there was sufficient work for both facilities. "This is only an expansion of
Bosch's activities and is not intended to replace it," a company press
release informed. 14
Several stewards and officers actively opposed the NSP, claiming it
was a management effort to study and reengineer jobs in preparation for
shifting all work to South Carolina and abroad. They argued that the
union had signed a three-year contract in April, 1980, and that efforts to
revise the incentive system should only be undertaken during
negotiations. Then the local would have an opportunity to make its own
demands for such things as plant closing language and limitations on
subcontracting. Importantly, they contended, only then could the rank
and file have vote to strike if they were dissatisfied with the proposal.
The negotiating committee remained divided throughout the five
months of talks and made no recommendation to the membership. All
they agreed on was that the rank and file had a right to vote for or against
the plan. In an October, 1981 secret ballot workers voted 531-453 to accept
the NSP. Just a month later a new business agent and slate of officers
openly opposed to the plan were elected. They pledged to fight to save the
plant they now believed United Technologies had already decided to
close. 1 5 Less than a year after the affirmative vote, these officers were
14 United Technologies Corporation press release, March, 1980.
15 Leaflets and campaign fliers in Local 206 holdings, UMass, Amherst Archives and
Manuscripts. The Springfield Union hailed the vote as proof-positive that American
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leading protests against a two-week shutdown of the plant caused by a lack
of work. A union press release read in part:
No more crawling - no more concessions. We are opposed to
this company shipping out work to other plants in this
country and overseas. And we are opposed to the politicans -
who come to the plant gates looking for votes, but are
nowhere to be found when their help is needed to pass plant
closing legislation. 16
Between 1980 and 1983 there was a sharp drop in demand for heavy
duty trucks and major customers cut their orders sharply. With the
additional production space in South Carolina, the division had excess
manufacturing capacity and a decision was made to shift several product
lines to South Carolina and Europe. Management decided, as well, to
limit production in Springfield to military contracts. The planned
modernization and diversification of production did not occur.
Subcontracting to local shops increased. Between 1982 and 1984 close to
400 workers were laid off, and at the end of 1984 the company informed
the union that an additional 100 to 150 workers would lose their jobs
during the first half of 1985 as part of its 'redirection program'. 17 From a
single German-built plant in 1911, Bosch had grown to be the leading plant
in the ARMA Corporation, eventually became part of the most profitable
division in world-wide AMBAC Industries, and now was a small and
Bosch was in Springfield to stay and quoted company spokesperson Frank Guisti who stated
"investments will now be made" (SMU, October 23, 1981).
16 SDN, September 4, 1982, p. 3.
17 Judith Leff, "United Technologies and the Closing of American Bosch," Harvard
Business School Case Study 386-174 (May, 1986) p. 3.
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aging plant owned by a Fortune 100 corporation that employed 205,000
workers world-wide.
In-plant Conflicts Hscalatp
Union-company conflict escalated. On average 15 grievances were
heard a week at the second step of the grievance procedure in a plant of
approximately 750. There was always a backlog of 50 - 75 cases to be heard.
The company tried to weaken seniority by denying workers with high
seniority jobs they successfully bid on. Put on the defensive by UTC, the
union won every arbitration case on the issue, but at great financial
expense. UTC was also determined to limit union rights on the factory
floor. During 1983 negotiations they sought, but failed, to limit the
number of workers who could attend a group or department grievance
hearing, tried to end the company practice of paying for worker and
steward lost time during grievance hearings, and attempted to limit the
time a steward could spend a week engaged in union activity. 18
Between 1984 and 1986 UTC moved product lines to the diesel
division's Italian and Dutch facilities. Joint ventures were entered into
with Toshiba Corporation of Japan, Renault of France, Westland PLC of
18 Local 206 Grievance files, UMass-Amherst Labor Archives, Series II. For a discussion of
the escalation of grievances at General Motors after 1960 see Nelson Lichtenstein,
"Reutherism on the Shop Floor: Union Strategy and Shop-Floor Conflict in the USA 1946 -
1970," in Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., Between Fordism and Flexibility:
The Automobile Industry and Its Workers (New York, 1992) p. 134 - 138. Lichtenstein
contends that the rise in grievances was a consequence, at least in part, of workers' concerns
for such in-plant issues as speed-up, automation, health and safety, and production
standards. Wildcat strikes, for example, dramatically increased at Crysler and GM in the
late 1960s in response to what GM Department Director Leonard Woodcock called the
industry's gold-plated sweatshops. Nationally publicized strikes at GM's Lordstown and
Norwood assembly plants in the early 1970s centered on similar issues related to how
production was done on the shop floor.
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England, and Fiat of Italy. Start-up companies were built in Spain,
Portugal, and Taiwan. UTC President Robert Daniell commented that
"Our markets are increasingly global. And over the next five years
international sales are likely to grow faster than domestic sales."
According to Business Week the key motivation was the fact that "UTC
earns a higher profit on foreign sales than on domestic sales." 19
The Case of the Laid Off Inspectors: Resisting
Management One Last Time
In the summer and fall of 1985 the two sides engaged in one final
group grievance that rivaled the 1970s fight over the timing of set-ups and
most likely hastened the corporation's decision to close the factory. The
incident began when Personnel Manager Michael Patulak laid off 33
inspectors in the plant and on the same day sought to fill the positions
with new inspectors at lower pay grades. The union first sought
injunctive relief through the federal courts to block the move, but failed.
The local argued that because of the complex layoff system close to 100
workers could be affected and that these personnel moves would cause
undue financial hardships to all affected workers, particularly those who
would be permanently laid off.
During the fall arbitration case the union contended that layoffs
were only to be made when there was a demonstrated lack of work: Since
in this situation the company hired an identical number of inspectors,
albeit at lower rates of pay, there was no such lack of work. Union officials
19 United Technologies Corporation Annual Report, April, 1985; "UTC Adds Westland to
Its Growing Foreign Arsenal," Business Week, February 24, 1985, p. 88 - 89.
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charged this was an attempt to slash wages and weaken the seniority
provisions of the contract. UTC lawyers countered that the lower
inspector's classifications were in the contract to be utilized, and that
management had the absolute right to staff the plant as it saw fit for the
good of their business. The union's viewpoint was upheld, with the
arbitrator dismissing the company's maneuvers as an attempt to
circumvent clear contract language. The company was ordered to pay all
lost wages, close to $125,000, and reinstate all workers to the jobs they held
prior to the layoffs.20
February 1986: The Closing Is Officially Announced
The victory proved to be hollow for on February 4, 1986, at the start
of scheduled contract negotiations, in a terse twenty line memo UTC
informed the negotiating committee of there decision to close the plant.
Vice President of Operations Jon Adamson told negotiators that:
We are unable to continue operating four facilities with this
continuing over-capacity situation. I, therefore, regret to
inform you that a very difficult business decision has been
made to close the Springfield manufacturing operation by the
end of August of this year. The military products will be
moved to Columbia, South Carolina; injectors to Brescia,
Italy; and industrial products to Fluid Power of the
Components Division. 21
20 SDN, August 22, 1985, p. 8. The federal judge ordered that the union exhaust its
grievance and arbitration rights first. National Labor Relations Board charges were also
filed and the Board essentially mimicked the court and told the local to arbitrate the case.
The company's financial liability totaled close to $100,000 and over 150 workers were
affected in some way through the lay-offs and subsequent shuffling of personnel.
21 Jon Adamson to all employees, Plant Closing Memorandum, February 4, 1986.
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Three weeks later In an Interview with a local newspaper, UTC
spokesperson Alan Muncaster stated, "We have to do something or we're
not a viable company anymore. We're stuck with manufacturing space
and nothing to nil it and no hope of filling It." The Columbia, South
Carolina plant represented a $110 million investment lor UTC and the 900
who would lose their johs in Springfield were 0.5 percent ol the
corporation's world-wide payroll. All alone, Local 206 was no match for
this.22
Springfield Mayor Richard Meal said: "I feel betrayed, because the
city ot Springfield, In good faith, held a series oi meetings, thai began eighl
to ten months ago, in which we offered all kinds oi assistance. And i
never knew until today what was going to happen. Each step ol the way
we were told not to worry, that they wore not going to c lose. .. To tell me
at 2:00 p.m. that the eventual phase out was Imminent does not, to my
mind, demonstrate high regard hy that corporation lor this community."
Stale Sec retary ol I ahor Paul Eustace called the corporation's previous
assurances that they would remain in the city "hold laced lies". Sixty-one
year old i >onald Staples, a 36-year veteran in the Bosch, summed it up best
lor workers when he remarked, "It's not like they pulled the rug out horn
under us. It's more like they pulled the trap door out horn under the
hangman's noose. "23
The announcement confirmed predictions union leaders made
months before. Alter watching 300 workers lose their johs in the spring ot
L985 the union issued a scathing memorandum to c ity, stale, and federal
Officials. "II all that were Involved here was the loss ol 300 or more well
22 Holyoke Transcript Teltgram, March L, 1986, p. i
23SMU February 5, p, I; February 7, L986, p, I,
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paid jobs, there would be enough cause for very serious concern/* they
wrote.
But these job losses are only the beginning. A clear pattern of
mismanagement and disinvestment on the part of United
Technologies, the parent corporation of American Bosch,
point toward a phase-out of all operations at American
Bosch's Springfield plant. Repeated management assurances
that American Bosch and UTC have a strong commitment to
continuing operations are contradicted by management
actions.... All of this occurs while the markets for AB's
traditional product lines are booming. Other firms are
becoming more cost competitive and investing heavily.
Meanwhile we see UTC milking this plant for whatever
remains here to be taken in profit and moving all its jobs, all
its commercial product lines and much of its machinery
elsewhere.
The local's memorandum added that management turnover was
close to 100 percent since 1981 and that ten top production managers had
been fired or resigned since November, 1984. It concluded with the
somber warning: "The union has cooperated fully in trying to stem
absenteeism, in trying to increase production. We've shown results. Such
cooperation has been repaid with layoffs and the promise of more layoffs.
We see clearly the impending closing of this plant."24
The company response to the memorandum came from Alan
Muncaster, vice president for communications.
We want to maintain all four of our plants, including the
two in Europe, but we have to redirect a number of product
lines to better utilize our manufacturing capacity. Nothing
24 Local 206, UTC Disinvestment Points Toward American Bosch Closing, Summer, 1985.
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has changed since we announced those SO layoffs. We've
done exactly what we said we'd do. There are no plans to
shul the plan! down." 1
|usl seven months later the closing was announced. Between
February and October, im a total oi 1,200 people were terminated,
Including all engineering and office personnel. Machine tools were
moved to other H IV facilities or sold to local machine shops. All
remaining diesel truck work was relocated to South C arolina, and the
building was locked up tight. 26
How Did Danahcr Do It ?
Mow, then, did Danaher manage to survive? C ould other North
r.nd plants have made the kind of recovery? Is the story instructive or
unique? Originally Moore Drop Gorging Company, and then Kasco I land
Tool in the 1970s and l^SOs, the facility employed close to 4,000 workers
engaged in the production ol a variety ol hand tools during World War II
Incorporated in the city in 1**00, the complex had its own foundry, forge
shop, heat treating furnaces, tool and die shop, and several departments ol
production machinery. The drop forging department was utilized
extensively by Rolls Royee in tin* l l>20s. However, a lack ol investment in
the l%()s and intense foreign competition from Pacific Run companies lor
2'
l [olyoke Iranscripi Tclcxnwi, |wne ?7, i l,s r\ |> io
26 The financial costs ol the closing were staggering ( >ver two /ears the 1,000 lost jobs
resulted In $31 I million In lost Income to the area, the additional expenditure ol $9 I
million in unemployment insurance, welfare, ami other benefits, and $H 0 million lost In
federal ami state taxes (Forrant, Metolworkinn Vhmt Closing ml Mfl/oi Layoffs t (uly,
L987, p, L3)
low and mid-priced wrenches and socket sets resulted in the firm
permanently laying off thousands of workers through the 1980s. The
company remained open because its biggest customer, Sears, had a
commitment to purchasing its top of the line Craftsman wrenches from
U.S. producers.27
Now part of the world-wide Danaher Corporation, employment has
grown slowly over the past two years and stands at 300. Close to $9
million has been spent on plant modernization and several product lines
are now manufactured using the fastest computer controlled machine tool
technology available. The plant is in direct competition with an Arkansas
non-union facility to maintain the work it has. In order to stay price
competitive and maintain a wage scale roughly 20 percent higher than the
southern factory the union and company negotiated a labor agreement
that eliminated labor grades and job classifications. A management
commitment was made to cross-train all workers to perform multiple
jobs. Teams comprised of machine operators, engineers, and managers
convene weekly to tackle production and quality problems. Each team
member has undergone several hours of training to insure a high level of
participation from every worker.
The contract guarantees workers will share in productivity gains
through quarterly bonuses. Union officials have access to all production
records and profit and loss statements and participate in meetings to
determine bonuses. There are also assurances that workers will not lose
employment as a consequence of productivity improvements. Instead,
they will be shifted to other occupations, with earnings protected during a
27 Information on Danaher based on interviews with plant manager Bruce Graham.
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training period for the new job. Finally, the piece work system was
eliminated in favor of hourly pay rates based on the levels of cross-
training workers have mastered. 28
The Production Conundrum and
Post-World War II Labor History
It is now possible to turn again to David Brody's search for common
threads capable of pulling American labor history together. In his 1978
paper before the Organization of American Historians, it will be recalled,
he put forward the notion that an economic approach that centered on
work and jobs and broadened out from there could possibly provide a
useful framework for understanding particularly post-World War II labor
history. 29 Certainly the history of the Bosch and its workers can be
understood utilizing this approach. It is also possible to generalize from
this history to understand a good deal about what happened to thousands
of metalworkers in the Connecticut River Valley.
The ways in which the union attempted to interject itself on the
factory floor to secure a role in improving the plant are brought to light, as
is the cogent analysis the rank and file and union officers provided on the
shortcomings of management. A work-centered history tells the story in
28 The award article appeared in the Springfield Union, May 2, 1994. The working
agreement between IUE Local 228 and plant management is similar to the labor-
management production committee that flourished in many Springfield metal working
plants during and immediately after World War II. See chapter 4 for a discussion of the
Westinghouse committee. Bosch Local 206 was certainly calling for the formation of
problem-solving committees through the 1960s and early 1970s although the union never
suggested the elimination of classifications and vigorously resisted any changes in the
incentive system.
29 David Brody, "Labor History in the 1970s: Toward a History of the American Worker,"
in Michael Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the
United States (Ithaca, 1980) p. 268.
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a way that an institutional approach could not. Workers realized that the
plant's problems were not going to be resolved with the acquisition of an
IBM computer to track work, or a handful of automatic machine tools.
Management persevered, however, disregarded union efforts to develop
joint strategies to solve shop-floor problems, and in the end compiled
computer print-outs informing them of their problems, and little else.
The union did, in fact, articulate strategies to get at the causes of
many in-plant problems. For example, unionists called for the
establishment of a consistent approach to the repair of machine tools to
prevent costly break-downs during production runs. Such disruptions
played havoc with delivery schedules and alienated customers counting
on deliveries to keep their own plants running. Union leaders never
shied from urging workers to produce quality products, and several times
issued detailed statements on how to improve quality. It is ironic to note
that the union's 1960s perspective on several of these issues closely
approximates underlying management principles guiding world-class
manufacturers today. But in the face of an intransigent management and
their drive for bureaucratic control, and aggressive international
expansion, the local's single plant production strategy, no matter how well
conceived, could never prevail. Danaher survived because as it
downsized a decision was never made to close. Local management was
able to persuade union leaders to agree to the various changes needed to
gain greater flexibility on the shop floor. They were also able to introduce
factory problem-solving teams and assure a measure of job security, with
the realization that many of their international competitors relied
extensively on the same approach. Bosch workers sought little more than
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this through the 1950s and 1960s when they argued lor the return of the
joint production committee C harles IVrclle had disbanded.
Martin Kenney and Richard Florida in their study of Japanese
transplant companies in the U.S state that "Perhaps the key element of the
Japanese industrial system lies in its ability to harness workers' knowledge
as a source of value directly at the point of production."3" According to
business historian William l.a/onick the Japanese were putting ideas in
practice originated in the United States through the work of management
and quality experts like F.dward Deming and J.M. Juran. However, U.S.
managers' drive for shop-floor control did not provide a receptive
environment for these concepts to take root. While skilled workers, like
those at the Bosch, represented a threat to U.S. managers, in Japan and
elsewhere they were mainly viewed in I.a/.onick's words as "a source of
enhanced value creation."31
Japanese and (lerman firms gained organizational advantages over
U.S. firms because workers played an integral role in designing quality
control and shop-floor production systems. By comparison, in the Bosch
the company and union fought over whether or not rates included
sufficient time to check work, and how many floor inspectors were needed
to cover the plant. These were the wrong arguments to be having. U.S.
30 Martin Kenney rind Richard Florida, Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and
its Transfer to the U.S. (New York, L993) p. 39.
31 For examples of this see Ira Magaziner and Mark Patinkin, the Silent War: Inside the
Global Business Buttles Shaping America's future ( New York, 1989) esp. ch. 4 on West
Germany; Michael best, The New Competition: Institutions of Industrial Restructuring
(Cambridge; L990) esp. ch, 7 on die Third Italy; Michael Cusumano, The \apanese
Automobile Industry: Technology and Management at Nissan and Toyota (Cambridge/
L989); Michael Dertouzos, Made in America: Renaming the Productive f.d^e (Cambridge,
1989); William Lazonick, Competitive Advantage on Hie Shop floor (Cambridge, I WO)
esp. chs. 9 - 10.
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management, Lazonick points out, "was not about to grant workers skills
and authority that they might use to exercise control over the flow of
work." But since Bosch unionists were not allowed a positive role they
used the various means at their disposal, including the grievance and
arbitration procedure, articles in their newspaper, strikes, and both
individual and well-organized shop-floor resistance to blunt attempts to
cut piece rates, change the incentive system, alter inspection techniques,
and change job descriptions, and the flow of work was negatively
affected.32
Whether or not shop-floor participation programs lead to speed-up
and ever more repressive shop floor regimes, as some critics contend, the
fact remains that current management rhetoric aimed at inclusion and
worker input resonates with workers and can not be ignored by trade
unions. 33 Bosch workers thirsted for it and were resisted. Now, ironically,
it is management that wants to introduce these changes, as the Danaher
story bears out. Finally, the Bosch story supports an observation made by
historian Philip Scranton that "top-down attempts to by-pass workers'
knowledgeability by creating 'smart' machines create as many problems as
achievements." In fact, the continuous improvement of U.S.
32 William Lazonick, Competitive Advantage on the Shop Floor , p. 290 - 292.
33 For recent discussions on this see Mike Parker, "Industrial Relations Myth and Shop
Floor Reality: The Team Concept in the Auto Industry," in Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell
John Harris, Industrial Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise (New York, 1993) p.
249 - 274; Koichi Shimokawa, "Product and Labour Strategies in Japan," and Ulrich Jurgens,
Knuth Dohse and Thomas Malsch, "New Production Strategies in West German Car
Plants," in Stephen Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin, Between Fordism and Flexibility (New
York, 1992); Tom Rankin, New Forms of Work Organization: The Challenge for North
American Unions (Toronto, 1990); Lowell Turner, Democracy at Work: Changing World
Markets and the Future of Labor Unions (Ithaca, 1991); Christian Berggren, Alternatives to
Lean Production: Work Organization in the Swedish Auto Industry (Ithaca, 1992.
289
manufacturing firms is only possible when well thought out shop-floor
strategies are conceived that have workers and their skills as the
centerpiece. Short of this, histories of decline, like the one told here, will
sadly remain the rule, with the Danaher story the exception.34
34 Philip Scranton, "The Workplace, Technology, and Theory in American Labor History,"
International Labour and Working-Class History, 35 (Spring, 1989) p. 10.
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The largest collection of papers on the history of the United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers Union is located at the University
of Pittsburgh Library. There are hundreds of documents on the history of
the union in New England, with several documents detailing organizing
efforts in the Connecticut River Valley.
For Springfield, the Pioneer Valley Historical Society's library
contains well-indexed business history files on many of the city's largest
companies and newspaper holdings dating back to the Civil War that are
also well-indexed by firm. City Directories date back to approximately 1830
and are very useful in determining such things as worker occupations and
numbers of firms in the city. Various state and federal census documents
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are also in the library and are an important source in understanding the
workforce structure.
For Bosch and Local 206 the single best source is the extensive
holdings at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. The union
donated all of its records to the library in the Summer of 1986 when the
plant closed. There are thousands of well-organized files with an excellent
index covering the history of the local from 1942 forward. The papers are
organized in five broad categories, administration, correspondence,
company-union relations, publications, and membership. Included in the
holdings are individual grievance and arbitration files, membership and
dues check-off lists, correspondence with various local and national
unions, an almost complete set of union newspapers dating from 1951 to
1970, minutes of various union meetings, and several contracts.
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